In re Missouri Pacific R.R.

• Decision Date: 04 March 1999
• Citation: 998 S.W.2d 212
• Parties: (Tex. 1999) IN RE MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, D/B/A UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, RELATOR. (Two Cases) IN RE SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY & MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY D/B/A UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, RELATORS IN RE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, RELATOR NO. 98-0841 NO. 98-0842 NO. 98-0843 NO. 98-1131
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 212

998 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1999)

IN RE MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, D/B/A UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, RELATOR. (Two Cases)

IN RE SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY & MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY D/B/A UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, RELATORS

IN RE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, RELATOR

NO. 98-0841

NO. 98-0842

NO. 98-0843

NO. 98-1131

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

Argued on March 4, 1999

Decided: July 1, 1999.

ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF MANDAMUS

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] JUSTICE GONZALES delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.

These consolidated mandamus proceedings concern the mandatory venue statute¹ for suits brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).² In each case the key issue is whether the plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit sued the corporate defendant in a county where it maintains "a principal office," as defined in the venue statutes.³ We conclude that the plaintiffs in all of the suits failed to prove that the corporate defendant has a principal office in the county of suit, so we direct the trial courts in Jefferson County⁴ and Tarrant County⁵ to transfer the cases to a proper county.

I

These mandamus proceedings arise out of three FELA lawsuits filed in Jefferson County, and three filed in Tarrant County. Section 15.018(b) of the venue statutes gives three choices:

(b) All suits brought under [FELA] shall be brought:

(1) in the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred;

(2) in the county where the defendant's principal office in this state is located; or

(3) in the county where the plaintiff resided at the time the cause of action accrued.⁶

Subparts (b)(1) and (b)(3) do not apply here because none of the plaintiffs reside in the county of suit and none claim the cause of action arose there. All the plaintiffs in the Jefferson County cases claim damages for an injury occurring outside of Texas. Freddie Burleigh, a Louisiana resident, sued his employer, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (Mo-Pac), for injuries he suffered in Louisiana. Terriance Spiller and Juanita Spiller, residents of Harris County, sued Mo-Pac for injuries Terriance Spiller received in Louisiana. Tamara L. Weston resides in Dalhart, Hartley County. She sued Southern Pacific Transportation Company and Mo-Pac in Jefferson County for an injury she suffered near Obar, New Mexico.

Each plaintiff in the Tarrant County suits against Union Pacific Railroad alleged he suffered an injury in his home state outside Texas. Ronald E. Smirl, a resident of Oklahoma, sued for an injury suffered in Chickasha, Oklahoma. Bobby Ray Martin, a Louisiana resident, sued for an incident occurring in Shreveport, Louisiana. Willie B. Williams is a resident of Arkansas who alleges an injury in Gurdon, Arkansas.

The venue challenges proceeded much the same in all the cases. The plaintiff alleged that the railroad maintained a principal office in the county of suit. The railroad denied that it had a principal office in the county of suit or that venue was proper there, and moved to transfer venue to Harris County where the railroad had principal offices in Texas. In each case the trial court denied the motion and retained venue, resulting in these mandamus proceedings.

II

Section 15.0642 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code directs appellate courts to enforce the mandatory venue statutes by mandamus:

A party may apply for a writ of mandamus with an appellate court to enforce the mandatory venue provisions of this chapter. An application for the writ of mandamus must be filed before the later of:

(1) the 90th day before the date the trial starts; or

(2) the 10th day after the date the party receives notice of the trial setting.⁷

Section 15.0642 does not detail the scope of mandamus review of mandatory venue decisions. Traditionally, mandamus will not issue (1) unless the trial court has committed a clear abuse of discretion, (2) for which appeal is not an adequate remedy.⁸ We determined in a prior case that the usual mandamus standard of review, abuse of discretion, applies to a section 15.0642 mandamus.⁹ But we have not considered whether a party challenging a mandatory venue decision also must show that appeal is an inadequate remedy.¹⁰ The railroads argue that it is presumed that there is no adequate remedy for a failure to enforce a mandatory venue statute, citing KJ Eastwood Investments., Inc. v. Enlow.¹¹ In that case, the court of appeals reasoned that it would undermine the purpose of section 15.0642 if a relator were forced to show inadequate remedy by appeal.¹² We agree.

We have repeatedly denied mandamus to review the merits of a venue decision because we considered it an incidental trial ruling correctable by appeal.¹³ Before 1983, venue rulings were immediately correctable by interlocutory appeal under the former plea of privilege practice.¹⁴ In 1983, the Legislature replaced interlocutory venue appeals with the rule that in an ordinary post-trial appeal, improper venue is not subject to harmless error analysis, virtually guaranteeing reversal.¹⁵

We have held that an appeal is inadequate to remedy an erroneous venue decision in only one instance mandatory transfer in a suit involving the parent-child relationship.¹⁶ In Proffer v. Yates, we reasoned that the need to expeditiously resolve custody and support issues makes ordinary appeal inadequate.¹⁷ Outside of suits involving the parent-child relationship, our Court has steadfastly declined to review by mandamus whether venue was proper in the county of suit under the venue statues.¹⁸

We reiterated in early 1995 that "Texas law is quite clear that venue determinations are not reviewable by mandamus."¹⁹ But a few months later, the Legislature enacted section 15.0642 authorizing parties to seek mandamus "to enforce the mandatory venue provisions," along with a timetable for seeking mandamus.²⁰ The Legislature left in place the "presumed harm" rule for challenging venue in an appeal after trial.²¹ Thus, section 15.0642 poses a conundrum: venue decisions are not reviewable by mandamus because they are correctable by appeal, but section 15.0642 authorizes mandamus review of mandatory venue decisions. Either the availability of mandamus relief under the statute is largely illusory, or we must dispense with the requirement of showing inadequate appellate remedy in mandatory venue cases.

Our goal in construing a statute is to carry out the Legislature's intent.²² The language of section 15.0642 seems to contemplate a review of the merits of the trial court's decision on mandatory venue. Yet if we still insist on a particularized showing of inadequate remedy by appeal, then a court could rarely, if ever, "enforce the mandatory venue provisions" by mandamus. Proffer is the exception that illustrates the near-impossibility of showing that appeal is inadequate to remedy an erroneous venue decision. We do not lightly presume that the Legislature may have done a useless act.²³ Rather, we presume the Legislature intended "a result feasible of execution."²⁴ To effectuate the Legislature's intent, we conclude that adequacy of an appellate remedy is not a requisite of a mandatory venue mandamus under section 15.0642.

III

Thus, the focus of a mandamus proceeding under section 15.0642 is whether the trial court abused its discretion. The trial court has no discretion in determining the legal principles controlling its ruling or in applying the law to the facts.²⁵ A trial court does not have the discretion to make an erroneous legal conclusion even in an unsettled area of law.²⁶ Therefore, we review in these cases whether the trial courts failed to analyze or apply the law correctly when they refused to transfer the cases to the defendants' chosen venue.

The parties' pleading and proof limits a trial court's discretion to determine venue. A plaintiff's choice of venue stands unless challenged by proper motion to transfer venue.²⁷ Once challenged, the plaintiff has the burden to present prima facie proof by affidavit or other appropriate evidence that venue is maintainable in the county of suit.²⁸ The plaintiff's prima facie proof is not subject to rebuttal, cross-examination, impeachment, or disproof.²⁹ However, if the plaintiff fails to discharge the burden, the right to choose a proper venue passes to the defendant, who must then prove that venue is proper in the defendant's chosen county.³⁰ The controlling issue here is what the plaintiffs had to plead and prove to establish venue in "the county where the defendant's principal office in this state is located" under the FELA venue statute.³¹

The railroads contend that a foreign corporation only has one principal office under the mandatory venue statutes for FELA actions. If the FELA venue statute is read in isolation, the provision for suit "in the county where the defendant's principal office in this state is located"³² would indicate a company's Texas headquarters. However, that view is complicated by the general definition of "principal office" in section 15.001:

In this chapter:

(a) "Principal office" means a principal office of the corporation . . . in this state in which the decision makers for the organization within this state conduct the daily affairs of the organization. The mere presence of an agency or representative does not establish a principal office.³³

The plaintiffs respond that the phrase "a principal office" indicates that there can be more than one principal office. Further, the plaintiffs argue, the "daily affairs" of these defendants consist of operating trains, so that a principal office is wherever a railroad official makes decisions about operating trains.

We agree with the plaintiffs that a corporation can have more than one principal office. We are bound by the statutory definition of "principal office" as "a" principal office.³⁴ Thus, when we apply the general definition of "principal...