In re Masterson's Estate

• Decision Date: 20 August 1919
• Docket Number: 15197.
• Citation: 183 P. 93,108 Wash. 307
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In re MASTERSON'S ESTATE. v. LLOYD. McMANIS

183 P. 93

108 Wash. 307

In re MASTERSON'S ESTATE.

McMANIS v. LLOYD.

No. 15197.

Supreme Court of Washington

August 20, 1919

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Walla Walla County; Edward C. Mills Judge.

In the matter of the estate of John Masterson, deceased. From an order of distribution, Emma J. McManis appeals. Affirmed.

Evans &amp Watson, of Walla Walla, for appellant.

John C. Hurspool, of Walla Walla, for respondent.

MAIN J.

This appeal presents for review the order of the superior court distributing the estate of John Masterson, deceased, and allowing a claim against the estate. The deceased left surviving him, as heirs at law, Emma J. McManis, a sister Andrew A. Smith, a nephew, being the son of a deceased sister, and Gertrude Lloyd, a sister by adoption. For approximately 14 months prior to his death John Masterson roomed and boarded in the home of his sister, Emma J McManis, and during this time A. K. Rice was his duly appointed, qualified, and acting guardian. At the time he began to room and board with his sister the deceased was a bachelor approximately 40 years of age. For his board and room the sister was to receive $20 per month. This was paid at the end of each month by the guardian and was receipted for by the daughter of Mrs. McManis. After a few months the amount paid was increased to $30 per month, and subsequently to $40. The evidence shows that all the money received was expended for the use and benefit of the deceased. The claim presented and which was allowed by the court was by Mrs. McManis for nursing her brother during the 14 months mentioned; it being her contention that she was to be paid for the nursing in addition to his room and board. During all of this time he was in a deplorable condition, both physically and mentally.

The order of distribution entered in the cause, from which the appeal is taken, distributed a portion of the estate to Gertrude Lloyd, the sister by adoption, as though she were a natural sister, and allowed the claim for nursing. The questions here for review are: First, whether the sister by adoption had a right to a portion of the estate; and, second, whether the court properly allowed the claim for nursing.

Gertrude Lloyd was the adopted daughter of Sima Masterson, now deceased. John Masterson was the natural son of Sima Masterson. Emma J. McManis was a natural daughter, and Andrew A. Smith was the son of a natural daughter. Under these facts is Gertrude Lloyd, a sister by adoption, entitled to an heir's portion of the estate of John Masterson, deceased? Whether she has the right to so inherit depends upon the construction to be given to the adoption statute. Rem. & Bal. Code, § 1699, provides what shall be the effect of adoption as follows:

'By such order the natural parents shall be divested of all legal rights and obligations in respect to such child, and the child shall be free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance in respect to them, and shall be, to all intents and purposes, the child and legal heir of his or her adopter or adopters, entitled to all rights and privileges and subject to all the obligations of a child of the adopter or adopters begotten in lawful wedlock: Provided, that on the decease of parents who have adopted a child or children under this chapter, and the subsequent decease of such child or children without issue, the property of such adopting parents shall descend to their next of kin, and not to the next of kin of such adopted child or children.'

By this statute the natural parents are divested of all legal rights and obligations in respect to the adopted child, and the child is free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance of its natural parents. It is expressly provided that such adopted child shall be, to all intents and purposes, the child and legal heir of the adopters and entitled to all the rights and privileges and subject to all the obligations of a child of the adopters begotten in lawful wedlock. The language of the statute is broad and comprehensive.

One of the rights or privileges of a natural child is to inherit from a brother or sister, the natural son or daughter of the same parents. If the adopted child does not have the same right, then it is denied a right or privilege which the natural child has. The statute says that such adopted child shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges as though it were begotten in lawful wedlock, and to all intents and purposes shall be the child and legal heir of its adopter. To hold that the adopted child cannot take an heir's portion of the estate of the natural son of the adopting parents would require a strict and narrow construction of the statute. The authorities are not in harmony as to whether such statutes are to be construed strictly or with a tendency to liberality in order that the primary purpose of such statutes, which is to promote the welfare of unfortunate children, may be carried into effect. Many of the...