In re Moawad
Decision Date | 03 February 2022 |
Docket Number | 21-BG-778 |
Parties | IN RE Edward Emad MOAWAD A Suspended Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals Bar Registration No. 998755 |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
On consideration of the certified order from the state of Maryland disbarring respondent from the practice of law in that state; the November 18, 2021, order suspending respondent from the practice of law in this jurisdiction and directing him to show cause why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed, respondent's response thereto wherein he states reciprocal discipline should not be imposed; the statement of Disciplinary Counsel regarding reciprocal discipline; respondent's reply thereto; and it appearing that respondent filed his D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g) affidavit on December 15, 2021, it is
ORDERED that Edward Emad Moawad is hereby disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia nunc pro tunc to December 15, 2021. Although respondent is correct that the state of Maryland presumptively disbars an attorney for any intentional dishonesty, a presumption this court does not apply, we review the findings of the originating state to determine, without consideration of the Maryland presumption, the range of discipline this court would impose for the misconduct if this were an original action. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c)(4). In doing so we accept the factual findings and aggravating circumstances of the state of Maryland, as described in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Moawad , 475 Md. 424, 257 A.3d 611 (2021), and apply our case law to that misconduct, see In re Guberman , 978 A.2d 200 (D.C. 2009).
Although we have limited the sanction of presumptive disbarment to cases involving reckless or intentional misappropriation and the conviction of crimes involving moral turpitude, we have also disbarred counsel in those cases where the underlying facts and aggravating circumstances require such a sanction including when we have determined that the attorney's intentional dishonesty rises to the level of flagrant dishonesty. See, e.g., In re Bleecker , 11 A.3d 1224 (D.C. 2011) ( ). Contrary to respondent's arguments, we have previously held that flagrant dishonesty does not require an associated misappropriation or that the dishonest statement be made either under oath or as part of a court proceeding. See, e.g., In re Bynum , 197 A.3d 1072, 1074 (D.C. 2018) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
In re Bailey
...so that where such billing is reckless or intentional, disbarment should be the presumptive sanction. See In re Moawad , 268 A.3d 820, 821 (D.C. 2022) ("[W]e have limited the sanction of presumptive disbarment to cases involving reckless or intentional misappropriation and the conviction of......