In re Mo. State Pub. Defender Dist. 21, St. Louis Cnty. Trial Office
| Decision Date | 26 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. ED106576,ED106576 |
| Parties | IN RE: MISSOURI STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER DISTRICT 21, ST. LOUIS COUNTY TRIAL OFFICE. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of of St. Louis County
18SL-CC00129
Honorable Douglas R. Beach
This is the first time this Court has been asked to construe § 600.0631, a 2013 effort by the legislature to address Missouri public defender "caseload concerns" by giving to each district defender the authority to request relief from the presiding judge on behalf of individual public defenders working in the district office. Here, the St. Louis County district defender filed a motion pursuant to § 600.063 on behalf of 16 of the 20 public defenders working in his office claiming their caseloads were excessive and further claiming that those 16 public defenders "will be unable to provide effective assistance of counsel" unless the presiding judge granted certain of the measures of relief authorized by the statute. § 600.063.
Before we consider the merits of this appeal, we must first determine the nature of the claims this statute seeks to create because § 600.063 is ambiguous in this regard. Here the presiding judge treated the matter before him as a court-tried case and applied a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof to the district defender's claims. But it is not clear on the face of the statute whether the legislature envisioned a court-tried civil action or whether the district defender's claims should be decided as an administrative action pursuant to administrative procedures by the presiding judge sitting in his role as the circuit court's chief administrative officer.
Based on our analysis pursuant to the applicable rules of statutory construction set forth below, we conclude that the legislature intended that the presiding judge conduct administrative proceedings to determine § 600.063 claims, not a court-tried case which would entail the full breadth of the rules, procedures, and standards applicable to civil actions. Therefore, we would reverse this case with directions that the presiding judge conduct such a procedure consistent with this opinion but due to the issues of general interest and importance presented here, this case is transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 83.022.
As with any statute, we apply the following standards to our review of § 600.063. Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, there is nothing to construe and we will give effect to the language as written without resorting to rules of statutory construction. Doe v. St. Louis Community College, 526 S.W.3d 329, 336-7 (Mo.App.E.D. 2018); Brady v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 213 S.W.3d 101, 107 (Mo.App.E.D. 2006). Only in those cases "[w]here the language ofthe statute is ambiguous or where its plain meaning would lead to an illogical result, will this court look past the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute." Anderson v. Ken Kauffman & Sons Excavating, L.L.C., 248 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Mo.App.W.D. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
A statute or regulation is ambiguous when the legislative intent cannot be determined from the plain meaning of the language. United Pharmacal Co. of Mo., Inc. v. Mo. Bd. of Pharm., 208 S.W.3d 907, 909-10 (Mo.banc 2006). Under the principles of statutory construction, courts should first consider the ambiguous language in the context of "the other words listed in a statutory provision to help it discern which of multiple possible meanings the legislature intended." Union Elec. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 425 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Mo.banc 2014); Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Senior Citizens Nursing Home Dist., 224 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Mo.App.W.D. 2007) ("Context determines meaning.") (citing Keller v. Marion Cty. Ambulance Dist., 820 S.W.2d 301, 302 (Mo.banc 1991)). This principle is known by the maxim noscitur a sociis—a word is known by the company it keeps. Union Elec. Co., 425 S.W.3d at 122.
Second, the court should read one provision of a statute in harmony with the entire section. Gott v. Dir. of Revenue, 5 S.W.3d 155, 159-60 (Mo.banc 1999) ("The provisions of a legislative act are not to be read in isolation, but are to be construed together and read in harmony with the entire act."). Third, if the statutory language is unclear from consideration of the statute alone, a court "should interpret the meaning of the statute in pari materia with other statutes dealing with the same or similar subject matter." Union Elec. Co., 425 S.W.3d at 122. In construing the meaning of an ambiguous enactment, a court should only adopt reasonable interpretations, disregarding constructions that would lead to absurd results. Senior Citizens Nursing Home Dist., 224 S.W.3d at 9.
We find that § 600.063 is ambiguous with regard to the rules, standards, and procedures the legislature intended the presiding judge to apply when considering motions filed pursuant to the statute. As a result, we have applied the foregoing rules of statutory construction to § 600.063 in reaching our conclusions regarding the meaning of the statute.
As a preface to our discussion, we note that due to the statute's murky and ambiguous language and its near silence3 as to the procedures applicable to these claims, we are not critical of the presiding judge's decision to treat these § 600.063 claims as court-tried civil actions, though we conclude in this opinion that he was in error. While the statute may seek to tackle a complex matter, public defender caseload concerns would almost certainly be better addressed by the legislature through budgetary action or by enacting statutory caseload protocols or standards rather than by tasking the judicial branch with the potentially overwhelming responsibility of considering case by case whether each individual public defender who claims a caseload issue will in fact be unable to provide effective assistance of counsel in every case that is the subject of a § 600.063 motion.
Beyond the judicial time and resources required to administer § 600.063, the statute also involves Missouri courts in enormously difficult questions of proper procedure and interpretation (many, though not all, detailed in this opinion) and for the first time requires our courts to determining prospectively whether counsel will be able to provide effective assistance. Of course, although in State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 607 (Mo.banc 2012), our Supreme Court recognized that the right to effective assistance is a "prospective right," the judicial branch has heretofore been called to consider the issue of effective assistance onlyretrospectively—using the context-dependent, prejudice-focused test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To attempt to apply the Strickland test prospectively to representation that has not yet occurred, even in an administrative adjudication setting, would be difficult and likely largely reliant on speculation.
The bottom line is that if the legislature intended that Missouri presiding judges treat § 600.063 claims as adversarial civil actions, it was entitled to do so. A cursory review of Chapters 521 through 538 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri pertaining to statutory causes of action demonstrates that when the legislature intends to create a civil action it knows how to do it. See, e.g., § 538.210.1 (); § 537.123 (); § 537.353 (). Here, it did not do so.
Moreover, since the legislature has already made clear that in Missouri there is only one type of case known as a "civil action," interpreting § 600.063 as creating a civil action would require the application of our well-established and mandatory rules of civil procedure, discovery, evidence, burdens of proof, and standards of review. § 506.040; see also Rule 42.01; Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. 1976); Rule 56.01; Rule 73.01; Rule 41.01(a). But, again, we do not believe that was the legislature's intent.
Nevertheless, there is limited language in § 600.063 that in the interest of completeness warrants mention because it not only helps to explain why the presiding judge may have decided to treat this as a court-tried civil action, but also demonstrates the statute's ambiguity. First, the claim commences with a "motion," a term generally used in a litigated civil action setting and a term with which the legislature is familiar. Rule 55.26; § 506.050. Second, the statute designates the district defender and the prosecuting attorney at the motion stage and at the appellate stage asthe two opposing sides of the matter. That again evokes a litigation posture. Finally, the statute directs the presiding judge to treat the motion and the conference as a request by the district defender for an order granting one or more of the six types of relief set forth in the statute4 and the presiding judge is authorized to grant relief only "upon a finding that the individual public defender or defenders will be unable to provide effective assistance of counsel due to caseload issues." Again, the notion of a motion being filed in a circuit court seeking an order granting relief is consistent with a litigation setting but, it must be stated, it is likewise consistent with a contested case under administrative procedures in which a party seeks relief from an administrative body. Kixmiller v. Bd. Of Curators of Lincoln Univ., 341 S.W.3d 711, 715 (Mo.App.W.D. 2011) (citing §563.010(4)) ("A 'contested case' is defined as 'a proceeding before an agency in which legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties are required by law to be determined after hearing.'").
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