IN RE MARRIAGE OF PFEIFER

• Decision Date: 19 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-194.,99-194.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Susan J. PFEIFER, Petitioner and Respondent, and Phillip Christopher Meredith Pfeifer, Respondent and Appellant.

999 P.2d 340

2000 MT 100

In re the MARRIAGE OF Susan J. PFEIFER, Petitioner and Respondent, and

Phillip Christopher Meredith Pfeifer, Respondent and Appellant.

No. 99-194.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs October 28, 1999.

Decided April 19, 2000.

Rehearing Denied May 11, 2000.

Philip J. O'Connell, Attorney at Law; Missoula, Montana, For Appellant.

Keith W. McCurdy, McCurdy Law Firm, P.C.; Polson, Montana, For Respondent.

Justice JIM REGNIER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Phillip Christopher Meredith Pfeifer appeals the January 13, 1999, Order of the Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, awarding Susan J. Pfeifer postjudgment interest. We reverse.

¶ 2 The issues on appeal are as follows:

¶ 3 1. Whether the District Court erred in awarding Susan Pfeifer postjudgment interest accruing from date of the initial Decree of Dissolution?

¶ 4 2. Whether the District Court erred in awarding Susan Pfeifer postjudgment interest on the $62,685.48 postjudgment interest award?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Phillip Christopher Meredith Pfeifer ("Chris") and Susan J. Pfeifer ("Sue") were married in Arizona in 1988. They have one child together, Barbara, who was born in 1988. In the early 1990s the marriage began to deteriorate, the parties separated, and in 1994 Sue filed a petition for dissolution. On December 15, 1995, the court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Dissolution dividing the $2,560,644 marital estate. As part of the dissolution, the court ordered Chris to make a cash payment to Sue in the amount of $400,000 and ordered Chris to pay Sue's attorney fees as well as his own.

¶ 6 Chris appealed the District Court's Decree of Dissolution claiming that the court erred in awarding Sue attorney fees. Sue cross-appealed, raising five issues. We reversed the award of attorney fees to Sue, determined that the District Court's findings regarding Sue's contribution to the marital estate were not clearly erroneous, concluded that the court had not abused its discretion by failing to award Sue sufficient income-producing property, upheld the court's decision to include certain loans as debt chargeable to the marital estate, affirmed the court's decision not to award maintenance to Sue, and determined that the court had erred in valuing Sue's possessory interest in the family home and 160 acres. See In re Marriage of Pfeifer (1997), 282 Mont. 461, 938 P.2d 684 (Pfeifer I).

¶ 7 The District Court held a hearing on remand, received evidence relating to the value of Sue's possessory interest in the home and land and, thereafter, found that the value of that interest equaled the $138,000 rental value of the property, rather than its original valuation of that interest at $552,000. Consequently, the court redistributed the value of the marital estate to maintain approximately equal distributions, which resulted in Chris owing Sue an additional equalizing cash payment of $130,857. Chris appealed and we affirmed the District Court. In re Marriage of Pfeifer, 1998 MT 228, 291 Mont. 23, 965 P.2d 895 (Pfeifer II).

¶ 8 This brings us to the facts of the current case. The District Court received our Remittitur in Pfeifer I on June 30, 1997. On July 10, 1997, Chris forwarded a $400,000 cash payment to Sue. On October 14, 1998, Sue filed a Motion for Issuance of Citation and Order to Show Cause. In this motion, Sue requested that the court require Chris to appear and show cause:

[W]hy [Sue] should not be authorized to obtain from the Clerk of District Court a writ of execution permitting her to execute against real property owed [sic] by Petitioner [sic] in Lake County, Montana [presumably referring to property owned by the Respondent, Chris] for non payment of the cash portion of the property division as awarded by this Court's Decree of Dissolution dated December 15, 1995 as more fully appears by Petitioner's affidavit filed contemporaneously herewith.

¶ 9 In her accompanying affidavit, Sue acknowledged that Chris had already paid her $400,000, but claimed that the $400,000 payment should be applied as follows:

First to the legal interest at the rate of 10% per annum . . . from December 15, 1995 [the date of the Decree of Dissolution] to date of payment in the sum of $62,685.48 and the balance of $337,314.52 applied to the principal. That there remains a principal balance due and owing to Petitioner in the sum of $62,685.48 together with interest thereon from July 10, 1997 until October 15, 1998, sum of $7,932.54 and at the rate of $17.17 per day from October 15, 1998 until paid.

¶ 10 On December 16, 1998, the court held a hearing and the issue of postjudgment interest was subsequently briefed by both sides. In an Order issued on January 13, 1999, the District Court awarded Sue postjudgment interest in the amount of $62,685.48 which had accrued on the $400,000 cash payment between the date of the initial Decree of Dissolution and the date Chris made payment. The court also awarded Sue interest on the $62,685.48 postjudgment interest award accruing from the date Chris made the $400,000 payment until that interest award was paid. Chris appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11 Whether a party is entitled to postjudgment interest is a conclusion of law which we review de novo. See Tipp v. Skjelset, 1998 MT 263, ¶ 11, 291 Mont. 288, ¶ 11, 967 P.2d 787, ¶ 11.

ISSUE ONE

¶ 12 Whether the District Court erred in awarding Susan Pfeifer postjudgment interest accruing from the date of the initial Decree of Dissolution?

¶ 13 Chris contends that Sue is not entitled to postjudgment interest on the $400,000 cash distribution because she appealed the initial distribution of the marital estate seeking a greater share and lost. Sue responds that under Rule 31, M.R.App.P., it is irrelevant who appealed or cross-appealed when determining whether a judgment creditor is entitled to postjudgment interest. Moreover, Sue asserts that the extent of the cash distribution was not at issue in Pfeifer I. Sue contends that had she appealed the $400,000 money...