In re Matthews, No. 25322.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: TOAL, Chief Justice
• Citation: 345 S.C. 638,550 S.E.2d 311
• Parties: In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Johnny MATTHEWS, Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 25322.
• Decision Date: 23 July 2001

345 S.C. 638
550 S.E.2d 311

In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Johnny MATTHEWS, Appellant

No. 25322.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard March 20, 2001

Decided July 23, 2001.

345 S.C. 641

Andrew D. Grimes, of Andrew D. Grimes, P.A., of Summerville, and John L. Drennan, of Joye Law Firm, L.L.P., of North Charleston, both for appellant

Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Deputy Attorney General Treva Ashworth, Senior Assistant Attorney General Kenneth P. Woodington, and Assistant Attorney General Steven G. Heckler, all of Columbia, for respondent.

TOAL, Chief Justice:

Johnny Matthews ("Matthews") appeals the trial court's order holding he was a sexually violent predator pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act ("Act"). S.C.Code Ann. §§ 44-48-10 through XX-XX-XXX (Supp.2000). We affirm.

345 S.C. 642

FACTUAL/ PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At the time Matthews was charged with the offenses which led to the present proceeding, he was a custodian employed at North Park Village Head Start Program in North Charleston. Approximately 80 children between the ages of three and five were participating in the program. Matthews was charged with eight counts of committing lewd acts upon a child. Six charges were dropped, and Matthews pled guilty to two counts of committing lewd acts upon a child.¹ Matthews was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

With the expiration of Matthews' sentence approaching, a multidisciplinary team accessed Matthews' records pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act. On October 1, 1998, the team found Matthews satisfied the definition of a sexually violent predator. By order dated May 6, 1999, the court below found probable cause and ordered Matthews into custody pending trial.

On July 16, 1999, a non-jury trial was held before the Honorable A. Victor Rawl in Charleston. Following the trial, the trial court entered a written order finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, Matthews was a sexually violent predator as defined by the Act and, therefore, should be committed for treatment. Matthews' constitutional arguments were rejected.

Matthews filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals transferred the case to this Court pursuant to Rule 204(a), SCACR, on the ground the principal issue on appeal would be a constitutional challenge to the Sexually Violent Predator Act. The issues before this Court are:

I. Did the trial court have jurisdiction to hear the State's civil commitment case against Matthews where the trial was held more than sixty days after the probable cause hearing in violation of S.C.Code Ann. § 44-48-90 (Supp.2000)?

II. Did the trial court have jurisdiction over this action when only four members, instead of the five listed in

345 S.C. 643

S.C.Code Ann. § 44-48-50 (Supp.2000), reviewed Matthews' records?

III. Did the trial court err in denying Matthews' motion for a directed verdict on the ground the evidence was insufficient to show he was a sexual predator?

IV. Does South Carolina's Sexually Violent Predator Act violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Federal² and State³ Constitutions?

LAW/ ANALYSIS

I. S.C.Code Ann. § 44-48-90

Matthews argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the State failed to bring the case to trial within the sixty day time period set forth in section 44-48-90 without having the trial court issue a continuance.⁴ We agree the State was statutorily required to bring Matthews' case to trial within sixty days of the probable cause hearing. However, we disagree the State's failure to do so resulted in the trial court losing jurisdiction to hear the case.

We have stated, "Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." Dove v. Gold Kist, 314 S.C. 235, 237-238, 442 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1994) (citations and internal quotations omitted). In Gold Kist we found, "the statute grants the court of common pleas throughout the State subject matter jurisdiction to hear [the litigants' case]." Id. at 238, 442 S.E.2d at 600. In the instant case, the Act provides:

Within sixty days after the completion of a hearing held pursuant to Section 44-48-80 [probable cause], the court shall conduct a trial to determine whether the person is a

345 S.C. 644

sexually violent predator. ... The trial may be continued upon the request of either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the due administration of justice, and only if the respondent will not be substantially prejudiced.

S.C.Code Ann. § 44-48-90 (Supp.2000) (emphasis added). The definition section of the Act provides: "Court means the court of common pleas." S.C.Code Ann. § 44-48-30(7) (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added). Therefore, the language of the statute clearly vests subject matter jurisdiction over cases brought pursuant to the Act with the court of common pleas.

Even though we find the court of common pleas had subject matter jurisdiction to hear Matthews' case, we do find the legislature's use of the term "shall" in section 44-48-90 indicates the holding of a trial within sixty days of the probable cause hearing is mandatory. See, e.g., South Carolina Police Officers Retirement Sys. v. Spartanburg, 301 S.C. 188, 391 S.E.2d 239 (1990) ("shall" is considered mandatory under principles of statutory interpretation); South Carolina Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Dickinson, 288 S.C. 189, 191, 341 S.E.2d 134, 135 ("Ordinarily the use of the word `shall' in a statute means that the action referred to is mandatory."). The language of the Act does allow a trial to be held outside the sixty day period, but only under certain conditions.

It is not a significant burden on the State or the trial court to require the issuance of a continuance, or even a notation in the record, indicating: (1) the trial cannot be held within sixty days; (2) good cause for the delay; and (3) the respondent will not suffer prejudice. Furthermore, the fact that the legislature set forth the terms under which a trial could be held outside the sixty day period is further evidence of the legislature's intent to require strict adherence to the mandated time frame.

However, we find the sixty day time period set forth in the Act is not a jurisdictional requirement. Matthews should have filed a motion to dismiss when the State failed to bring the case to trial within sixty days without asking for a continuance. By failing to make a motion to dismiss, Matthews waived his right to challenge the State's failure to comply with the requisite time period.

345 S.C. 645

Therefore, we hold the State's failure to comply with the time period set forth in the section, when a proper continuance has not been issued, does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. When the sixty day period has passed, and no continuance has been granted, the proper procedure for a respondent to follow is to file a motion to dismiss

II. S.C.Code Ann. § 44-48-50

Matthews argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this action because he was not properly evaluated. He contends that the court's jurisdiction is predicated on the multidisciplinary team's conclusion he was a sexually violent predator. He asserts that the action of the multidisciplinary team was void ab initio because the make-up of the multidisciplinary team did not comply with the requirements of S.C.Code Ann. § 44-48-50 (Supp.2000).⁵ We disagree.

Before an action is commenced under the Act, the Director of the Department of Corrections appoints a multidisciplinary team to review the records of the alleged predator. S.C.Code Ann. § 44-48-50 (Supp.2000). The team assesses whether or not the person meets the definition of a sexually violent predator. Id. If the team determines the person is a predator, the case is then referred to the prosecutor review committee. The Act provides:

Membership of the [multidisciplinary] team must include:

(1) a representative from the Department of Corrections;

(2) a representative from the Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services;

(3) a representative from the Department of Mental Health who is a trained, qualified mental health clinician with expertise in treating sexually violent offenders;

(4) a retired judge appointed by the Chief Justice who is eligible for continued judicial service pursuant to Section 2-19-100; and

345 S.C. 646

(5) the Chief Attorney of the Office of Appellate Defense or his designee.

S.C.Code...