In re Military Training Camp in Prince George County, Va.

• Decision Date: 23 October 1919
• Citation: 260 F. 986
• Parties: In re MILITARY TRAINING CAMP IN PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY, VA.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

260 F. 986

In re MILITARY TRAINING CAMP IN PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY, VA.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia.

October 23, 1919

Hiram M. Smith, U.S. Atty., of Richmond, Va., for the United States.

Wilson M. Farr, of Fairfax C.H., Va., George H. Lamar, of Washington, D.C., Wyndham R. Meredith and Meredith &amp Meredith, all of Richmond, Va., and James A. Hefflin and A L. Jones, both of Hopewell, Va., for sundry landowners.

WADDILL District Judge.

On the 24th of June, 1919, the original petition in these proceedings was filed by the United States of America, having for its purpose the condemnation of 32 tracts or parcels of land, with the improvements thereon, in the county of Prince George, Va., in the Eastern district of Virginia, at and adjacent to Camp Lee, and on the 30th day of June, 1919, an amended petition, having for its object the same purpose, was also filed by leave of court. Subsequently, on the 10th day of September, 1919, an order was entered giving notice by publication to the tenants of the freehold, as required by law, made returnable before this court, at its courtroom in the city of Richmond, Va., on the 6th day of October, 1919 the first day of the next ensuing term.

On the return day of this process, sundry defendants appeared, some specially, and some generally, and by appropriate proceedings, by way of demurrer, by special plea, and motions to dismiss, raised the question of the jurisdiction of the court, and sought to contest the validity of the proceedings. The case is now before the court for consideration of the legal questions thus presented.

The government's petition sets forth that the same was filed by direction of the Attorney General of the United States acting in this behalf in accordance with the request of the Secretary of War of the United States, who had certified that it was necessary and advantageous to the interests of the United States to acquire the lands described in and set forth in said petition; that the said lands were needed for the site, location, construction, and prosecution of works for a military training camp, and that the Secretary of War was acting pursuant to the provisions of the act of the 2d day of July, 1917 (Fed.Stat.Ann.Supp. 1918, p. 166; U.S. Comp.Stat.Temp.Supp. 1917, p. 363; 40 Stat. 241, c. 35 (Comp. St. 1918, Sec. 6911a)).

The petition further sets forth that the United States, acting through their proper officers and agents and duly authorized representatives, had made an effort to agree with the landowners upon the price and terms of purchase, but without avail. It is further averred that, at the time of the filing of the petition and amended petition, a state of war existed between the United States of America, on the one hand, and the Imperial German government and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian government, on the other; that the interests of the landowners proposed to be taken by the United States were the fee-simple interests in and to said properties; and that an appropriation to pay for said lands was available, contained in the act entitled 'An act making appropriations for the support of the army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1919,' approved July 9, 1918 (Act July 9, 1918, c. 143, 40 Stat. 845).

The grounds of defense interposed are briefly: First, that this court is without jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding, and that the same can only be maintained in the circuit court of Prince George county, Va., where the lands lie; second, that the proceedings should not be entertained, because it is manifest that the lands are not sought for public use, such as is authorized by the Constitution and laws of the United States, warranting the exercise of the right of eminent domain in respect thereto; and, third, because no appropriation exists whereby the lands condemned can be paid for. These two last positions will be considered in the order named, and in connection with the authority of the Secretary of War to inaugurate the proceedings.

By Act July 2, 1917, 40 Stat. 241, being an enlargement of Act Aug. 18, 1890, 26 Stat. 316, c. 797 (Comp. St. Sec. 6911), the Secretary of War is authorized to cause proceedings to be instituted in the name of the United States, in any court having jurisdiction of such proceedings, for the acquirement by condemnation of any land, or the temporary use thereof, or any other interest therein, or right pertaining thereto, needed for the site, location, construction, or prosecution of works for fortifications, coast defenses, and military training camps; such proceedings to be prosecuted in accordance with the laws relating to suits for the condemnation of property of the states wherein the proceedings may be instituted. The act further provides for the purchase of property when terms can be agreed upon, acceptance of donations in that connection by the Secretary of War, and for the taking of immediate possession of the property by the government in advance of the ascertainment even of the validity of the title, by reason of the imminence of war, etc., and an existing immediate urgency arising therefrom.

The defendants insist that, notwithstanding this plain provision of the act of Congress authorizing the Secretary of War to acquire property by condemnation, he is now prohibited from so...