In re Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I&N Dec. 209 (I & N 3/26/2010)
Decision Date | 26 March 2010 |
Docket Number | Interim Decision No. 3676. |
Citation | 25 I&N Dec. 209 |
Parties | Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, Respondents. |
Court | U.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals |
In a decision dated February 12, 2008, an Immigration Judge found the respondents removable on their own admissions and granted their application for asylum under section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006). The Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") has appealed from that decision. The DHS's appeal will be sustained, the decision of the Immigration Judge will be vacated, and the respondents will be ordered removed from the United States.1
The respondents, who are husband and wife, are natives and citizens of China. They have two United States citizen children, a son born in November 2003 and daughter born in March 2007. The respondents do not claim to have suffered past persecution, or even to have been threatened with persecution in China. However, the female respondent asserts that if she is returned to China, and particularly to Huang Qi Town, Lian Jiang County, in Fujian Province, she has a well-founded fear of persecution as a result of the birth of her two children in the United States.2
In a hearing before the Immigration Judge, the respondent testified that if she is removed to China, she would be forcibly sterilized and fined by Chinese Government officials because she has two children. In support of her asylum application, the respondent submitted an affidavit from her mother. The respondent's mother stated that upon her inquiry to the family planning office of Huang Qi Town, she was informed that if a Chinese national violates the regulation requiring the insertion of an intrauterine device ("IUD") after the first birth and sterilization after the second birth and then returns to China, she will definitely be sterilized and fined 20,000 yuan. The respondent also included statements from friends and other relatives attesting to this policy.
The Immigration Judge found that the respondent was a credible witness and determined that she had established that the family planning authorities who would have jurisdiction over her, i.e., the family planning authorities of Huang Qi Town, located in Lian Jiang County, Fujian Province, would force her to be sterilized and impose a significant fine on her. The Immigration Judge therefore granted the respondent's application for asylum. Having granted asylum, the Immigration Judge did not address the respondent's requests for withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006), and protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46. 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987; for the United States Apr. 18, 1988).
Section 101(a)(42) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), includes within the definition of a "refugee" a person who has a well-founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo involuntary sterilization or will be subject to persecution for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for resistance to a coercive population control program. The DHS challenges the Immigration Judge's determination that a reasonable person in the respondent's circumstances would fear being subjected to a forced sterilization or sanctions rising to the level of persecution upon her return to China.
We review the Immigration Judge's findings of fact, including those relating to credibility, to determine whether they are "clearly erroneous." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2010). We review de novo all other questions of law, discretion, and judgment, including the question whether the parties have met the relevant burden of proof. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).
The Immigration Judge's favorable credibility determination is not "clearly erroneous." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). However, it remains the respondent's burden to establish that a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear being subjected to a forced sterilization or sanctions rising to the level of persecution upon her return to China. See Yong Hao Chen v. U.S. INS, 195 F.3d 198, 204 (4th Cir. 1999) ( ). Regardless of the policy generally prohibiting the birth of additional children following the birth of a son, to be eligible for relief the respondent must also meet her burden of demonstrating a reasonable possibility that Chinese Government officials would enforce the family planning policy against her through means constituting persecution. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2008) ( ); Matter of J-H-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 196 (BIA 2007); Matter of J-W-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 185 (BIA 2007).
While the Immigration Judge's findings of fact are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard, the question whether the facts are sufficient to establish that the respondent has a well-founded fear of persecution upon return to China is a legal determination that we review de novo. Matter of V-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 500, 501-02 (BIA 2008); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3); see also, e.g., Cubillos v. Holder, 565 F.3d 1054, 1058-89 (8th Cir. 2009). Determining whether a fear of what may happen in the future is well founded essentially involves predicting future events, and "it is impossible to declare as `fact' things that have not yet occurred." Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 493, 498 (BIA 2008).3 We therefore review de novo the question whether the respondent has carried her burden of establishing a well-founded fear that the family planning policy will be enforced against her through means constituting persecution upon her return to China.
In order to determine, under de novo review, whether specific facts are sufficient to meet a legal standard such as a "well-founded fear," the Board has authority to give different weight to the evidence from that given by the Immigration Judge. Id. at 497; see also Rotinsulu v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2008) ( ). This authority is critical to permit the Board to determine whether the facts as found by the Immigration Judge meet the relevant legal standard, including circumstances where anecdotal and subjective evidence is presented to undercut more recent evidence from more established and reliable sources. See Matter of C-C-, 23 I&N Dec. 899, 903 (BIA 2006) ( ). This review authority also promotes consistency in the application of legal standards so that cases with similar facts are generally decided in a like manner.4
State Department reports on country conditions, including the Profiles of Asylum Claims & Country Conditions, are highly probative evidence and are usually the best source of information on conditions in foreign nations. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 341-42 (2d Cir. 2006); Gonahasa v. U.S. INS, 181 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir. 1999); Matter of V-T-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 792, 799 (BIA 1997). The reports are accorded "special weight," Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F3d. 701,705 n.6 (9th Cir. 2010), because they are based on the collective expertise and experience of the Department of State, which "`has diplomatic and consular representatives throughout the world.'" Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 471 F.3d at 341 (quoting Zamora v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055, 1062 (2d Cir. 1976)). However, this evidence does not "automatically discredit contrary evidence presented by the applicant," and it is critical to also consider and evaluate "`any contrary or...
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...evidence lies largely within the agency's discretion. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. DOJ, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006); In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (BIA 2010) (giving diminished weight to letters from relatives because they were from interested witnesses notsubject to cross-ex......