In re Mazingo-Mayronne

• Decision Date: 09 June 2022
• Docket Number: 20-BG-601
• Parties: IN RE Deni-Antionette MAZINGO-MAYRONNE, Respondent. A Suspended Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Bar Registration No. 479656)
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

276 A.3d 19

IN RE Deni-Antionette MAZINGO-MAYRONNE, Respondent.

A Suspended Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Bar Registration No. 479656)

No. 20-BG-601

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued February 8, 2022

Decided June 9, 2022

John O. Iweanoge, II, Washington, for respondent.

Myles V. Lynk, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, with whom Hamilton P. Fox, III, Disciplinary Counsel, was on the brief, for petitioner.

Before Easterly and McLeese, Associate Judges, and Thompson, Senior Judge.^*

Dissenting opinion by Senior Judge Thompson at pages 23–24.

Per Curiam:

The Board on Professional Responsibility determined that respondent Deni-Antionette Julia Mazingo-Mayronne committed flagrant acts of dishonesty that violated the District of Columbia and Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct. The Board recommended that Ms. Mayronne be disbarred. Ms. Mayronne does not challenge the findings of misconduct, instead arguing solely that disbarment is not an appropriate sanction. We accept the Board's recommended sanction of disbarment.

I.

The Board's recommendation of disbarment rests on the following, among other things.

1. Ms. Mayronne was admitted to the District of Columbia Bar in 2002 and to the Bar of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in 2005. From 2002 to 2005, Ms. Mayronne repeatedly filed forms for clients in bankruptcy cases stating that she was a non-attorney petition preparer. Ms. Mayronne did not meet the definition of a petition preparer, because she was an attorney, was giving legal advice, and was charging her clients accordingly. Ms. Mayronne made knowingly false statements in those filings. Although Ms. Mayronne testified at the disciplinary hearing that she did not know that she was making false statements in the filings, the Hearing Committee did not credit that testimony.

2. When Ms. Mayronne applied in 2005 to be admitted to the District of Maryland Bar, she intentionally and falsely denied having prior criminal convictions. Ms. Mayronne's testimony at the disciplinary hearing about why she did that was not credible to the Hearing Committee.

3. In 2005, Ms. Mayronne intentionally made numerous false statements in connection with her personal bankruptcy. Ms. Mayronne did not provide any explanation for some of those false statements, and her explanation for one false statement was not credible to the Hearing Committee.

4. In 2006, Ms. Mayronne was barred from practicing law in the federal Bankruptcy Court in the District of Maryland. Ms. Mayronne nevertheless continued to represent a client in that court, knowing that her conduct violated the injunction. Although Ms. Mayronne testified at the disciplinary hearing that she lacked such knowledge, the Hearing Committee did not credit that testimony.

5. In 2010, Ms. Mayronne represented a client in a Maryland personal injury suit even though Ms. Mayronne was not admitted to practice law in Maryland. Ms. Mayronne failed to advise her client properly in that matter. After a fee dispute, Ms. Mayronne intentionally disclosed damaging and confidential information about her client to opposing counsel. Although Ms. Mayronne testified at the disciplinary hearing that the disclosure was inadvertent, the Board found that her testimony was intentionally false.

In recommending disbarment, the Board concluded that "over the first eight years of her career as an attorney, [Ms. Mayronne] repeatedly engaged in conduct that was dishonest and disingenuous," violating numerous rules of professional conduct. The Board also found that Ms. Mayronne repeatedly provided explanations for her conduct that "were plainly false." That included presenting "intentional falsehoods" to the Hearing Committee in her testimony in 2015. The Board explained that disbarment was warranted for "flagrant" dishonesty "reflect[ing] a continuing and pervasive indifference to the obligations of honesty in the judicial system." In re Pennington , 921 A.2d 135, 141 (D.C. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

II.

In determining what sanction to impose for violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, "this Court ‘shall adopt the recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted.’ " In re Vohra , 68 A.3d 766, 771 (D.C. 2013) (quoting D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(1)). "A sanction recommendation from the Board comes to us with a strong presumption in favor of its imposition." In re Baber , 106 A.3d 1072, 1076 (D.C. 2015) (per curiam) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). In general, "if the Board's recommended sanction falls within a wide range of acceptable outcomes, it will be adopted and imposed." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "Ultimately, however, the system of attorney discipline, including the imposition of sanctions, is the responsibility and duty of this court." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "Where this court takes a significantly different view of the seriousness of an attorney's conduct, the court thus has not hesitated to reach its own conclusion as to the appropriate sanction." Id.

We conclude that the Board's recommendation of disbarment is supported by the record of Ms. Mayronne's repeated acts of dishonesty. As this court has explained, "honesty is basic to the practice of law," and "a continuing and pervasive indifference to the obligations of honesty in the judicial system" can warrant disbarment. In re Guberman , 978 A.2d 200, 209-10 nn.12 & 13 (D.C. 2009) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Given the circumstances of this case, we view the Board's recommendation of disbarment as reasonable and as consistent with prior disciplinary decisions of this court. See, e.g. , In re Bynum , 197 A.3d 1072, 1073-74 (D.C. 2018) (per curiam) (in uncontested discipline case, court accepts Board's recommendation of disbarment, which "appears to flow directly from our precedent"; respondent's "dishonest conduct spanned five years, from the outset of his representation of clients, through the disciplinary hearing in this case"); see generally, e.g. , In re Baber , 106 A.3d at 1077 (disbarring respondent despite Board's recommendation for more lenient sanction; "Although an isolated incident of dishonesty will not ordinarily by itself warrant disbarment, this case involves a series of knowingly false statements, not only to [a client] but also orally to the court, in written pleadings filed in court, and in a written submission to Bar Counsel. Mr. Baber's dishonesty was also protracted, starting in October 2007 and continuing through to his December 2009 submission to Bar Counsel. The repeated and protracted nature of Mr. Baber's dishonesty weighs significantly in favor of disbarment. Particularly where dishonesty is aggravated and prolonged, disbarment is the appropriate sanction.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

In sum, accepting the Board's recommendation of disbarment in this case would not "foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct" or "otherwise be unwarranted." D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(1).

We are not persuaded by Ms. Mayronne's arguments to the contrary. First, Ms. Mayronne attempts to minimize the seriousness of her dishonesty, arguing for example that her dishonesty did not harm her clients or affect the outcome of judicial decisions. Relatedly, Ms. Mayronne appears to argue that dishonesty warrants disbarment only if the dishonesty involved criminal conduct or the improper taking of funds for personal gain. To the contrary, however, the cases cited above make clear that disbarment can be warranted for a prolonged pattern of repeated dishonesty, even in the absence of the aggravating circumstances Ms. Mayronne identifies.

Second, Ms. Mayronne challenges the Board's conclusion that Ms. Mayronne gave intentionally false testimony to the Hearing Committee to try cover up her prior dishonesty. As Ms. Mayronne accurately points out, the Hearing Committee did not explicitly find that Ms. Mayronne's testimony at the disciplinary hearing was intentionally false. We agree with the Board, however, that the Hearing Committee's findings clearly imply that Ms. Mayronne's testimony at the disciplinary hearing was in some respects intentionally false. In any event, the Board was free to reach an independent conclusion as to whether Ms. Mayronne's testimony was intentionally false. See In re Bradley , 70 A.3d 1189, 1194 (D.C. 2013) (per curiam) (whether attorney gave "sanctionable false testimony before Hearing Committee is a question of ultimate legal fact" that Board and this court review de novo). We agree with the Board's conclusion on that point.

Third, Ms. Mayronne argues that she did not engage in a prolonged pattern of repeated dishonesty, because her instances of dishonesty (1) fell into several discrete groups, (2) occurred primarily between 2005 and 2007, and (3) did not occur after 2011. We disagree. Ms. Mayronne's account omits her intentionally false testimony at the disciplinary hearing in 2015. Moreover, we do not see Ms. Mayronne's instances of dishonesty as isolated or discrete. To the contrary, in our view the record fully supports the Board's conclusion that "over the first eight years of her career as an attorney, [Ms. Mayronne] repeatedly engaged in conduct that was dishonest and disingenuous."

The dissent concludes that accepting the Board's recommendation of disbarment would be inconsistent with the discipline imposed by this court in comparable cases. Infra at 24–30. We respectfully disagree.

As we have explained, see supra at 21–22, this case in our view fits comfortably with prior cases in which we have disbarred attorneys for engaging in a broad, prolonged, and persistent pattern of dishonesty. It is true, as the dissent points out, infra at 27–29, that this court has not always imposed disbarment in cases involving multiple...