In re Mintz
Decision Date | 24 June 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 92-SP-222.,92-SP-222. |
Citation | 626 A.2d 926 |
Parties | In re Mark A. MINTZ, Respondent, A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Mark A. Mintz, New York City, did not file an appearance.
Leonard H. Becker, Bar Counsel, and Michael S. Frisch, Asst. Bar Counsel, Washington, DC, were on the Statement of Bar Counsel, for petitioner.
Before ROGERS, Chief Judge, and FERREN and SULLIVAN, Associate Judges.
Respondent Mark A. Mintz is a member of the Bars of both New Jersey and the District of Columbia. Effective February 2, 1992, and until further court order, the Supreme Court of New Jersey suspended respondent for two years for grossly neglecting his clients' matters, exhibiting a pattern of neglect, lacking due diligence, failing to communicate with clients, failing to cooperate with ethics authorities, and failing to maintain a bona fide office in New Jersey, in violation of New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1(a), 1.1(b), 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(b), and New Jersey Rules of General Application 1:21-1(a).1In re Mintz, 126 N.J. 484, 600 A.2d 143 (1992). The New Jersey Supreme Court further ordered, as a condition of reinstatement, that respondent practice under the supervision of a proctor for two years. Id.
Based upon the New Jersey disciplinary proceedings against respondent, and pending final disposition of the instant proceeding, this court suspended respondent from the practice of law in the District of Columbia by order dated March 12, 1992. See D.C.Bar R. XI § 11(d). We also directed the Board on Professional Responsibility to recommend whether reciprocal discipline should be imposed. See D.C.Bar R. XI § 11(e).
Upon consideration of a statement filed by Bar Counsel2 and of the record of the New Jersey proceedings against respondent, the Board concluded that there was no violation of due process or infirmity of proof in the New Jersey proceedings and that the misconduct established in those proceedings would have constituted a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility that was in effect in the District of Columbia at the time of respondent's acts.3 The Board further concluded that a two-year suspension, conditioning reinstatement on a showing of fitness,4 is within the range of sanctions that would be imposed in this jurisdiction for such a significant pattern of misconduct. Accordingly, the Board has now recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for two years and that, as a condition of his reinstatement, respondent be required to prove his fitness to practice. The Board also decided, however, that it would be inappropriate to follow the New Jersey Supreme Court in requiring respondent's supervision for an additional two years, because that is not the kind of sanction our court has ordered in similar cases. See D.C.Bar.R. XI § 11(c)(4) ( ).
We traditionally defer to the Board's recommendations. See In re Garner, 576 A.2d 1356, 1357 (D.C.1990); D.C.Bar R. XI § 9(g) (). In this case, we adopt the Board's recommendations in virtually all respects.
We agree with the Board that a two-year suspension, with reinstatement conditioned upon a showing of fitness, is "within the range of sanctions," Garner, 576 A.2d at 1357, that we have previously ordered for similar cases of gross and persistent negligence of client matters. See In re Delate, 598 A.2d 154 (D.C.1991) ( ); In re Alexander, 496 A.2d 244 (D.C.1985) ( ); In re Sheehy, 454 A.2d 1360 (D.C.1983) ( ). We also agree with the Board's conclusion that a subsequent period of supervised practice would be inappropriate in this case, as we did not require such supervision in the comparable cases of Delate, Alexander, or Sheehy.
Our order differs from the Board's recommendation only insofar as we impose respondent's suspension prospectively. The Board had proposed that the sanction be ordered nunc pro tunc from the date of respondent's temporary suspension. After the Board had issued its recommendation, however, Bar Counsel informed this court that respondent had failed to file an affidavit of compliance with D.C.Bar R. XI § 14, as required by § 14(f) of that rule. In cases such as this, where an attorney has failed to carry out his or her responsibilities under this rule, we have imposed disciplinary sanctions prospectively, rather than retroactively. See In re Mulkeen, 606 A.2d 136, 139 (D.C.1992).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that respondent shall be, and hereby is, suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for a period of two years from the date hereof, with reinstatement conditional upon a showing of rehabilitation in accord with the provisions of D.C.Bar R. XI §§ 3(a)(2) & 16. See In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215, 1217 (D.C.1985).
I join the court's opinion but write separately to place this decision in its broader context.
Our caselaw development as to supervised probation in reciprocal discipline cases has not been entirely consistent. In at least one reciprocal discipline case, this court imposed the discipline ordered by the other jurisdiction, including supervision by a "probation monitor" for four years after completion of a one-year suspension. See In re Chadwick, 585 A.2d 798, modified, 591 A.2d 837 (D.C.1991). The monitoring, however, was limited to that conducted in California, where the respondent had his practice. See id., 585 A.2d at 801.
In contrast, in another reciprocal discipline case where Florida had imposed both a ninety-one day suspension and a two-year probation period for charging clearly excessive attorney's fees, this court ordered the same suspension but did not, in addition, require the two-year probation as reciprocal discipline in the District of Columbia. See In re Richardson, 602 A.2d 179 (D.C. 1992). The Board had taken the view that probation would be inappropriate because there was no evidence that the attorney had a practice or health-related problem that called for monitoring. See id. at 186.
I agree that, given our required deference to the recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility, see ante at 927-928, this is not a case in which supervised probation should be required in addition to suspension and reinstatement upon a showing of fitness. Because we regularly do require supervised probation in certain kinds of cases, however, I believe it is important to show that the present case does not fall within the scope of those cases where we commonly have done so.
Typically, this court has ordered a period of supervised probation only in cases where the attorney's prior misconduct has been "attributable to extraordinary circumstances, such as a physical, mental, or emotional crisis or illness which had abated since the time of the violation." In re Tinsley, 582 A.2d 1192, 1195 (D.C.1990).1Compare In re Larsen, 589 A.2d 400 (D.C. 1991) ( ) and In re Peek, 565 A.2d 627 (D.C.1989) ( ) and In re Reid, 540 A.2d 754 (D.C. 1988) ( ) and In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C.1987) (same) with Tinsley, 582 A.2d at 1195-96 ( )...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
IN RE LYLES, 94-BG-1408
...other serious violations, and prior discipline, have warranted two-year suspensions with fitness requirements. See, e.g., In re Mintz, 626 A.2d 926 (D.C. 1993); In re Delate, 598 A.2d 154 (D.C. 1991); In re Alexander, 496 A.2d 244 (D.C. 1985); In re Thorup, 461 A.2d 1018 (D.C. 1983). In In ......
-
In re Speights
...aggravating circumstances had resulted in suspension for two years, namely: In re Lyles , 680 A.2d 408, 418 (D.C. 1996) ; In re Mintz , 626 A.2d 926, 928 (D.C. 1993) ; In re Delate , 598 A.2d 154, 161 (D.C. 1991). See also In re Alexander , 496 A.2d 244 (D.C. 1985) ; In re Thorup , 461 A.2d......
-
In re Bradley, 12–BG–1205.
...for or respond to ongoing litigation on behalf of the clients over several years causing all clients to lose their claims); In re Mintz, 626 A.2d 926, 928 (D.C.1993) (imposing two-year suspension for failing to file complaints for four clients and completely ignoring clients calls and lette......
-
In re Drury, 96-BG-156.
...sanctions for comparable conduct." In re Slosberg, 650 A.2d 1329, 1330 (D.C.1994) (referencing D.C.Bar Rule XI, § 9(g); In re Mintz, 626 A.2d 926, 927 (D.C.1993)). In the reciprocal discipline cases, "this court can impose a greater sanction than that imposed in the other jurisdiction." In ......