In re Marriage of Vargas
| Decision Date | 04 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2 CA-CV 2020-0078 |
| Parties | IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF AMBER VARGAS, Appellant, v. DANIEL CRUZ, Appellee. and |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County No. S1100DO201300569 The Honorable Richard T. Platt, Judge Pro Tempore The Honorable Barbara A. Hazel, Judge Pro Tempore
Georgini Law Offices L.L.C., Casa Grande By Tresa S. Georgini Counsel for Appellant
The Law Office of Vincent L. Mattioli, Scottsdale By Vincent L Mattioli Counsel for Appellee
Vice Chief Judge Staring authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Eppich concurred.
¶1 Amber Vargas appeals from the trial court's ruling granting Daniel Cruz final decision-making authority on matters related to their minor child's education and modifying his child support obligation. We affirm.
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to affirming the trial court's ruling. See Downing v Downing, 228 Ariz. 298, ¶ 2 (App. 2011). Vargas and Cruz were married in 2009 and have one child together, N.C., born in 2010. In 2013, Vargas petitioned for dissolution, and the court issued a decree dissolving the marriage and awarding the parties joint legal decision-making authority and equal parenting time. In 2017, pursuant to a modification petition, the court ordered the parties to "share joint legal decision-making with neither party having a final say."
¶3 In July 2019, Vargas filed the petition currently at issue, requesting modification of legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support, and asking the trial court to award her final decision-making authority as to all matters related to N.C. [1] Cruz filed a counter-petition, asking the court to "[m]odify legal decision-making authority so that the parties share joint legal decision making but allow [him] the final say." IN RE MARRIAGE OF VARGAS &CRUZ Decision of the Court After a bench trial, the court denied Vargas's request to be awarded final decision-making authority on all matters and ordered the parties to exercise joint legal decision-making authority, with Cruz having final decisionmaking authority on all matters relating to N.C. 's education, including decisions as to school and after-school childcare programs. It also ordered that the parties would have equal parenting time pursuant to a "week on, week off" schedule and reduced Cruz's child support obligation from $245 per month to $74 per month. This appeal followed.[2] We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(2).[3]
¶4 Vargas argues the trial court erred in granting Cruz final decision-making authority on all matters related to N.C. 's education, including after-school care. Specifically, she contends the court "failed to base its decisions on the best interests of" N.C. and instead based its ruling on "incorrect findings of fact that are not adequately supported by the record." Further, she argues, the court did not have jurisdiction to order that she "discontinue the use of her child care provider."
¶5 We review a trial court's modification of legal decision making authority for an abuse of discretion. See Baker v. Meyer, 237 Ariz. 112, ¶ 10 (App. 2015). The court abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law or when the record is "devoid of competent evidence to support" its decision. Woyton v. Ward, 247 Ariz. 529, ¶ 5 (App. 2019) IN RE MARRIAGE OF VARGAS &CRUZ Decision of the Court (quoting Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, ¶ 5 (1999)). We accept the court's findings of fact absent clear error. Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 82(a)(5); Engstrom v. McCarthy, 243 Ariz. 469, ¶ 4 (App. 2018). "A finding of fact cannot be clearly erroneous if there is substantial evidence to support it, even though there also might be substantial conflicting evidence." Lewis v. Midway Lumber, Inc., 114 Ariz. 426, 429 (App. 1977). "Evidence is substantial if it allows 'a reasonable person to reach the trial court's result.'" Castro v. Ballesteros-Suarez, 222 Ariz. 48, ¶ 11 (App. 2009) (quoting Davis v. Zlatos, 211 Ariz. 519, ¶ 18 (App. 2005)). We will not reweigh conflicting evidence on appeal, see Clark v. Kreamer, 243 Ariz. 272, ¶ 14 (App. 2017), and we defer to the court's assessments of witness credibility, see Gutierrez v. Fox, 242 Ariz. 259, ¶ 49 (App. 2017).
¶6 Vargas challenges the trial court's ruling point-by-point under A.R.S. §§ 25-403(A), 25-403.01(B), and 25-403.05. We first consider her arguments regarding its determinations under § 25-403(A).
¶7 Under § 25-403(A), the trial court "shall determine legal decision-making and parenting time . . . in accordance with the best interests of the child." The statute sets out eleven factors for the court to consider, including the parents' past, present, and future relationship with the child; the child's interaction and interrelationship with parents and siblings; whether the child is adjusting to home and school; the wishes of the child; the "mental and physical health of all individuals involved"; the likelihood the parent will "allow the child frequent, meaningful and continuing contact with the other parent"; "[w]hether one parent intentionally misled the court"; and whether there have been acts of domestic violence or child abuse. Id. In a contested case, the court must make specific findings on the record "about all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the child." § 25-403(B). Notably, however, trial courts are given broad discretion to determine what is in a child's best interests because they are in the best position to make that fact-based determination. Porter v. Porter, 21 Ariz.App. 300, 302 (1974).
¶8 Evaluating "[t]he interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parent or parents, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest" under § 25-403(A)(2), the trial court found that N.C. "interacts with [Vargas], her IN RE MARRIAGE OF VARGAS &CRUZ Decision of the Court spouse and three other children in her residence," as well as Cruz, "his spouse and other members of his household." On appeal, Vargas argues that although N.C. has a "good relationship" with Cruz and other members of his household, "there have been issues with [Cruz]'s spouse" in that she "prohibits [ N.C. ] from wearing clothes he received from [Vargas], or that he left [Vargas]'s house wearing."
¶9 However, testimony at trial concerning the nature of the relationship indicated N.C. had been "interested in going to a dog show . . . with" Cruz's spouse, and Cruz testified his spouse "regularly" picks N.C. up from school. Thus, Vargas's argument essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence concerning the relationship, which we will not do. See Clark, 243 Ariz. 272, ¶ 14. Because substantial evidence indicates N.C. interacts with Cruz's spouse, the trial court did not clearly err in so finding. See Lewis, 114 Ariz. at 429.
¶10 Regarding N.C. 's adjustment to home, school, and community under § 25-403(A)(3), the trial court found he is well-adjusted to both Vargas's and Cruz's homes, as well as to his school and community. The court stated the parties could not agree as to which middle school N.C. would attend, noting Vargas's testimony that her preferred school had a higher rating than the one Cruz preferred, that her other children attend her preferred school and it would be hard for her to pick up N.C. from a different school, and that if N.C. attended her preferred school, he could take the bus home. It also noted Cruz's testimony that if N.C. were to attend the school Cruz preferred, "he would be with his friends since all of them attended the same elementary school together." The court concluded "[t]here is not a clear choice as to which option is in the child's best interests."
¶11 Vargas challenges the trial court's conclusion, arguing it stated "many reasons . . . as to why attending [her preferred school] would be a better . . . choice" for N.C. and "would be easier" for her, and the only reason Cruz provided in support of his school choice "is that the child's friends will likely be attending that school." She also points to Cruz's testimony that "he cannot speak on exactly what he found as far as research when it comes to the differences between" the two schools, as well as her own testimony that her preference is "only approximately four to five miles away from [Cruz]'s residence, which would result in a simple four-to-seven-minute drive for him." IN RE MARRIAGE OF VARGAS &CRUZ Decision of the Court
¶12 Conflicting evidence exists as to which school is in N.C. 's best interests, including Cruz's testimony that N.C. 's "friends that he's pretty much grown up with" would likely attend Cruz's preferred school because "that's normally the school that they go into" from N.C. 's current elementary school. And, Cruz testified Vargas lives only five miles from his preferred school. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in finding there was not a clear choice as to which school was in N.C. 's best interests. See Clark, 243 Ariz. 272, ¶ 14; Lewis, 114 Ariz. at 429.
¶13 In addition, after noting Cruz wanted N.C. to attend the Boys and Girls Club for after-school care and Vargas wanted him to attend a daycare center after school, the trial court stated "It appears to be in the child's best interest to attend the Boys and Girls Club after school." Vargas contends that "[i]f the trial court found that...
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