In re McConnell
Decision Date | 08 July 1996 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 95-14862-MVB. |
Parties | In re Evan Theodore McCONNELL, Jr. and Margaret Elizabeth McConnell. |
Court | Bankr. V.I. |
Ronald B. Cox, Woodbridge, VA, for Debtors.
Andrew G. Elmore, Chadwick, Washington, Olters, Moriarty & Lynn, P.C., Fairfax, VA, for the Association.
MARTIN V.B. BOSTETTER, Jr., Chief Judge.
Today we consider the objection to confirmation of the debtors' Chapter 13 Plan filed by Holly Forest Homes Association, Ltd. This matter came for hearing on March 26, 1996, at which time the parties represented to the court that the facts of the case are undisputed and the only issue is a question of law. The parties agreed to submit memoranda setting forth their respective positions. We took the matter under advisement and rendered our decision from the bench on June 4, 1996. This Memorandum Opinion incorporates our ruling from the bench.
The pertinent facts are as follows. The debtors, Evan and Margaret McConnell, are the owners in fee simple of Lots 5 and 6, Section Three, in the Holly Forest Subdivision in Fairfax County, Virginia. The debtors built their residence on Lot 6, and Lot 5 is an adjoining undeveloped parcel. Lot 5 is a corner lot which fronts both Wolf Run Shoals and Sylvan Glen Lane. Sylvan Glen Lane is a street owned and maintained by Holly Forest Homes Association, Ltd. while Wolf Run Shoals is a publicly maintained street. Lot 5 does not have an access road to either street. The lots are five acre largely wooded parcels in a section of Fairfax County not served by public sewer. In addition to being undeveloped, Lot 5 does not "perk."
The debtors filed a joint chapter 13 petition in this court on November 1, 1995. Their modified plan was filed on December 20, 1995, in which they propose to make payments of $1,570.00 per month to the trustee for a period of 60 months. The plan provides payment to Holly Forest Homes Association, Ltd. (the "Association") in the amount of $2,100 for delinquent homeowner's assessments. On January 19, 1996, the Association filed its objection to confirmation on the grounds that the plan fails to provide for its secured claim in the amount of $16,150.50.
The Association is a homeowners association composed of the property owners in Holly Forest Subdivision. In March, 1965, the owner of the development, Dowfair Company, filed a Deed of Dedication and Declaration of Reservations and Restrictive Covenants (the "Declaration") as recorded in Deed Book 2596, Page 228 among the land records of Fairfax County. The Declaration sets forth the rights of the Association and the obligations of the property owners.1
The Declaration provides in pertinent part:
By virtue of the Declaration, the Association claims a secured interest in the debtors' real property in the amount of $16,150.50 for both annual and special assessments against Lots 5 and 6. The debtors do not dispute that as property owners in Holly Forest Subdivision they are subject to the Declaration and are required to pay both annual and special assessments. However, the debtors maintain that they are not liable for equal assessments against both Lots 5 and 6 and challenge the Association's authority to levy a special assessment against only those property owners having access to the private roads of the subdivision.
The Association's claim against the debtors is based on annual assessments for each lot for each fiscal year of the Association from 1991 through 1995. According to the Association, the debtors owe a total of $3,100, exclusive of interest, in annual membership fees for both lots.
Additionally, in July, 1994, the Association, by vote of its members, amended the Declaration to approve a special assessment to make road repairs and perform maintenance on some or all of the private roads within the Holly Forest Subdivision which are owned by the Association. The amendment states that the road repair project was to be funded by an assessment charged to those "estates and tracts having addresses on, or driveway access to, the private roads of the Association." On August 16, 1994, the Association sent notices to each lot owner informing them that the Association was assessing each lot owner, at the rate of $6,000 per lot, for necessary road repairs and maintenance for all or part of the private roads within the Holly Forest Subdivision. The debtors were assessed $12,000 ($6,000 per lot) for the road project due to be paid by September 16, 1994. Following completion of the road project, the Association issued a credit to all lot owners in the amount of $365.53 per lot. The debtors never paid the assessment. According to the Association, the debtors' delinquent amount for the road project assessment is $11,268.94, exclusive of interest.
The debtors challenge their liability for both the annual and special assessments against Lot 5. Their argument is two-fold. First, the debtors argue that the language of the Declaration requires the owner-members to pay an annual membership fee for their "estate." The debtors contend that they own one "estate" in Holly Forest Subdivision which consists of two adjoining "lots," on which one residence is constructed. The Declaration states that "membership fees for each estate ... shall be paid annually." Thus, the debtors claim that they should only be assessed one annual fee and one special assessment against their single estate.
Second, the debtors challenge the Association's authority to levy a special assessment against only those property owners with "addresses on, or driveway access to the private roads of the Association." Further, even if the special assessment is valid, the debtors contend that the special assessment does not apply to Lot 5 because it does not have an address on, or driveway access to a private road. In any event, the debtors claim that the special assessment is vague as it applies to Lot 5 because it is undeveloped and does not percolate.
This court has jurisdiction over this controversy under 26 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(a) and the general order of reference entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on August 15, 1984. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) and (L).
The fundamental rule in construing restrictive covenants is that the intention of the parties governs. That intention is gathered from the entire instrument by which the restriction is created, the surrounding circumstances and the objects which the covenant is designed to accomplish. See Whitehurst v. Burgess, 130 Va. 572, 107 S.E. 630 (1921); Traylor v. Holloway, 206 Va. 257, 259-60, 142 S.E.2d 521, 523 (1965); Bauer v. Harn, 223 Va. 31, 286 S.E.2d 192 (1982). See also Village Gate v. Hales, 219 Va. 321, 325, 246 S.E.2d 903, 905 (1978); Bruton v. Wolter, 216 Va. 311, 313-14, 218 S.E.2d 438, 440-41 (1975). In determining the intent of a restrictive covenant, specific words...
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