In re Matteson, No. 68310-7

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington
• Writing for the Court: BRIDGE, J.
• Citation: 142 Wash.2d 298,12 P.3d 585
• Parties: In Matter of the Personal Restraint of Michael MATTESON, Russell Taylor, and Jason Hull, Petitioners.
• Docket Number: No. 68310-7, No. 68492-8., No. 68486-3
• Decision Date: 02 November 2000

12 P.3d 585

142 Wash.2d 298

In Matter of the Personal Restraint of Michael MATTESON, Russell Taylor, and Jason Hull, Petitioners.

Nos. 68310-7, 68486-3, 68492-8.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued May 9, 2000.

Decided November 2, 2000.

Russell D. Taylor, Jason Edward Hull, Airway Heights, Michael Matteson, Monroe, Pro se.

Suzanne Elliott, Seattle, for Petitioners.

Christine Gregoire, Atty. Gen., John Scott Blonien, Kasey Kneip, Martin E. Wyckoff, Asst. Attys. Gen., Olympia, for Respondent.

Kevin Christian Osborn, Seattle, Amicus Curiae on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union.

BRIDGE, J.

In 1999, the Washington Department of Corrections (DOC) transferred 254 inmates to the private Crowley County Correctional Facility (Crowley) in Olney Springs, Colorado. Many of those inmates have filed, pro se, personal restraint petitions with this court contesting the legality of their transfer. Review has been granted, and counsel appointed, for three representative petitions from Jason Hull, Michael Matteson, and Russell Taylor. Together petitioners argue that the Legislature improperly granted the DOC the authority to transfer them to Crowley. In the alternative, they argue that due process required a pretransfer hearing. They contend that the DOC has surrendered jurisdiction over them as a result of their transfer and seek release from incarceration for the remainder of their sentences. For reasons set forth herein, we deny the personal restraint petitions and hold that the DOC possessed the proper statutory authority to transfer the petitioners to Crowley, and further hold that this transfer did not violate due process.

FACTS

Because these personal restraint petitions (PRPs) were originally before us pro se, the record is very limited. "Legal face sheet[s]" attached as exhibits to the DOC's response briefs reveal in scant detail the petitioners' crimes and sentences. Hull was convicted of second degree murder in Clark County Superior Court and is serving a sentence of over 23 years. Matteson was convicted in King County Superior Court of child molestation and is serving a sentence of over 10 years. Taylor was convicted of second degree murder in Thurston County Superior Court and is serving a sentence of over 18 years.

In November 1998, the DOC signed a "Memorandum of Understanding" with the Teamsters' union that represents guards in its correctional facilities. That memorandum spoke of "an immediate need to address the offender overcrowding situation until such time as beds come on line at Stafford Creek Corrections Center."¹ It was agreed that placement of offenders outside of DOC facilities would be "an interim measure only" and that "[a]t such time as beds become available within the Department, all offenders will be returned to facilities operated by the Washington State Department of Corrections."² On February 26, 1999, the DOC entered into a contract with the Colorado Department of Corrections and Crowley Correctional Services L.L.C. to house transferred Washington inmates.

In early March 1999, Hull, Matteson, and Taylor were among 254 inmates transferred from Washington correctional facilities to the private Crowley facility. Each inmate was granted the opportunity to appeal his transfer.³ According to an affidavit from Eldon Vail, the deputy secretary of DOC, the reason for this transfer was that the DOC was "experiencing an excess of inmates over bed space. The overcapacity problem is expected to continue until early 2000, when it is anticipated that the Stafford Creek facility in Grays Harbor will be completed and available."⁴ Vail stated that "overcrowding in a prison setting can be very dangerous" and "ordinary methods" of easing it could not have relieved the necessity of transferring the inmates temporarily to Crowley.⁵ He averred that not only would the construction of temporary bed space have taken too long, but other state facilities did "not have sufficient capacity to accept any substantial number of DOC inmates."⁶

Upon being transferred to Colorado, the Washington inmates filed an array of PRPs—generally arguing that their transfer to Colorado was illegal. In August and September 1999, Hull, Matteson, and Taylor each filed, pro se, the underlying PRPs at issue here. We granted review and consolidated the three PRPs. In his October 29, 1999, order granting review, Chief Justice Guy also directed that counsel be appointed to represent the three petitioners. The American Civil Liberties Union was granted leave to file an amicus curiae brief.

Prior to review being granted, Hull had originally requested preliminary relief preventing his transfer back to Washington, and Chief Justice Guy denied this in his order. Undeterred, all three petitioners joined forces in a second pro se motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent Crowley's warden from transferring them from the facility prior to the resolution of their PRPs. The clerk advised the petitioners that this motion should be filed through their counsel of record, and counsel advised him that she had no objection to the filing. The clerk then denied the motion, noting that Chief Justice Guy had already denied the same motion in Hull's case. Counsel made a motion to modify this ruling, and that motion was denied on May 2, 2000. All Washington inmates had been returned to state facilities as of June 28, 2000, and the DOC's contract with Crowley expired two days later.

ANALYSIS

I.

At the threshold, we must resolve a motion by the State to dismiss this matter as moot in light of the fact that, following oral argument, all three petitioners were returned to Washington. We decline the State's motion to declare this matter moot for that reason, as it ignores the nature of petitioners' argument. Petitioners were not seeking to return to Washington. Instead they claim that the State surrendered jurisdiction over them as a result of their allegedly unlawful transfer to Crowley. In light of petitioners' argument, their transfer back to Washington would only compound their injury (through continued incarceration), not remedy it. While we do not accept this argument, we will resolve the issues petitioners raise.

In a PRP, it is not enough for petitioners to demonstrate constitutional error. They must meet the "threshold burden of demonstrating actual and substantial prejudice" arising from that error.⁷ The error must be "significant enough to justify overriding principles of finality."⁸ This is true because "`collateral relief undermines the principles of finality of litigation, degrades the prominence of the trial, and sometimes costs society the right to punish admitted offenders.'"⁹

The petitioners argue that their restraint is unlawful because "[t]he conditions or manner of ... restraint ... are in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of the State of Washington...." RAP 16.4(c)(6). The petitioners contend that the Legislature had not properly granted the DOC the authority to transfer inmates to a private, out-of-state correctional facility, and that, accordingly, the DOC has surrendered jurisdiction over them and they should be released from confinement and from the balance of their sentences. The DOC counters by arguing that it did possess properly granted authority to transfer the inmates to Crowley.

In granting review, we directed that the parties specifically address whether the Legislature properly amended RCW 72.09.050 in the 1999 bill adopting a state budget. That bill, Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 5180, was entitled, "An Act Relating to fiscal matters...."¹⁰ This is a pivotal issue inasmuch as the petitioners argue that the only authority for their transfer was derived from changes to RCW 72.09.050. In relevant part, RCW 72.09.050, with the 1999 changes underlined, reads as follows:

The secretary shall manage the department of corrections and shall be responsible for the administration of adult correctional programs, including but not limited to the operation of all state correctional institutions or facilities used for the confinement of convicted felons. In addition, the secretary shall have broad powers to enter into agreements with any federal agency, or any other state, or any Washington state agency or local government providing for the operation of any correctional facility or program for persons convicted of felonies or misdemeanors or for juvenile offenders. Such agreements for counties with local law and justice councils shall be required in the local law and justice plan pursuant to RCW 72.09.300. The agreements may provide for joint operation or operation by the department of corrections, alone, or by any of the other governmental entities, alone. Beginning February 1, 1999, the secretary may expend funds appropriated for the 1997-1999 biennium to enter into agreements with any local government or private organization in any other state, providing for the operation of any correctional facility or program for persons convicted of felonies. Between July 1, 1999, and June 30, 2001, the secretary may expend funds appropriated for the 1999-01 biennium to enter into agreements with any local government or private organization in any other state, providing for the operation of any correctional facility or program for persons convicted of felonies.

The question is whether the 1999 changes were a grant of authority, in violation of Const. art. II, § 19, to the DOC to transfer inmates to a private facility like Crowley. The DOC correctly points out that its contract to house the Washington inmates was initially with both the State of Colorado and Crowley Correctional Services L.L.C. However, RCW 72.09.050, without the language added in 1999, stated that the agreements it authorizes "may provide for joint operation or operation by the department of corrections, alone, or by any of the other governmental entities, alone." There is no dispute over the fact that...