In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("Mtbe")
| Decision Date | 09 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. MDL 1358(SAS).,No. 1:00-1898.,No. M 21-88.,1:00-1898.,M 21-88.,MDL 1358(SAS). |
| Citation | 415 F.Supp.2d 261 |
| Parties | In re: METHYL TERTIARY BUTYL ETHER ("MTBE") PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION This document relates to: City of Mishawaka v. Amerada Hess Corp., et al., 04 Civ. 2055 City of Rockport v. Amerada Hess Corp., et al., 04 Civ. 1724 City of South Bend v. Amerada Hess Corp., et al., 04 Civ. 2056 North Newton School Corp. v. Amerada Hess Corp., et al., 03 Civ. 2057 Town of Campbellsburg v. Amerada Hess Corp., et al., 04 Civ. 4990 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Scott Summy, Carla Burke, Baron & Budd, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Plaintiffs.
Robin Greenwald, Robert Gordon, C. Sanders McNew, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., New York City, for Plaintiffs.
Michael A. Walsh, Courtney L. Jones, Jadd F. Masso, Strasburger & Price, LLP, Dallas, TX, for Defendant 7-Eleven, Inc.
Christopher J. Garvey, Goodwin Procter, LLP, New York City, for Defendant Gulf Oil Limited Partnership.
J. Stephen Bennett, Baker & Daniels, Fort Wayne, IN, for Defendant Lassus Bros. Oil, Inc.
Peter John Sacripanti, James A. Pardo, Stephen J. Riccardulli, McDermott, Will & Emery LLP, New York City, for Defendants.
In this consolidated multi-district litigation, plaintiffs seek relief from defendants' alleged contamination, or threatened contamination of groundwater with the gasoline additive methyl tertiary butyl ether ("MTBE"). The parties have already engaged in extensive motion practice, and familiarity with the Court's previous opinions is assumed.1 Gulf Oil Limited Partnership ("Gulf Oil LP"), Lassus Bros. Oil, Inc. ("Lassus Bros. Oil"), and 7-Eleven, Inc. ("7-Eleven") now move pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the complete dismissal of City of South Bend, Town of Campbellsburg, City of Mishawaka, City of Rockport, and North Newton School Corporation's ("Indiana plaintiffs") claims against them.
On April 20, 2005, I dismissed the claims of the Indiana plaintiffs against all downstream handlers, as defined by plaintiffs,2 without prejudice because their Complaints were inherently contradictory.3 Because of the possibility that this inherent contradiction resulted from a drafting error, I granted leave to replead and advised plaintiffs that if they amended their complaints, they should "clarify whether `defendants' and `downstream handlers' are mutually exclusive categories."4
Plaintiffs filed amended Complaints on June 30, 2005.5 In these Complaints, plaintiffs alleged causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) public and private nuisance, (3) trespass, (4) damages resulting from civil conspiracy, and (5) the recovery of costs under the Indiana Environmental Legal Actions statute6 ("IELA") against Gulf Oil LP, Lassus Bros. Oil, and 7-Eleven.7 Plaintiffs removed previously asserted claims for products liability and failure to warn against these three defendants. The claims as to these defendants now rest on allegations that they released MTBE-containing gasoline.8 In this way, plaintiffs identified Gulf Oil LP, Lassus Bros. Oil, and 7-Eleven as the three downstream handler defendants.9
In the newly filed Complaints, plaintiffs also retained the earlier overlapping definitions of defendants and downstream handlers. Plaintiffs continued to allege that all downstream handler defendants were misled as to the potential harm of MTBE.10
Downstream handler defendants now assert that the only way for plaintiffs to proceed on their claims of negligence, nuisance, trespass, recovery of costs pursuant to the IELA, and damages due to civil conspiracy is to rely on theories of collective liability, but that "no theory of collective liability is applicable to [downstream handler defendants]."11 Downstream handler defendants also claim that the Complaints remain inherently contradictory and that they should be dismissed with prejudice.12 For the following reasons the downstream handler defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
In a previous ruling I held that in the absence of a definitive ruling by the highest court of a particular state, this Court is called upon to predict what that court would decide when faced with an undecided issue of state law.13 States have the primary responsibility to construe their own laws.14 Therefore, some federal courts—especially in diversity cases—have exercised great restraint in ruling on novel issues of state law.15 The Second Circuit has stated that the role of the federal court is to "construe and apply state law as [it] believe[s] the state's highest court would, not to adopt innovative theories that may distort established state law."16 Courts have noted that such caution is especially appropriate when a plaintiff has chosen to bring an action in federal court.17
Here, plaintiffs did not bring these actions in federal court in the hope of obtaining a broader interpretation of state law than they reasonably might have expected to obtain from the state. In fact, these actions were originally brought in state court but removed to federal court over plaintiffs' vigorous objections. Thus, plaintiffs sought to have a state court interpret state law and should not be prejudiced by a removal they opposed.
When a defendant removes a case from state to federal court, the principle of dual sovereignty requires the application of a liberal construction of state law in order to protect a party who sought to obtain a resolution of state law claims from state courts. If this Court were to adopt a more restrictive reading of state law than the highest courts of the relevant states would be likely to adopt, the parties would be treated differently than they would be in a state court—a result directly contrary to the fundamental goals of Erie, namely the "discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of laws."18
In making a prediction of state law, federal courts "look to the state's decisional law, as well as to its constitution and statutes."19 The "fullest weight" is accorded to the pronouncements of the state's highest court, while "proper regard" is given to the relevant rulings of the state's lower courts.20 A court may consider cases from other jurisdictions on the same or analogous issues.21 If the state has not passed on the question but the federal appeals court in the circuit where the state is located "has essayed its own prediction of the course of state law ... the federal courts of other circuits should defer to that holding."22 However, a court is not bound by the relevant circuit court's decision if it is "persuaded that the holding ha[s] been superceded by a later pronouncement from state legislative or judicial sources, or that prior state court decisions had been inadvertently overlooked by the pertinent court of appeals."23 Thus, while a court may not adopt innovative theories without support in state law, or distort existing state law, when a case is removed to federal court, the plaintiff is entitled to the same treatment it would receive in state court—no more, and no less.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) should be granted only if "`it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [its] claim which would entitle [it] to relief.'" 24 At the motion to dismiss stage, the issue " " 25
The task of the court in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is "merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof." 26 When deciding a motion to dismiss, courts must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor.27 Although the plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, the claim may still fail as a matter of law if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief, or if the claim is not legally feasible.28 Accordingly, a claim can only be dismissed if "`no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'" 29
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the plaintiff must provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 8(a) does not require "a plaintiff to plead the legal theory, facts, or elements underlying his claim."30 "To comply with Rule 8, plaintiffs need not provide anything more than sufficient notice to permit defendant to file an answer."31 The only requirement is that a complaint allege the "bare minimum facts necessary to put the defendant on notice of the claim so that [it] can file an answer."32 Fair notice is "`that which will enable the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial, allow the application of res judicata, and identify the nature of the case so that it may be assigned the proper form of trial.'"33 This notice pleading standard "relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." 34
Rule 8 also allows for pleading in the alternative. Rule 8(e) states in relevant part that,
[a] party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two or more...
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In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (Mtbe) Products, MDL 1358(SAS).
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In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("Mtbe")
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