In re Marriage of Guo
| Decision Date | 19 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 81236-0-I,81236-0-I |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Marriage of BEILEI GUO, Respondent, and JIE REN, Appellant. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
VERELLEN, J. — Under RCW 26.09.191(2)(a)(iii), a trial court can limit a parent's residential time due to a history of domestic violence. Because substantial evidence establishes that Jie Ren physically abused his former wife, Beilei Guo, makes ongoing threats to her, suffers decompensating mental health because of a delusional disorder, lacks anger management, and causes Guo and his two daughters to fear him, the court did not abuse its discretion in entering a parenting plan restricting his residential time.
Ren fails to establish the trial court abused its discretion or denied due process in its management of the trial, or erred in its division of property.
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
On February 21, 2004, Jie Ren married Beilei Guo in Shanghai, China. Before moving to the United States, Ren physically abused Guo twice. In 2013, Ren, Guo, and their two daughters moved to Bellevue, Washington.
On October 10, 2018, Guo filed for divorce. Jude McNeil, a parenting plan evaluator and guardian ad litem, was appointed to make recommendations to the court as to the parenting plan and Ren's mental health.
That November, Guo moved into an apartment with their two daughters and obtained a temporary domestic violence protection order (DVPO) against Ren. In December, Ren was arrested for violating the temporary DVPO when he attempted to pick up one of his daughters from the bus stop.
After the temporary orders were entered, Ren's mental health deteriorated. Ren kept guns "everywhere" in the house.1 Ren sent Guo threatening messages, including that he would "never let her go," that he would "come to find" her, and that he found a cemetery for her body.2 Ren called himself an "amazing American superhero" and "God's messenger."3
In January 2019, the trial court ordered a one-year DVPO that suspended Ren's visitation with his daughters and entered an order to surrender weapons. Ren surrendered 22 guns and 33 knives to the Bellevue Police Department.
McNeil referred Ren to Dr. Yie-Wen Kuan for psychological testing. Dr. Kuan, a native Mandarin speaker and an immigrant from Taiwan, evaluated Ren and diagnosed him with a persecutory type of delusional disorder.
After a six-day bench trial, the trial court entered oral findings and conclusions, which were later supplemented by written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based upon the recommendations of McNeil and Dr. Kuan, the court entered a phased parenting plan, allowing Ren to begin limited daytime residential visits upon completing six months of treatment if the psychiatrist recommends visits and confirms the visits pose no safety threat to his daughters.4 The plan provides that a post-decree guardian ad litem (GAL) evaluation is required before any overnight visits are allowed. The court noted that these restrictions were "for both domestic violence and Mr. Ren's long struggle with his mental health."5 The trial court entered a final divorce decree.6
The trial court also imposed a "lifetime" DVPO that included Guo and their daughters, but expressly provided that if Ren was "fully compliant with all of the treatment set forth in the parenting plan . . . then [he] may ask the court to modify the protection order."7
Ren appeals.
ANALYSIS
Ren argues that the trial court failed to "reasonably calculate" the restrictions imposed on the parenting plan in accordance with RCW 26.09.191.
We review a trial court's determinations on the provisions of a parenting plan for abuse of discretion.8 A trial court abuses its discretion when its decisions are based on untenable grounds or made for untenable reasons.9
RCW 26.09.191(2)(a)(iii) permits a trial court to impose restrictions in a parenting plan when a parent has engaged in "a history of acts of domestic violence." Domestic violence is defined as "[p]hysical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, sexual assault, or stalking."10 A "showing [of] past violence" and "present fear" are sufficient to support a finding of domestic violence.11
Ren does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact about domestic violence, making them verities on appeal.12 Instead, he appears to argue that the trial court's finding of domestic violence was inadequate because the court did not make a finding in accordance with the "clinical definition of domestic violence."13But section .191(2)(a)(iii) allows restrictions upon a finding of "a history of domestic violence as defined in RCW 26.50.010(3)," and, as noted above, it is well-established that a history of domestic violence and a showing of present fear allow a finding of statutory domestic violence.14 Ren provides no controlling authority to support the proposition that a finding of abuse must satisfy the clinical rather than legal definition of domestic violence. The issue is whether the court abused its discretion by imposing .191 restrictions.
Guo testified that Ren was physically violent with her twice in China. The first incident occurred when Guo was watching a movie with a friend and forgot to return Ren's phone call. When she returned home, he slapped her "hard" across the face.15 Ren does not dispute this happened. She stated the second incident occurred when Ren wanted to "go out with friends."16 She took his keys away in an attempt to stop him, and "he tried to choke" her.17 Guo stated that Ren has not been physically violent with her since they arrived in the United States, but when he loses his temper, he will "speed up the car . . . threatening [to] crash" or "yell at us."18 She also testified "[h]e threatened, that I should have the cemetery for myself or use a weapon to solve the problems."19 Guo testified that even aftermoving into an apartment with her daughters, she still feels "scared" because Ren has appeared at her apartment building "many times."20
McNeil testified that Guo was "really scared" about the amount of guns and knives Ren had.21 McNeil thought Guo's fear was credible because in domestic violence cases "if there ever was physical abuse, then what happens is the people—it's a control tactic in that the victim can remember the abuse and so they're fearful that could happen again."22 McNeil also testified that both daughters told her that they were fearful and nervous when Ren was around. And Dr. Kuan diagnosed Ren with a persecutory type of delusional disorder.
The trial court's unchallenged finding is that Ren has a history of physical abuse, and trial testimony demonstrated Guo and her daughters still fear him. The older daughter does not feel safe with him "due to his confusing behavior and problems with anger."23 The younger daughter was especially upset about Ren kicking the family dog and was scared when he shouted. This is sufficient to support a finding of statutory domestic violence. As a result, the trial court found it was "appropriate to enter limitations in the parenting plan for both domestic violence and Mr. Ren's long struggle with hismental health."24 Ren fails to establish that the court abused its broad discretion.
Ren contends that the court's RCW 26.09.191 restrictions violated his right to parent because .191(2)(a) does not give the court the "'authority to [completely] eliminate residential time.'"25 Ren appears to argue that when the trial court granted Guo a "lifetime" DVPO that included their daughters, the court "effectively eliminated" Ren's residential time. But Ren's argument is misguided.
The court found that Ren engaged in domestic violence under .191(2)(a)(iii), which allowed it to limit his residential time. The court also found that Ren was suffering from a "long struggle" with his mental health, which "gets in the way of his ability to parent."26 Contrary to Ren's assertion, the court did not completely eliminate Ren's residential time. Instead, in accordance with the recommendations of McNeil and Dr. Kuan, the court entered a phased parenting plan. The parenting plan provides for residential time to begin phasing in after six months of successful treatment; Ren controls whether he will comply with the parenting plan's requirements.27 If hecomplies, he can petition the court to modify the DVPO and resume residential time with his daughters. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering the parenting plan or the DVPO.
Ren appears to contend that the court's management of the trial denied him due process because the six-day bench trial was inadequate, and he was not afforded sufficient time to confer with his counsel prior to trial.
"'The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'"28 Ren appears to challenge the court's management of trial and does not argue he was denied any specific statutory or procedural protection.
We review the judge's trial management decisions for abuse of discretion.29 A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on untenable grounds or made for untenable reasons.30 Whether those decisions violated Ren's procedural due process rights are a question of law reviewed de novo.31 Whenevaluating an alleged procedural due process violation, we weigh "(1) the private interest impacted by the government action; (2) 'the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,' and (3) the government interest, including the additional burden that added procedural safeguards would entail."32
Here, the first Mathews factor favors Ren because he has a fundamental interest in parenting his daughters.33 The third Mathews factor does not, however, because the "government has an equally compelling interest in protecting...
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