In re Micaela C.
| Citation | 769 A.2d 600 |
| Decision Date | 19 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-43-Appeal.,99-43-Appeal. |
| Parties | In re Micaela C. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
Present WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.
Frank P. Iacono, Jr., Thomas J. Corrigan, Jr., Washington Crossing, PA, for plaintiff. Jason M. Gramitt, Portsmouth, Thomas L. Mirza, Rumford, for defendant.
The respondent-father, Wesley Spratt (father), appeals from a Family Court decree terminating his parental rights to his daughter, Micaela C., born September 4, 1990. The Family Court terminated the parental rights of Regina C., mother of Micaela, on September 12, 1997 by a default judgment. Only the father is appealing the Family Court decree.
Micaela was committed to the care, custody and control of the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF or department) on July 18, 1994 after the child was found to be neglected by the father. On May 10, 1996, the department filed a termination of parental rights petition pursuant to G.L. 1956 (1996 Reenactment) §§ 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii), (a)(3), (a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(iv).1 As applied to the father, the petition alleged: (1) that Micaela had been in the legal custody or care of the department and that her father's chronic substance abuse problems and prognosis indicated that she would not be able to return to the father's custody within a reasonable period of time, considering Micaela's age and need for a permanent home; (2) that Micaela had been in DCYF custody for at least twelve months and there was not a substantial probability that the child would be returned to her father within a reasonableperiod of time; (3) that the father was unfit as a parent by reason of emotional illness, mental illness, mental deficiency, or institutionalization, including imprisonment; and (4) that the court had previously terminated the father's parental rights to another child who is a member of the same family and the father continues to lack the ability or willingness to cooperate with services which led to the child being placed.
Thereafter, on February 13, 1997, the father was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, without the possibility of parole. See State v. Spratt, 742 A.2d 1194, 1197 (R.I.1999)
. In addition, he was convicted of carrying a pistol without a license and committing a crime of violence when armed with a firearm. Id. He received a ten-year sentence as to each, consecutive to each other and to the life sentence. Id. He was also convicted for being a habitual offender and received a twenty-year sentence consecutive to the other sentences. Id. His conviction was later affirmed by this Court. Id.
The trial justice found that DCYF had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Micaela had been in the care of the department for at least twelve months. He also found that the department had offered the father services to correct the situation that led to the child being placed, but that, despite the department's efforts, the father did not follow through with DCYF's case-plan programs. The trial justice stated that "[e]ven if Mr. Spratt had not been incarcerated, his lack of commitment to follow through with services and visitation indicates that no placement with him would have been possible within a reasonable time." The trial justice also determined that the father's conviction and imprisonment "renders it improbable for him to care for the child for an extended period of time." He also found that the father's parental rights to another child, Ariana, had been terminated based upon his failure to cooperate with proffered services and to maintain contact with the child. Based upon these findings, thetrial justice concluded that the father was unfit to parent Micaela. He concluded that it was in Micaela's best interests to terminate the father's parental rights, stating:
The trial justice granted the petition and terminated the respondent's parental rights. The father thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal.
This case came before this Court for oral argument pursuant to an order directing the father to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 13-6-1 — the civil death statute. After a hearing, this Court found that cause had been shown on this issue. Thereafter, we ordered the parties to show cause why this appeal should not be summarily decided on the merits, without reference to § 13-6-1. In light of this Court's order, the father raises a series of issues that address the merits of the decree granting this termination-of-parental-rights petition. Nevertheless, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that we can decide the appeal summarily.
The father argues that the termination of his parental rights does nothing to further the best interests of Micaela. The father also contends that the trial justice misconstrued or misapplied other subsections of § 15-7-7(a) that related to the father's substance abuse, to the probability of Micaela's safe return to her father's care, to the father's incarceration, and to the effect of a previous termination of the father's parental rights with respect to another child. In sum, the father contends that clear and convincing evidence did not exist so as to justify the trial justice's findings. We address each of these arguments below.
Our review of the record reveals that evidence does exist to support the trial justice's findings in this case. Indeed, the uncontradicted evidence showed that the father had a long-standing substance abuse problem, which he had refused to address. As was noted by the trial justice, the father's parental rights to Micaela's sister, Ariana, were terminated based upon the same issues as those raised in this case. Moreover, the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that the father had failed to cooperate with drug treatment, despite the department's efforts in arranging for services. He missed numerous appointments and never completed treatment to the satisfaction of the department.
The father also argues that the trial justice was clearly wrong in terminating his parental rights based upon his imprisonment. It is his contention that his imprisonment, standing alone, was an insufficient basis for terminating his parental rights because it did not affect Micaela's living situation and because the department made no efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship following his imprisonment.
In this case, the father is a convicted murderer who has been sentenced to a term of life without parole — plus an...
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...H., 813 A.2d 55, 57 (R.I.2003). "Such factors can include `the probable duration of * * * incarceration.'" Id. (quoting In re Micaela C., 769 A.2d 600, 604 (R.I.2001)). Significantly, we have held that "[i]n calculating the period of incarceration, the [trial] justice may look to the total ......
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