In re Mondie Forge Co., Bankruptcy No. B92-11729.
Decision Date | 12 May 1993 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. B92-11729. |
Citation | 154 BR 232 |
Parties | In re MONDIE FORGE CO., Debtor. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Ohio |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Daniel D. Wilt, Cleveland, Ohio, for debtor.
David Simon, Cleveland, Ohio, trustee.
Steven S. Davis, Cleveland, Ohio, for trustee.
On September 15, 1992 the Trustee filed a Motion for Review of Attorney's Fees and Order of Turnover pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 329. The Court's December 4, 1992 Memorandum of Opinion and Order reserved ruling on said motion until a fee application was before the Court. On December 11, 1992 the Trustee filed a Motion to Require a Fee Application be Filed. The Court granted said Motion on December 14, 1992 and ordered that a fee application be filed by January 7, 1993. The fee application and accompanying brief in support were timely filed. The U.S. Trustee filed comments and a hearing was held March 18, 1993.
Attorney Daniel Wilt was paid a prepetition retainer by the Chapter 7 Debtor for legal services. The Compensation Statement of Attorney for the Debtors, required under Rule 2016(b), asserts the retainer was in the amount of $10,000.00. The Statement of Financial Affairs lists the retainer at $12,500.00. Subsequently, an application for employment was filed wherein the Applicant asserted he was to provide professional services to the Debtor. The fee application requests compensation for 81.9 hours and total fees of $12,349.41, reflecting an hourly rate of $150.79. The fee application also requests expense reimbursement of $150.59. No written retainer agreement exists. In view of the fact that no retainer agreement exists, coupled with the inconsistent amount of the retainer alleged, the $12,500.00 figure will be utilized for the purpose of this examination.
The Applicant's fee application and brief reflect that he performed prepetition services in the nature of an attempted workout. He ultimately filed a Chapter 7 petition on the morning of a secured creditor's auction of the Debtor's assets. The Applicant continued to counsel the Debtor postpetition and contends that he has yet to perform certain services to be compensated by the retainer, i.e., dissolution of the debtor corporation under state law after the bankruptcy closes.
Section 329 of the Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. 329 provides:
Section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. 330 provides, in pertinent part:
Rule 2016, Bankr.R. provides:
11 U.S.C. § 541 provides in pertinent part:
Under § 329, attorney fees are scrutinized on the basis of their reasonableness. See, In re Office Products of America, Inc., 136 B.R. 964 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1992); Stewart v. Law Offices of Dennis Olson, 93 B.R. 91 (N.D.Tex.1988); 11 U.S.C. § 329(b). The legislative history of § 329 provides:
Payments to a debtor\'s attorney provide serious potential for evasion of creditor protection provisions of the bankruptcy laws, and serious potential for overreaching by the debtor\'s attorney, and should be subject to careful scrutiny.
H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 329 (1977); S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 5825, 6285.
The policy behind § 329 was further described by the United States Supreme Court in its decision in Conrad, Rubin & Lesser v. Pender, 289 U.S. 472, 476-477, 53 S.Ct. 703, 704-05, 77 L.Ed. 1327 (1933) when it discussed § 329's predecessor former Bankr.R. 220 which revised and superseded § 60(d) of the Bankruptcy Act:
The manifest purpose of the provision is to safeguard the assets of those who are acting in contemplation of bankruptcy, so that these assets may be brought quickly and without unnecessary expense into the hands of the trustee, and to provide a restraint upon opportunities to make an unreasonable disposition of property through arrangement for excessive payments for prospective legal services. citing In re Wood and Henderson, 210 U.S. 246, 28 S.Ct. 621, 52 L.Ed. 1046. We said in the case of Wood and Henderson that the statute recognizes the temptation of a failing debtor to deal too liberally with his property in enabling counsel to protect him in the view of financial reverses in probable failure. It recognizes the right of such a debtor to have the aid and advice of counsel, and, in contemplation of bankruptcy proceedings which will strip him of his property, to make provisions for reasonable compensation to his counsel.
Although fee applications are not the usual procedure for a § 329 review of fees, the court may order a fee application to sustain the reasonableness of the charges. In re McDonald Bros. Const. Inc., 114 B.R. 989, 996 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1990).
Under § 330, attorney fees are awarded only to the extent that the services are reasonable, actual, necessary and beneficial to the estate. See, Office Products, supra; Stewart v. Olson, supra; 11 U.S.C. § 330. Thus, § 330 applies a more stringent standard than § 329. The burden of proof is on the attorney to show the reasonableness of the fees charged. In re Rheuban, 121 B.R. 368, 385 (Bankr. C.D.Cal.1990), rev'd. on other grounds, 124 B.R. 301 (C.D.Cal.1990).
Section 330 applies to the review of a retainer, if the retainer is property of the estate. McDonald Bros., supra at 993. The fee requested must not only be reasonable, but also must be necessary and beneficial to the...
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