In re Melton

• Decision Date: 06 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 85-1589.,85-1589.
• Citation: 565 A.2d 635
• Parties: In re Tommie Lee MELTON, Appellant.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 635

565 A.2d 635

In re Tommie Lee MELTON, Appellant.

No. 85-1589.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued January 26, 1989.

Decided November 6, 1989.

Harry J. Fulton, Public Defender Service, with whom James Klein, and Laurie B. Davis, Public Defender Service, were on the brief, for appellant.

Janet L. Maher, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom Frederick D. Cooke, Corp. Counsel at the time the brief was filed, Charles L. Reischel, and Ann O'Regan Keary, Deputies Corp. Counsel, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before FERREN and SCHWELB, Associate Judges, and MACK,^* Associate Judge, Retired.

FERREN, Associate Judge:

Tommie Lee Melton appeals his civil commitment after a jury trial. He claims that, in allowing in evidence the expert opinion testimony of two psychiatric witnesses, the trial court abused its discretion by summarily rejecting appellant's objections to (1) the psychiatrists' reliance on hearsay evidence as the basis for their expert opinions and (2) the qualifications of the psychiatrists themselves to render expert opinions about Melton's dangerousness.¹ Because not all hearsay can be reasonably relied upon as a basis for expert opinion testimony, and because not all psychiatrists are necessarily qualified to provide expert testimony on a person's dangerousness, we agree that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting in evidence the opinion testimony of the two psychiatrists without addressing appellant's objections. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

I.

On July 11, 1985, Dr. Antoine Cornet, a staff psychiatrist at Saint Elizabeths Hospital's Spring Road Mental Health Clinic, hospitalized Melton involuntarily at Saint Elizabeths pursuant to an application for emergency hospitalization, D.C.Code § 21-521 (1989 Supp.). The hospital detained Melton for about a week, id. §§ 21-521 to 21-528 (1989 Supp.), and then extended the detention by filing a judicial hospitalization petition seeking civil commitment for an indeterminate period, id. § 21-541 (1989 Supp.). The Commission on Mental Health held a hearing on the petition on August 5, 1985, Id. § 21-542 (1981). In its Report and Recommendations to the Superior Court issued on August 12, the Commission found that Melton was mentally ill and likely to injure himself or others and recommended his commitment as an outpatient at Saint Elizabeths' Spring Road Clinic.² Melton requested a de novo jury trial, which began on October 17, 1985, and lasted three days. At trial, Saint Elizabeths presented two witnesses, Dr. James Byrd, the administrator and psychiatrist on the ward where Melton was detained, and Dr. Cornet. Melton presented no witnesses. The jury found Melton mentally ill and a danger to himself or to the community, and on October 23, 1985, the trial court ordered Melton's indefinite commitment to the Spring Road Clinic for treatment as an outpatient.

II.

On appeal, Melton claims the trial court committed reversible error by admitting in evidence the expert opinion testimony of Drs. Byrd and Cornet, both of whom testified that he was mentally ill and likely to injure himself or others.³ Melton contends, first, that the trial court abused its discretion in summarily rejecting his objection to the hearsay basis for the psychiatrists' opinions. The testimony of Drs. Byrd and Cornet encompassed both fact and opinion, presented in an intermittent fashion. The doctors testified as to their own observations of Melton's mental condition and based their conclusions that he was mentally ill on these observations, as well as on hearsay diagnoses recorded or related to them by other doctors. But, as for Melton's dangerousness to self or others, the doctors presented almost 110 direct evidence to support their opinions. Instead, they based their opinions that Melton was dangerous almost entirely on incidents of dangerous conduct, allegedly seen by lay observers, which had been related orally to the doctors or recorded in medical records. We agree with Melton that the trial judge's decision to admit the hearsay testimony over appellant's objection, absent a finding that such testimony was reasonably relied upon by the psychiatrists as a basis for their opinions, was an abuse of discretion.

A.

The hospital's first witness at trial was Dr. Byrd, whom the trial court accepted as an expert in the diagnosis and treatment of mental health.⁴ Dr. Byrd testified that he had known Melton since Melton's admission to Saint Elizabeths on July 11, 1985, was "quite familiar" with the medical records pertaining to Melton's most recent admission, and had "reviewed" the most recent records pertaining to Melton's last several admissions.⁵ He then proceeded to offer his opinion — based on his review of the hospital records and his discussions with other hospital staff members, as well as on his observations of Melton⁶ — that Melton suffered from "chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia with strong aspects of a paranoid tendency." Counsel for the hospital next asked Dr. Byrd whether his opinion was affected in any way by his knowledge of the specific circumstances leading to Melton's July 11 admission to Saint Elizabeths. Melton's counsel immediately objected to any explanation of these events. The court overruled the objection. After Dr. Byrd testified that he had diagnosed Melton based on his own observations of Melton while Melton was on the ward and "didn't need outside evidence to substantiate that," hospital counsel again asked him to describe the events leading up to Melton's hospitalization. Melton's counsel objected once again to testimony about these events, stating that such evidence would be hearsay. The following colloquy then occurred:

THE COURT: Of course, it's hearsay. Of course it's hearsay. It's an exception, however, Mr. Fulton [Melton's counsel]. Go ahead, Doctor.

MR. KELLY [Hospital's counsel]: It certainly is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Fulton, please be seated. Go ahead.

MR. FULTON: If I might, Your Honor, could we come to the bench?

THE COURT: Mr. Fulton, no. We won't get the case started. We'll never get started at the rate we're going. Go ahead, Mr. Kelly.

Over three objections, therefore, and without identifying the source of the information, Dr. Byrd proceeded to provide the following hearsay testimony concerning "what [Melton] had done right before he came into the hospital":

He is living with his mother and he became upset with her. He became impulsive and lost control of his temper which is a characteristic of a schizophrenic. And he punched his mother in the nose and became very angry with her and was threatening to poison her.

She became very frightened and called up Dr. Cornet, who was following Mr. Melton on an out-patient basis. And Dr. Cornet went to the home, asked Mr. Melton to sign himself into the hospital voluntarily to receive treatment. And Mr. Melton said that he had no mental illness and that he had no interest at all in signing himself into the hospital for voluntary treatment.

At which point his mother was once again forced to call the police to have Mr. Melton brought into the clinic so that they could bring him to the hospital as an emergency.⁷

Melton's mother, the alleged victim of Melton's punch, was not called to testify concerning the alleged incident, even though she was present at trial for at least one day during the proceedings.

Dr. Byrd next described Melton's behavior on the hospital ward.⁸ He stated that Melton had "a hard time dealing with his feelings of dependency on his mother" but that, once he was away from her and in a controlled environment on medication, he "rapidly became very calm and seclusive,' a course typical of schizophrenics who have difficulty with close relationships. According to Dr. Byrd, Melton was "relatively passive" and cooperative; he would "sit around the ward most of the day," thinking or reading books on religion, and would occasionally chat with other patients. On a few occasions, however, Melton displayed "impulsive, explosive verbal outbursts" when asked to do something he did not want to do. Dr. Byrd testified that Melton "was able to bathe himself and dress appropriately and was eventually ready to be returned home."

Dr. Byrd continued to testify, relaying facts and opinion, without indicating the sources of his data. Melton was released for outpatient treatment September 3, 1985, and was required to report to the Spring Road Clinic once every two weeks for an injection of prolixin, an anti-psychotic medication. According to Dr. Byrd, the medication resulted in "a substantial improvement" in Melton's condition, as compared to "the way that he presented himself to the hospital, completely disheveled, extremely untidy, extremely dirty, having not bathed for weeks, urinating in his bedroom." Dr. Byrd stated that Melton had superficial insight into his mental illness.⁹ Although Dr. Byrd already had testified that he had only reviewed the history of Melton's most recent admissions to the hospital, he maintained at trial that Melton "had not been able to follow his treatment for the past ten [to] fourteen years." According to Dr. Byrd, with some prodding and encouragement Melton had been able to say that he needed medication, but he had not been able to follow through. Dr. Byrd opined, "If he misses one or two injections, he will be right back to where he started from which is psychotic and threatening and assaultive and very bizarre and delusional."

Counsel for the hospital next asked Dr. Byrd to relate details of Melton's non-compliance with treatment during previous admissions to the hospital. The trial court, after sustaining Melton's counsel's objection that Dr. Byrd already had testified that he had not reviewed the records from earlier admissions, limited Dr. Byrd to discussing the 1985 admissions for which he had read the medical records. Dr. Byrd testified that Melton's admission from November 1984 through January 1985 was representative of all...