In re Marshall

Decision Date09 October 2003
Docket NumberNo. LA 02-30769-SB.,LA 02-30769-SB.
Citation300 B.R. 507
PartiesIn re J. Howard MARSHALL et ux., Debtors.
CourtU.S. Bankruptcy Court — Central District of California

Bingham McCutchen, LLP, Julia Frost-Davies, Rheba Rutkowski, Andrew J. Gallo, Boston, MA.

Bingham McCutchen, LLP, G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., Hartford, CT.

Bingham McClutchen, LLP, Matthew A. Lesnick, Los Angeles.

David L. Neale/Anne E. Wells, Levene Neale Bender Rankin et al., Los Angeles.

SECOND AMENDED OPINION ON PLAN CONFIRMATION AND MOTION TO DISMISS (CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES)

SAMUEL L. BUFFORD, Bankruptcy Judge.

I. Introduction

In this case Pierce Marshall, as trustee for three family trusts (collectively referred to as "Pierce") opposes confirmation of the chapter 111 plan proposed by the debtors, who are his brother J. Howard Marshall, III ("Howard") and Howard's wife Ilene O. Marshall. Pierce also moves to dismiss the case. Pierce supports both of these positions with the argument that this case falls outside the bankruptcy jurisdiction of the federal courts under the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution, because the debtors are solvent under a balance sheet test. Notably, Pierce has declined to file a claim on behalf of the trusts (or on his own behalf) in this case.

The court finds that the balance sheet test for insolvency was unknown in United States bankruptcy law until 1898, when balance sheet insolvency first entered United States bankruptcy law. Prior thereto, insolvency in the bankruptcy context always meant liquidity (or equity) insolvency.

The court further holds that the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution does not require that a debtor in bankruptcy be insolvent under any test, and that the debtors in this case may constitutionally invoke remedies provided under chapter 11.

II. Relevant Facts

The relevant facts in this case are set forth in the court's recently issued opinion on the non-constitutional issues involved in the pending plan confirmation and motion to dismiss. See In re Marshall, 298 B.R. 670 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.2003). The filing of this bankruptcy case was precipitated in part by a judgment in favor of Pierce and against Howard in the Texas probate case of their father J. Howard Marshall II ("J. Howard"). The judgment, which was then on appeal, was for $11 million plus costs and interest at ten percent. By the filing date of the bankruptcy petition, this debt totaled more than $12 million.

As amended, the debtors' schedules show assets worth $13,138,311.38 and liquidated debts of $13,914,112.39. In addition to the valued assets, the schedules disclose interests in a revocable family trust, claims made in the probate estate of Howard's father, J. Howard, and an interest in the Eleanor P. Stevens Irrevocable Gift Trust (which is described in detail in a full-page exhibit). In addition to the quantified debts, the schedules list nonpriority debts in unknown amounts owing to Wells Fargo Bank Texas, the City of Pasadena, a Dallas law firm and the Marshall Museum & Trust.

In addition to the $12 million judgment, Howard had been named as a defendant in a $5 million lawsuit in Louisiana. Furthermore, Pierce's lawyer also sent a letter to Howard's lawyer on May 20, 2002 providing substantial detail for another claim against Howard exceeding $100 million.

The court set a claims bar date of November 15, 2002. Pierce declined to file a proof of claim in this case. Pierce has moved to dismiss this case and has objected to the confirmation of the debtors' chapter 11 plan as amended.

Pierce makes both statutory and constitutional objections to the confirmation of the chapter 11 plan proposed by debtors Howard and Ilene Marshall. The court has previously found that the statutory requirements for confirmation are satisfied, and that the case should not be dismissed on good faith grounds. See Marshall, 298 B.R. at 675-684.

III. Constitutionality of a Chapter 11 Case for a Solvent Debtor

Pierce contends that the debtors' assets exceed their liabilities as of the date of filing, and that in consequence they were solvent under a balance sheet test. The court finds that determining the accuracy of this contention would be very difficult and very time consuming in this case. While for some purposes in bankruptcy it is necessary to make such a determination,2 in this case no such determination is necessary. For the purposes of the constitutional analysis, the court assumes without deciding that the debtors were solvent, in the balance sheet sense, when they filed this case.

As a statutory matter, it is clear that the bankruptcy law does not require that a bankruptcy debtor be insolvent, either in the balance sheet sense (more liabilities than assets) or in the liquidity sense (unable to pay the debtor's debts as they come due), to file a chapter 11 case or proceed to the confirmation of a plan of reorganization. The Ninth Circuit firmly rejected such a view in Sylmar Plaza where it held, "insolvency is not a prerequisite to a finding of good faith under § 1129(a)." Platinum Capital, Inc. v. Sylmar Plaza, L.P. (In re Sylmar Plaza, L.P.), 314 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir.2002); accord, In re James Wilson Associates, 965 F.2d 160, 170 (7th Cir.1992) (rejecting bad faith challenge to confirmation).

Pierce concedes that insolvency is not a statutory requirement for filing a voluntary bankruptcy case under chapter 11. Instead, he argues that the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution can only be invoked by a bankruptcy debtor who is insolvent under a balance sheet test. Pierce argues that the constitutional grant of authority to Congress to enact "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States"3 is limited to regulating the affairs of debtors who are insolvent in this sense.

Pierce argues that there must be some content to the Bankruptcy Clause in the Constitution. In general terms, this court agrees. On this point Pierce is on solid ground. Congress is not free to define the contours of bankruptcy without any limitations: the bankruptcy terrain clearly must have some boundaries. See, e.g., Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 669-70, 55 S.Ct. 595, 79 L.Ed. 1110 (1935).

The test, according to Pierce, is that the Constitution must require that a debtor in a bankruptcy case be insolvent under a balance sheet test. Insofar as the Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy filing by a debtor who is balance sheet solvent, according to Pierce, the law falls outside the powers granted by the Constitution to the federal government. In such a circumstance, the Constitution, and not the law, must govern the case. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) ("If then ... the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.")

The court finds that neither balance sheet insolvency nor liquidity insolvency is required for the constitutional invocation of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. The limits on the application of the Bankruptcy Clause lie elsewhere, not in balance sheet insolvency.

As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to distinguish the exercise of powers under the Bankruptcy Clause from the exercise of congressional powers under the Commerce Clause. These two powers are closely related. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 465-66, 102 S.Ct. 1169, 71 L.Ed.2d 335 (1982). However, the conditions for invoking the Commerce Clause are different from those for invoking the Bankruptcy Clause, and each has its own limitations. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[u]nlike the Commerce Clause, the Bankruptcy Clause itself contains an affirmative limitation or restriction upon Congress' power," and "if we were to hold that Congress had the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws." Id. at 468-69, 102 S.Ct. 1169.

Setting aside the Commerce Clause, the powers granted to Congress under the Bankruptcy Clause are expanded by art. 1, § 8, cl. 18, which grants Congress the power "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers ...." See Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513, 58 S.Ct. 1025, 82 L.Ed. 1490 (1938). Theoretically, this provision might be invoked to support the use of the Bankruptcy Clause in doubtful cases. However, the Supreme Court has never in fact utilized this approach to determine the constitutionality of bankruptcy provisions.

The court assumes without deciding that Congress was not exercising its Commerce Clause or its Necessary and Proper Clause powers in determining the qualifications for filing a bankruptcy case. Thus the court's constitutional analysis in this case is confined to the Bankruptcy Clause.

To analyze Pierce's argument, we examine the understanding of the framers of the Constitution at the time of its adoption, the history of bankruptcy law in the United States and its predecessor English statutes, and applicable Supreme Court case law. We also examine Pierce's argument that, insofar as the Bankruptcy Code permits a solvent chapter 11 debtor to file a case and proceed to plan confirmation, Congress has exceeded its Bankruptcy Powers and has deprived him of property without due process of law.

A. Definition of Insolvency

Before undertaking this analysis, we must first address what Pierce means by "insolvency," because this term has two commonly used definitions in the bankruptcy context.

For the purposes of this argument, Pierce urges the court to adopt the balance sheet definition of solvency in § 101(32)(A), which states in relevant part:

"insolvent" means ... with reference to an entity...

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8 cases
  • In re Marshall
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Central District of California
    • March 18, 2009
    ...arguendo, that they were solvent. After considering the issue and the scholarly opinion of Judge Bufford on this point, In re Marshall, 300 B.R. 507 (C.D.Cal.2003), the Court is convinced that he was correct in confirming the Chapter 11 Plan in this matter. The Bankruptcy Clause empowers Co......
  • Marshall v. Marshall
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • June 28, 2013
    ...11 plan and denial of Elaine's motion to dismiss with respect to the constitutional issues raised in the motion. See In re Marshall, 300 B.R. 507 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.2003). Therefore, we adopt the bankruptcy court's opinion on Elaine's constitutional claims, and affirm the district court's decis......
  • In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • September 20, 2004
    ...from financial distress. Id. at 163 (early access for solvent debtors designed to preempt "a hopeless situation"); In re Marshall, 300 B.R. 507, 512-13 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.2003) ("It is not uncommon for debtors to be solvent under the balance sheet test, and yet to have severe financial problems......
  • In re Aldrich Pump LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Western District of North Carolina
    • December 28, 2023
    ...financial distress) by the debtor. The only case that Movants cite that even considered that question, rejected it. In re Marshall, 300 B.R. 507, 509 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003). The court in Marshall concluded that "the constitutional history gives no support to the argument that the founders ......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Redefining due process analysis: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and the concept of emergent rights.
    • United States
    • Albany Law Review Vol. 69 No. 1, December 2005
    • December 22, 2005
    ...Schs., 385 F.3d 935, 941-42 (6th Cir. 2004); Hutchison v. Brookshire Bros., 284 F. Supp. 2d 459, 467 (E.D. Tex. 2003); In re Marshall, 300 B.R. 507, 524 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. (91) For cases concluding that Lawrence did not announce a fundamental right, see Williams v. Att'y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232,......

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