In re McCaskey

• Decision Date: 10 October 1917
• Docket Number: No. 10023.,10023.
• Citation: 65 Ind.App. 349,117 N.E. 268
• Parties: In re McCASKEY.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

65 Ind.App. 349

117 N.E. 268

In re McCASKEY.

No. 10023.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1.

Oct. 10, 1917.

Certified Questions from State Industrial Board.

In the matter of the claim of Charles M. McCaskey. Proceeding by Lewis Grabhorn for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act against the Cotton-Wiebke Company. On questions certified by Industrial Board. Questions answered.

HOTTEL, C. J.

The Industrial Board has certified to this court for its decision and determination under section 61 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Acts 1915, ch. 106, p. 410) certain questions of law based on the following facts as certified to by said board: On February 17, 1916, Lewis Grabhorn, hereinafter referred to as “G.,” was in the service of the Cotton-Wiebke Company hereinafter referred to as “the Co.,” as an employé at an average weekly wage of $18, and while in the discharge of his duties in such employment on said day was accidentally struck in the forehead with a sledge hammer by one of his coemployés. Said Co. is a corporation, and its president and manager was present at the time of and witnessed said accident. The blow of the hammer made an abrasion on the forehead of G., but made no visible physical wound that required medical or surgical treatment. G. continued his work in the belief that he had received no physical injury until and including March 18, 1916, when in the evening and after the completion of his work on that day, he was taken with a violent pain in his forehead, of which fact his employer was immediately notified. Said pain continued throughout the night, and on the following day, March 19th, Chas. M. McCaskey, a licensed and practicing physician and surgeon of the city of Indianapolis, was called. Said physician responded to said call, visited G., and examined him, and on March 20th diagnosed G.'s trouble as an abscess in the right frontal sinus which required a surgical operation in order to open and drain the same. On the same day, March 20th, said physician put G. under an anesthetic, and drained the right frontal sinus, and continued his treatment for about 10 days, when G. was so far recovered that he required no further surgical or medical attention. G.'s said abscess as conceded by the Co., was the direct result of the said blow of the sledge hammer received on his head on February 17, 1916. The physician presented a claim for $50 for his services, which the Co. concedes to be reasonable and proper as against G., considering his standard of living. Upon these facts we are asked to determine and decide whether, under the act in question, said physician is entitled to have his claim approved by the Industrial Board.

It appears from the brief of said board, accompanying said certified question, that the Co., through the insurance carrier, contends that said claim should not be approved for the reason that the services for which it is filed were all rendered more than 30 days after February 17, 1916. In support of its contention, said carrier relies on the provisions of section 25 of said act, which requires an employer to furnish a physician only during “the thirty days after an injury.” It will be observed that in the language just quoted the “injury” and not the accident is the thing designated as controlling in determining when the duty to furnish a physician begins and ends, and it will also be observed that throughout said entire act the injury, and not the accident, is treated not only as the condition upon which liability arises, but its date fixes the day upon which liability begins, and from which the period of its continuance must be ascertained, and the time for giving notices, etc. See sections 25, 27-30, 57, and 67. The use of the word “injury” instead of “accident” in these various sections of the act is, we think, significant. It comports with the spirit and purpose of the act, in that it makes liability and compensation, and the time of the beginning and ending of each depend on the actual injury, or the result, rather than on the accident, or the cause.

In our examination of this question, we have found no cause that supports the contention of the insurance carrier, but, on the contrary, we have found several cases in other jurisdictions, where statutes containing language very similar to that of our act, supra, were given the interpretation which we have indicated should be given to our act. Section 7, Connecticut Acts 1913, c. 138, provides that:

“The employer shall provide a competent physician or surgeon to attend any injured employé during the thirty days immediately following the injury as such injury may require, and in addition shall furnish such medical and surgical aid or hospital service, during such thirty days, as such physician or surgeon shall deem reasonable or necessary. ***”

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