In re Mire

• Decision Date: 19 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2015–B–1453.,2015–B–1453.
• Citation: 197 So.3d 656
• Parties: In re Christine M. MIRE.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

197 So.3d 656

In re Christine M. MIRE.

No. 2015–B–1453.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 19, 2016.
Rehearing Denied May 2, 2016.

197 So.3d 657

Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Charles Bennet Plattsmier, Baton Rouge, LA, Gregory Lynn Tweed, for Applicant.

Dane S. Ciolino, Christine Marie Mire, Schiff, Scheckman & White, Leslie J. Schiff, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Christine M. Mire, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

UNDERLYING FACTS

Count I—The Keaty Matter

By way of background, Judge Phyllis Keaty presided over family law matters in the 15th Judicial District Court during the time in question.¹ Respondent regularly practiced family law in the 15th JDC at this time.²

In one such case, McNabb v. McNabb, respondent represented Stanford McNabb. Against respondent's advice, Mr. McNabb filed a pro se motion to recuse Judge Keaty on grounds of bias and incompetence. On September 15, 2009, Judge Keaty recused herself in the McNabb matter, but did not assign reasons for her recusal.

Meanwhile, respondent had several other family law matters pending before Judge Keaty, including Hunter v. Hunter. In that matter, respondent represented Kenneth Hunter in a child custody, visitation, and support proceeding involving his former wife, Cheri Coussan Hunter. In a hearing on July 20, 2009, Judge Keaty made a disclosure on the record regarding the extent of the relationship between herself and her family and Ms. Coussan and her family. Respondent and opposing counsel both stated that there were no objections to Judge Keaty's disclosure, and the hearing proceeded.

Mr. Hunter subsequently became concerned that Judge Keaty was biased in favor of his former wife. In addition, respondent discovered additional connections between Judge Keaty's family and the Coussan family which she felt made Judge Keaty's earlier disclosure inadequate. Therefore, Mr. Hunter instructed respondent to file a motion to recuse Judge Keaty. In a chambers conference on September 17, 2009, respondent, at the request of her client, presented Judge Keaty with a motion to recuse. The motion alleged three grounds for recusal: (1) Judge Keaty failed to fully disclose the extent of the

197 So.3d 658

relationship between herself and her family and Ms. Coussan and her family; (2) Judge Keaty indicated that she would not follow the law regardless of the evidence presented at trial [relating to the use of Worksheet “B” in shared custody arrangements]; and (3) the manner in which the case had been handled, the rulings made, and the deference given to Ms. Coussan over Mr. Hunter all manifested a bias or prejudice toward Ms. Coussan.

During the chambers conference, Judge Keaty was insistent that the parties and Mr. Hunter's prior attorney were fully aware of the circumstances of her relationship with the Coussan family, as she stated that she made those disclosures in earlier proceedings. Judge Keaty took the motion to recuse under advisement and stayed the proceedings.

The following day, September 18, 2009, respondent e-mailed Judge Keaty's court reporter and requested that she prepare the transcript of three hearings in the Hunter matter, including the July 20, 2009 hearing. When respondent received the transcript of the hearing, she claimed it contained a statement which had not been made at the hearing.³ Respondent ultimately obtained the court reporter's tapes and had them analyzed, but the court never made any factual findings regarding any alleged alterations to the hearing transcript.⁴

Meanwhile, in the McNabb case, respondent had appealed a ruling made by Judge Keaty prior to her recusal. On November 13, 2009, Chief Judge Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux of the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit signed an order directing the clerk of the 15th JDC to prepare a proffer of Mr. McNabb's motion to recuse filed August 18, 2009 and Judge Keaty's order of recusal signed September 14, 2009. The order concluded that “[t]he panel on the merits shall determine whether the proffer is properly before the Court on appeal.” The court of appeal panel consisted of Judges Thibodeaux, Peters, and Painter.

Respondent and Mr. McNabb estimated that approximately 90% of the March 31, 2010 oral argument was spent discussing Judge Keaty's post-judgment recusal, and whether this action necessitated a de novo review by the court of appeal of all of her rulings, as respondent argued. However, the court of appeal affirmed Judge Keaty's ruling on April 21, 2010, finding the standard of review was manifest error because “the motion to recuse was not timely made, and ... has no bearing on this appeal.” Moreover, in a concurrence, Chief Judge Thibodeaux stated:

While the recusal issue is mentioned in this appeal, the record is bereft of any evidence of its relationship to the specific issues in this dispute. We are not aware of the contents of the motion to recuse nor does the record contain the Order of Recusal. I have my concerns, but the issue simply is not properly before us. [Emphasis added; citations omitted.]

197 So.3d 659

Respondent filed an application for rehearing, pointing out that the motion to recuse and the order of recusal were both in the record because the court of appeal had ordered the record supplemented with them. The court of appeal denied rehearing on May 26, 2010.

Respondent and Mr. McNabb thought that the court of appeal had simply been mistaken in its original statement that the motion to recuse and order of recusal were not in the record. However, once the court of appeal denied rehearing, respondent and Mr. McNabb became convinced that something had occurred which was “more difficult to explain.”

Respondent and Mr. McNabb drafted a writ application to this court which stated the following:

This case personifies the double edged sword of Justice. This case highlights the unfavorable consequences of the legal profession—incompetence and/or corruption of its members. Undeniably, the people who are elected to uphold the higher purpose of the law sometimes go their own way and believe that the people's vested power is their own. The general public assumes that the vast majority of our legal community believes that no one does more harm to the legal system than one who has the name and rank of honor while he/she acts perversely. Unfortunately, this case also exemplifies an additional and more horrifying issue—the tolerance and indifference of other judges, the Court of Appeals and other officers of the court who did nothing to help the financial and emotional pain of family law litigants and the most innocent of all victims—Stanford McNabb's children. [Emphasis in original.]

* * *

The corruption and/or incompetence of attorneys and judges in this case is not only a systemic problem; it is an opportunity for reparation for Stanford McNabb and everyone who was victimized by a system designed to protect their rights....

* * *

Stanford McNabb drives past Judge Phyllis M. Keaty's billboards and signs which advertise her desire to be the next member of the lower court which recently issued a decision contrary to the panels' [sic] statements at oral argument, the record, and the law. ... Although the lower court which affirmed the egregious actions of the trial court is the same court Judge Keaty is actively campaigning to sit upon, Stan did not presume wrongdoing. Rather, Stan presumed that the lower court's opinion was a mistake since it was contrary to the panels' [sic] statements at oral argument. However, when the rehearing was denied, a mistake became difficult to defend. This Honorable Court should consider this case from the vantage point of a litigant or outside third party. There are two plausible explanations: 1.) The lower court inadvertently issued an opinion written prior to oral argument. When Stan gently alerted them to the fact that the Motion and Order of Recusal was part of the record, the panel was confused and/or did not remember the oral argument of the matter and therefore again inadvertently denied rehearing; or 2.) The lower court wants to cover up the egregious actions of the trial court so it cannot be used in the current election. Either way this Court's active intolerance of such incompetence and/or corruption is essential to restore integrity to the judicial system....

Respondent attached a copy of the Hunter CD as an exhibit to Mr. McNabb's

197 So.3d 660

writ application, claiming that the inaccuracy of the transcripts of family court proceedings was not unique to Mr. McNabb's case. Ultimately, this court did not consider the writ application in the McNabb case as it was not timely filed. McNabb v. McNabb, 10–1506 (La.10/1/10), 45 So.3d 1087. Despite being put on notice by the ODC of concerns with the language in the writ application, respondent circulated a copy of same by e-mail to her friends and colleagues in the Lafayette Bar.

The ODC alleged that respondent's conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions), 3.2...