In re Miller
Citation | 171 A.3d 367 |
Decision Date | 01 June 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 8 JD 15,8 JD 15 |
Parties | IN RE: Kenneth MILLER, Former Senior Magisterial District Judge |
Court | Court of Judicial Discipline of Pennsylvania |
OPINION BY JUDGE DAVID BARTON
Respondent Kenneth Miller (Respondent Miller), a former Senior Magisterial District Judge, appears before this Court in response to a Complaint filed by the Judicial Conduct Board. The Complaint contains two counts, to wit; Count 1—alleging a violation of Article V, § 18(d)(1) of the Pennsylvania Constitution for former Senior MDJ Miller's felony conviction in federal court, and; Count 2—alleging a violation of Article V, § 18(d)(1) of the Pennsylvania Constitution for bringing the judicial office into disrepute.1 These charges arise from Respondent Miller's attempting to influence the outcome of a case in Philadelphia Traffic Court.
1. Article V, § 18(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution established this Court and grants it the authority to adjudicate cases against Pennsylvania justices, judges, and magisterial district judges.
2. Article V, § 18(a) of the Pennsylvania Constitution grants to the Judicial Conduct Board the authority to determine whether there is probable cause to File formal charges against a judicial officer in this Court, and thereafter, to prosecute the case in support of such charges in this Court.
3. After Respondent Miller retired from his service as a commissioned magisterial district judge, he was certified to serve as a senior magisterial district judge from January, 2006, until his resignation from senior status on January 7, 2013.
4. The court orders assigning Respondent Miller to the particular assignments listed above provided that he "shall have the same jurisdiction and authority as one elected and qualified to serve in said magisterial district."
5. As a senior magisterial district judge either eligible for assignment or actively serving such an assignment, Respondent Miller was subject to all the duties and responsibilities imposed on him by the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Rules Governing Standards of Conduct of Magisterial District Judges.
6. Prior to his resignation from senior status, Respondent Miller was the subject of a federal grand jury investigation regarding his participation in the practice of giving favorable treatment in traffic court cases to certain defendants based upon ex parte requests.2
7. On January 31, 2013, in a case filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, captioned United States v. Kenneth Miller, at Docket No. 2:13–cr–00046–RK, Respondent Miller was charged by criminal information with one felony count of Mail Fraud,3 for his act of using the mails between December 2010 and February 2011 to attempt to influence a case pending in Philadelphia Traffic Court.
8. On February 12, 2013, before the Honorable Robert F. Kelly, United States District Judge, Respondent Miller waived his right to indictment by grand jury and pleaded guilty to one felony count of Mail Fraud pursuant to a guilty plea agreement.
9. The exact conduct as recited by the prosecutor at the guilty plea colloquy, and admitted by Respondent Miller, in pertinent part, is as follows:
Bd. Ex. "6" at 15.
10. On January 5, 2015, United States District Judge Kelly sentenced Respondent Miller to one year of probation, plus a $100.00 assessment, and a $1,000.00 fine.
11. Respondent Miller's felony conviction arises from his acts during a period of time during which he was either actually serving judicial assignments, or he was otherwise eligible for such assignment.
Respondent Miller admits his criminal conduct but sets forth in his Answer that:
[Respondent Miller] was not an active or appointed Senior District Justice [sic] at the time of the acts set forth in the information filed against him and to which he pled guilty and therefore he had no duty or responsibility as a judge and was not violative of Article V, § 18(d)(1)....
Respondent Miller's Answer, and letter brief submitted on April 20, 2016, raises a jurisdictional challenge to this Court's ability to hear and decide this case. Respondent Miller argues that he is not subject to the jurisdiction and authority of the Court of Judicial Discipline because he was not a senior magisterial district judge at the time of the alleged misconduct.4 Respondent Miller's argument is that the acts leading to the conviction did not occur while Respondent Miller was acting as a senior magisterial district judge. The act giving rise to the federal conviction was his use of the U.S. Mail to transmit an attempt to influence a case pending in Philadelphia Traffic Court. According to the guilty plea colloquy by the Government, Respondent Miller mailed the ticket to William Hird "[b]etween December 11, 2010, and February 14, 2011." The record in this matter does not reflect that Respondent Miller was assigned to actual judicial service in December, 2010. Thus, Respondent Miller's argument concludes that Respondent Miller was not a "judge" on December 11, 2010, or at the time of his conviction on January 5, 2015, and is therefore not subject to the provisions of Article V, § 18(d) of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
This proposition fails on a number of levels. First, it is beyond question that this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate charges filed by the Judicial Conduct Board against a jurist. See In re Bruno, 627 Pa. 505, 101 A.3d 635, 661–662 (2014). This Court's jurisdiction continues after a judge has left office. See In re Ciavarella, 108 A.3d 983, 987 (Pa.Ct.Jud.Disc. 2014). Respondent Miller's claim is essentially that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because he was not in active judicial service at the time he committed the acts leading to his federal criminal conviction, or at the time of the January 5, 2015 conviction itself. This conclusion can only be reached through an unduly narrow reading of the case law conferring power on the Court of Judicial Discipline, and an equally unsupportable characterization of the criminal conviction.
It has long been decided that senior judges, whether on a period of active judicial service or merely eligible for such an assignment, have submitted themselves to the proscriptions of Article V, § 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, In the case of In re Cain, 527 Pa. 260, 590 A.2d 291 (1991), our Supreme Court held that the voluntary act of a judge to hold himself or herself out as being available for a temporary judicial assignment renders himself or herself subject to the disciplinary provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In this regard, eligibility for judicial service is a voluntary act by an otherwise retired jurist, and the ability to receive such assignments and hold oneself out as a "senior judge" carries with it a concomitant obligation to continue to be bound by the Constitution, and...
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