In re Marriage of Gonzalez

• Decision Date: 28 January 2000
• Docket Number: No. 970521.,970521.
• Citation: 2000 UT 28,1 P.3d 1074
• Parties: In re Marriage of Juanita GONZALEZ and Martin Briceno. Juanita Gonzalez aka Juanita L. Briceno, Petitioner and Appellant. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Company, Intervenor and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

1 P.3d 1074

2000 UT 28

In re Marriage of Juanita GONZALEZ and Martin Briceno.

Juanita Gonzalez aka Juanita L. Briceno, Petitioner and Appellant.

Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Company, Intervenor and Appellee.

No. 970521.

Supreme Court of Utah.

January 28, 2000.

Rehearing Denied May 31, 2000.

Tamara J. Hauge, Salt Lake City, for Gonzalez.

Robert L. Stevens, Salt Lake City, for Metropolitan.

SUMMARY

DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice:

¶ 1 Petitioner Juanita L. Gonzalez appeals a decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of intervenor Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Company ("Metropolitan") and denying her motions to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention and to amend her complaint. This is an action based on Ms. Gonzalez's petition for adjudication of marriage, brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (Supp.1998), regarding her relationship with Martin Briceno.¹ Metropolitan moved to intervene. Ms. Gonzalez contested the intervention but ultimately stipulated to it. Metropolitan moved for summary judgment on the ground that Ms. Gonzalez failed to complete the adjudication of her petition within the statutory time period. This appeal followed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings, but note the following divergence in the justices' separate opinions concerning the issues: (1) as to the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (Supp. 1988) ("ONE-YEAR LIMITATION"), this opinion reflects a majority view, being concurred in by Justices Stewart and Zimmerman; (2) as to the propriety of the trial court's refusal to dismiss Metropolitan as an intervenor below ("INTERVENTION"), Justice Zimmerman concurs in that portion of Justice Russon's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Howe, but only to the extent it holds that intervention pursuant to the stipulation was properly permitted.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 According to the petition for adjudication of marriage (the "petition"), Ms. Gonzalez and Mr. Briceno began living together in September, 1983. On October 21, 1995, Briceno set fire to Gonzalez's home. Ms. Gonzalez alleges that her relationship with Briceno "terminated" on that day. At the time, Briceno had insurance through Metropolitan. If Gonzalez was Briceno's spouse at the time of the fire, she would have a claim under the Metropolitan policy. Presumably, premiums were calculated on this basis.

¶ 3 On February 5, 1996, Metropolitan filed a motion to intervene pursuant to rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Metropolitan asserted that Briceno had no reason to contest the recognition of the alleged marriage and that Metropolitan's interest was therefore not represented in the action. In its memorandum in support of the motion, Metropolitan stated that it moved to intervene because Gonzalez had filed the petition "to establish her insurance claim against Metropolitan." Gonzalez opposed the motion, arguing that Metropolitan had failed to attach a memorandum of points and authorities or appropriate affidavits, as required under rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Gonzalez answered the intervenor's complaint on March 11, 1996. On March 12, 1996, the parties filed a Stipulation for Leave to Allow Metropolitan to Intervene. An order granting Metropolitan leave to intervene was filed on March 12, 1996.

¶ 4 Metropolitan formally denied Ms. Gonzalez's insurance claim on June 4, 1996. On August 7, 1996, the trial court set a date of January 7, 1997, for trial of Ms. Gonzalez's petition, depending on the court's availability. On October 4, 1996, Metropolitan moved for summary judgment. Its motion was based upon "the fact that Ms. Gonzalez did not have a uniform reputation as the wife of Martin Briceno," as required under section 30-1-4.5 of the Utah Code. No affidavits were attached. That motion was denied.

¶ 5 A minute entry of January 6, 1997, noted that the trial date, scheduled for the following day, had been stricken. The trial was continued because of a criminal trial that took precedence on the court's calendar. On March 18, 1997, the court ordered a new scheduling conference for April 8, 1997. Trial was reset for August 5, 1997. Gonzalez never requested an accelerated trial. ¶ 6 On April 10, 1997, Metropolitan filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment based upon Failure to Comply with Statutory Time Limits," in which it claimed that Ms. Gonzalez's petition should be dismissed because she failed to obtain a judgment concerning her alleged marriage within one year of its termination, as required under Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5. Metropolitan contended that the statutory time period ran from the date the relationship terminated, allegedly October 21, 1995, and that the statute of limitations was not tolled by filing the action. Metropolitan did not contend, and has not argued here, that the statute of limitations expired prior to Ms. Gonzalez's commencement of this proceeding.

¶ 7 In an affidavit in support of her memorandum in opposition, Gonzalez admitted that on October 21, 1995, she considered her relationship with Briceno "permanently terminated." She also indicated, however, that "[s]ince that time, I have re-established a relationship with Martin." Gonzalez filed a second motion to amend her petition to allege the re-establishment of the relationship on April 23, 1997.

¶ 8 On May 8, 1997, Gonzalez moved to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint as intervenor. She asserted that she had stipulated to Metropolitan's intervention based on its alleged suggestion that a decision on her marital status would dispose of all coverage questions in Briceno's insurance policy. She then argued that Metropolitan was not a proper party under rule 24(a) because it had in fact already denied Gonzalez's insurance claim based on lack of coverage. She asserted that Metropolitan's intervention would prejudice the rights and social status of herself and her three children, whose father is Briceno, inasmuch as denial of her petition would prevent all of them from "assuming[] legal rights, responsibilities and social status due them under the circumstances of their joint relationships."

¶ 9 In Metropolitan's memorandum in opposition, it argued that its interest in Ms. Gonzalez's status remained, despite its unequivocal denial of coverage to her.

¶ 10 After arguments on all the motions, Gonzalez's motion to amend was denied, as was her motion to dismiss the intervenor's complaint. The court granted Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment based on Gonzalez's failure to comply with the statutory time limit.

¶ 11 In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint in intervention, the court concluded that Gonzalez had "presented no valid legal basis for her withdrawal of [the] Stipulation," thus allowing the complaint in intervention to stand. The court also ruled that Metropolitan "falls squarely within rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding intervention." In its findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding intervenor's motion for summary judgment, the court held that the statutory limitation period expired on October 21, 1996, which date occurred after the commencement of the action. This date was also prior to the initial trial date set by the court.

¶ 12 In its conclusions of law, the trial court determined that the "petitioner is not and never has been married to Martin Briceno in any solemnized or unsolemnized relationship."

¶ 13 Petitioner raises three issues on appeal. First, she argues that it was error for the trial court to grant Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment dismissing the petition on the ground that the petition was not adjudicated within one year of the termination of the relationship. Second, Ms. Gonzalez contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her motion to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention. Finally, Ms. Gonzalez argues that the trial court should not have denied her motion to amend the petition to allege a continuing relationship with Briceno.

¶ 14 As noted in ¶ 1, this opinion (Durham, J.), joined by Justice Stewart and Justice Zimmerman, determines the result regarding the statute of limitations issue. As to the intervention issue, Justice Zimmerman concurs in that portion of Justice Russon's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Howe, but only to the extent it holds that intervention pursuant to the stipulation was properly permitted.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 15 A trial court's grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989)

. When deciding whether the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, this court reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party. See id. Additionally, because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, we give the trial court's legal conclusions no deference and review their decision for correctness. See White v. Gary L. Deseelhorst, NP Ski Corp., 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994).

¶ 16 This court has not heretofore identified the standard it employs when reviewing a motion to intervene as of right under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). See Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982)

(reversing trial court's denial of intervention but not stating standard of review for that reversal). We now adopt a de novo standard of review when intervention as of right is before us on appeal.²

ONE-YEAR LIMITATION

¶ 17 In 1987, the Utah Legislature enacted a statute that recognized the possibility of establishing an unsolemnized marriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (Supp.1998).³ Subsection two of the statute states, in pertinent part, "The determination or...