In re Marriage of Cauley

• Decision Date: 24 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. H028589.,H028589.
• Citation: In re Marriage of Cauley, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 902, 138 Cal.App.4th 1100 (Cal. App. 2006)
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Gerald and Eileen CAULEY. Gerald W. Cauley, Respondent, v. Eileen J. Cauley, Appellant.

41 Cal.Rptr.3d 902

138 Cal.App.4th 1100

In re the MARRIAGE OF Gerald and Eileen CAULEY Gerald W. Cauley, Respondent, v. Eileen J. Cauley, Appellant.

No. H028589.

Court of Appeal, Sixth District.

April 24, 2006.

Robin Yeamans, Attorney for Appellant Eileen J. Cauley.

Tammara S. Bloom, Attorney for Respondent Gerald W. Cauley.

MIHARA, J.

Under Family Code section 4325, there is a rebuttable presumption that an award of spousal support not be made to a spouse who has been convicted of intraspousal domestic violence¹. Appellant Eileen J. Cauley has been convicted of domestic violence against respondent Gerald W. Cauley. The parties' settlement agreement provided that spousal support was not subject to modification or termination. The trial court found that the presumption of section 4325 applied here and had not been rebutted. It then granted respondent's motion to terminate spousal support to appellant. We find no merit to appellant's contentions and affirm.

I. Statement of Facts

On November 25, 2002, respondent filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. The parties had been married for 18 years. In March 2003, respondent requested a temporary restraining order. His declaration stated that appellant had threatened his life in numerous telephone messages and calls and had physically attacked him several times during the prior year. The court issued the temporary restraining order, which was due to expire in July 2003.

On June 25, 2003, the parties signed a stipulation for judgment. It provided in relevant part: "Husband shall pay Wife for her support and maintenance $5,250.00 per month, payable via direct deposit on the 10th day of each calendar month commencing immediately after the effective date of this Agreement. These spousal support payments shall continue until Wife's remarriage or the death of either Husband or Wife, whichever occurs first, or until further order of the court. These payments shall be non-modifiable with the following exceptions which may form the basis for a modification of the above amount: 1) Wife's cohabitation with a partner; 2) Husband's loss of income either due to disability, or job loss." The trial court retained jurisdiction as to spousal support until March 31, 2010. Respondent also agreed to take his request for a restraining order off calendar with prejudice.²

On August 6, 2003, appellant flew to Florida where respondent was living with his girlfriend and her son. During the next couple of days, appellant removed items from the exterior of respondent's house, sprayed herbicide in the garden, ripped out plants, killed his fish, stole personal property, and threw numerous items in the bay behind the house. At some point during appellant's crime spree, respondent opened his door, and she sprayed herbicide in his face. When his girlfriend arrived, appellant sprayed her as well. Appellant was eventually arrested for domestic battery.

On August 12, 2003, respondent obtained a temporary restraining order in Florida. On September 10, 2003, appellant did not appear at the hearing, and the trial court made the restraining order effective for one year. It ordered appellant to have no contact with respondent.

On August 15, 2003, appellant sent respondent's attorney a letter in which she threatened to accuse respondent of rape if he did not have the domestic battery charges dropped. A few days later, appellant contacted the police department and reported that respondent had raped her.

Appellant also repeatedly violated the restraining order. She sent written and electronic correspondence to respondent. She made telephone calls, and left messages on his voicemail. Appellant threatened respondent, his wife, members of their families, and his employer. Between September 2003 and March 2004, appellant made more than 1,000 calls, and left nearly 500 messages, which totaled almost 70 hours of recordings. Though respondent changed his home telephone to an unlisted number, appellant was able to obtain his new cell phone number within a few weeks, and the calls continued. In February 2004, appellant threatened the president of the company that employed respondent. On March 22, 2004, appellant left over 52 messages on respondent's voice mail.

Since appellant had left Florida, the prosecutor was seeking her extradition from California for violations of the restraining order. In the meantime, on March 30, 2004, respondent requested a restraining order in California so that California authorities could prosecute her if she continued to harass him. On the same date, respondent filed a motion for modification and termination of spousal support based on appellant's acts of domestic violence.

In the spring of 2004, Florida issued a warrant for appellant's arrest on the charge of felony aggravated stalking and a $1,000,000 bond was set. On April 16, 2004, appellant was arrested in San Jose and eventually extradited to Florida. On May 17, 2004, she pleaded guilty to felony aggravated stalking and was placed on five years probation. Appellant's conditions of probation required her to attend anger management training, receive alcoholic/psychiatric treatment, and not contact the victims.

Meanwhile, on April 26, 2004, the court in California ordered a temporary cessation in spousal support under section 4325, and set the case for a review hearing on October 18, 2004.³ The court also granted respondent's request for a restraining order. Appellant was ordered to have no contact with respondent, his wife, and her son for three years.

On May 17, 2004, appellant was released from custody in Florida. Less than two weeks later, appellant again began making telephone calls in which she threatened to harm respondent and his coworkers. She made over 91 calls between May 28 and October 11, 2004. Though the trial court had set spousal support temporarily at $0, appellant repeatedly threatened respondent if he did not pay her. Based on this conduct, Florida again charged appellant with felony aggravated stalking as well as violation of the conditions of her probation.

On October 13, 2004, the review hearing on the spousal support order was held. Appellant did not attend. The trial court then set a hearing for appellant to present evidence to rebut the presumption that she was not entitled to spousal support. Counsel agreed to provide declarations and to use the hearing for cross-examination and argument. Later that same afternoon, appellant was arrested on the Florida charges.

Prior to the hearing on December 15, 2004, respondent submitted two declarations. Though appellant did not submit a declaration, her counsel made an offer of proof on her behalf at the hearing. He stated that there was a nonmodifiable settlement agreement that provided for spousal support, that appellant was a convicted felon who was an alcoholic with no job and no training, and that appellant made the telephone calls to find out when she would receive her support payments. Respondent's counsel argued that respondent and his family had lived through "two years of sheer hell," that appellant had been in numerous alcohol treatment programs, and that appellant had violated court orders in both Florida and California.

II. Discussion

A. Termination of Spousal Support

Section 4325, subdivision (a) states: "In any proceeding for dissolution of marriage where there is a criminal conviction for an act of domestic violence perpetrated by one spouse against the other spouse entered by the court within five years prior to the filing of the dissolution proceeding, or at any time thereafter, there shall be a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof that any award of temporary or permanent spousal support to the abusive spouse otherwise awardable pursuant to the standards of this part should not be made."

Relying on section 3591, appellant contends that the trial court erred in applying section 4325 in the present case. Section 3591, subdivision (c) states in relevant part that "[a]n agreement for spousal support may not be modified or revoked to the extent that a written agreement ... specifically provides that the spousal support is not subject to modification or termination." Here the parties agreed that spousal support would not be modified or terminated unless appellant cohabited with a partner or appellant suffered a loss of income. Respondent counters that enforcement of the settlement agreement would violate the public policy against domestic violence.

"In determining whether a contract violates public policy, courts essentially engage in a weighing process, balancing the interests of enforcing the contract with those interests against enforcement. But the cases make clear that the judicial power to declare public policy in the context of contract interpretation and enforcement should be exercised with great caution. `"`"The power of the courts to declare a contract void for being in contravention of sound public policy is a very delicate and undefined power, and, like the power to declare a statute unconstitutional, should be exercised only in cases free from doubt." (Rosen v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1070, 1082, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 361, 70 P.3d 351, internal citations and quotation marks omitted.)

In resolving the issue before us, we turn to the Restatement on Contracts, which provides that "[a] promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms." (Rest.2d Contracts, § 178(1).) Courts will examine the interest in enforcement of a contract term, taking into account "the parties' justified expectations, ... any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, and ... any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular term." (Rest.2d Contracts, § 178(2).) Courts will...