In re Michael
Citation | 66 S.Ct. 78,90 L.Ed. 30,326 U.S. 224 |
Decision Date | 05 November 1945 |
Docket Number | No. 38,38 |
Parties | In re MICHAEL |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
Mr. Robert T. McCracken, of Philadelphia, Pa., for petitioner.
Mr. Robert Hitchcock, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.
A Federal District Court, after a hearing, adjudged that the petitioner was guilty of contempt on findings that he had given 'false and evasive' testimony before a Grand Jury which 'obstructed the said Grand Jury in its inquiry and the due administration of justice.' A sentence of six months imprisonment was imposed. The Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence, found that the petitioner had not been 'contumacious or obstreperous', had not refused to answer questions, and that his testimony could not be 'fairly characterized as unresponsive in failing to give direct answers to the questions asked him.' But it accepted the District Court's finding that the petitioner's testimony as to relevant facts was false, and concluded that it was of a type tending to block the inquiry and consequently 'an obstruction of the administration of justice' within the meaning of Sec. 268 of the Judicial Code,1 so as to subject petitioner to the District Court's power to punish for contempt. 3 Cir., 146 F.2d 627, 628, 630. We granted certiorari to review this question, 324 U.S. 837, 65 S.Ct. 914, in view of the close similarity of the issues here to those decided in Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 39 S.Ct. 337, 63 L.Ed. 656, 11 A.L.R. 333, a case in which the District Court was held to have exceeded its contempt power.
A brief summary of circumstances leading to the petitioner's conviction will help to focus the issues. The Grand Jury undertook a general investigation of frauds against the United States which led to an inquiry concerning administration of the reorganization of the Central Forging Company under Sec. 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 207. The petitioner, by appointment of a district judge, had been serving as that company's trustee. While before the Grand Jury he was repeatedly interrogated concerning payments of various amounts made from the bankrupt's assets. He was asked to explain the purposes for which numerous checks had been drawn. After weeks of inquiry in which he and others were interrogated about these matters, the Court, on petition of the prosecution before the Grand Jury, issued a rule to petitioner to show cause why an order should not be made adjudging him in contempt of court for obstructing the investigation. Upon trial by the Court the transcript of petitioner's Grand Jury testimony was offered in evidence. The Court then heard other witnesses on behalf of the prosecution who testified to facts which directly conflicted with the petitioner's explanations before the Grand Jury. The District Court, disbelieving petitioner and believing the other witnesses, made its finding that petitioner's Grand Jury testimony had been false. No witness was offered to indicate that the petitioner in the Grand Jury room had been guilty of misconduct of any kind other than false swearing. And a reading of the evidence persuades us that the Circuit Court of Appeals correctly found that he had directly responded with unequivocal answers.2 These unequivocal answers were clear enough so that if they are shown to be false petitioner would clearly be guilty of perjury. But he could have been indicted for that offense, in which event a jury would have been the proper tribunal to say whether he or other witnesses told the truth. Our question is whether it was proper for the District Court to make its finding on that issue the crucial element in determining its power to try and convict petitioner for contempt.
Not very long ago we had occasion to point out that the Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 487, from which Sec. 268 of the Judicial Code derives, represented a deliberate Congressional purpose drastically to curtail the range of conduct which Courts could punish as contempt. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 44—48, 61 S.Ct. 810, 813—816, 85 L.Ed. 1172.3 True, the Act of 1831 carries upon its face the purpose to leave the courts ample power to protect the administration of justice against immediate interruption of its business. But the references to that Act's history in the Nye case, supra, reveal a Congressional intent to safeguard constitutional procedures by limiting courts, as Congress is limited in contempt cases, to 'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231, 5 L.Ed. 242. The exercise by federal courts of any broader contempt power than this would permit too great inroads on the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights, since contempts are summary in their nature, and leave determination of guilt to a judge rather than a jury. It is in this Constitutional setting that we must resolve the issues here raised.
All perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice, since it may produce a judgment not resting on truth. Therefore it cannot be denied that it tends to defeat the sole ultimate objective of a trial. It need not necessarily, however, obstruct or halt the judicial process. For the function of trial is to sift the truth from a mass of contradictory evidence, and to do so the fact finding tribunal must hear both truthful and false witnesses. It is in this sense, doubtless, that this Court spoke when it decided that perjury alone does not constitute an 'obstruction'...
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...S.Ct. 1288, 1290, 8 L.Ed.2d 434 (1962), and use of "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227, 66 S.Ct. 78, 79, 90 L.Ed. 30 (1945). Recent decisions have rehearsed the pruning of the contempt power in federal court, beginning with the Act of 18......
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...properly under the omnibus clause of § 1503. Defendant relies principally on the Supreme Court's decision in In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 66 S.Ct. 78, 90 L.Ed. 30 (1945), to support this proposition. In In re Michael, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a defendant who had been fou......
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...115–16 (4th Cir.1984) (citing Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383, 39 S.Ct. 337, 63 L.Ed. 656 (1919)); compare In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 228, 66 S.Ct. 78, 90 L.Ed. 30 (1945) (“[P]erjury alone does not constitute an ‘obstruction’ [of the administration of justice] ... [and] there ‘must b......
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...a ‘judgment not resting on the truth.’” (first quoting United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978), and then quoting In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945))); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993) (finding perjury statutes necessary to uphold integrity of the trial syste......
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