In re Monreal-Aguinaga
| Decision Date | 04 May 2001 |
| Docket Number | File A93 093 210.,Interim Decision Number 3447 |
| Parties | In re Francisco Javier MONREAL-Aguinaga, Respondent |
| Court | U.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals |
The respondent has filed a timely appeal from an Immigration Judge's May 19, 1998, decision finding him removable as charged, denying his application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (Supp. V 1999), and granting his request for voluntary departure under section 240B(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b) (Supp. V 1999). The respondent appeals solely from the denial of his application for cancellation of removal. The appeal will be dismissed.
In proceedings conducted in 1998, the respondent conceded that he was removable from the United States but applied for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Act, as well as for voluntary departure. Section 240A(b) of the Act provides that the Attorney General may cancel the removal of, and adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien: (A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application; (B) has been a person of good moral character during such period; (C) has not been convicted of specified criminal offenses; and (D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. Section 240A(b) of the Act; see also 8 C.F.R. § 240.20 (2001).
The respondent is a 34-year-old native and citizen of Mexico who has been living in the United States since his entry in 1980. He has not returned to Mexico since coming to this country as a 14-year-old child. His wife, who was not statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal, voluntarily departed to Mexico shortly before the respondent's hearing on his application for cancellation of removal, and she took their infant United States citizen child with her. The couple's two older children have remained with the respondent in the United States. The oldest child is now 12 years old and the middle child is 8 years old. Both are United States citizens.
The respondent has been gainfully employed in this country since his entry as a teenager, and he provides the sole support for his two citizen children in this country, as well as sending money to his wife in Mexico. He has worked in an uncle's business continuously since 1991. The respondent's parents lawfully immigrated to this country in 1995, and his children sometimes spend time with these grandparents when their father is working. In addition, the respondent has seven siblings who reside lawfully in the United States, as well as a brother in Mexico who also works for the respondent's uncle. The respondent's oldest child testified at the hearing about his life in this country and his desire not to depart for Mexico, which he would do if his father was required to leave the United States.
There is no dispute that the respondent satisfies the good moral character and continuous physical presence requirements for cancellation of removal. Moreover, if he were found statutorily eligible for cancellation, we would grant relief in the exercise of discretion. In this latter regard, the Immigration Judge noted that this was a "sad" case, particularly in view of its effect on the United States citizen children, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service trial attorney characterized the respondent and his family as "really good people." Thus, the determinative issue before us is whether this respondent's United States citizen children or his lawful permanent resident parents will suffer "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" if the respondent is ordered deported, as is required for him to establish statutory eligibility for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge concluded that this hardship requirement had not been met. We agree.
This case requires that we address the meaning of the term "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship," as used in section 240A(b)(1)(D) of the Act. Under the prior law regarding suspension of deportation, an alien, such as this respondent, seeking that form of relief had to establish that he or his qualifying relative would suffer "extreme hardship" if deported. See section 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994) (repealed 1996). In 1996, Congress replaced the suspension of deportation provisions of the Act with a form of relief entitled "Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain Nonpermanent Residents." See section 240A(b) of the Act.
In enacting the cancellation statute, Congress narrowed the class of aliens who could qualify for relief. Under the present cancellation statute, an alien must have 10 years of continuous physical presence in this country, rather than the 7 years necessary under the previous requirements for suspension of deportation. Furthermore, under the new statute, hardship to the applicant for relief is not considered; only hardship to the alien's United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, or child may be considered. Finally, as indicated above, an alien must show that his or her qualifying relative would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if the alien is deported.
The cancellation statute does not further define the term "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship." It is axiomatic, however, that the interpretation of statutory language begins with the terms of the statute itself, and if those terms, on their face, constitute a plain expression of congressional intent, they must be given effect. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Citing INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984), we have also recognized that the "legislative purpose is presumed to be expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used." Matter of Crammond, 23 I&N Dec. 9, 11 (BIA 2001).
The terms "exceptional" and "extremely unusual" seemingly have ordinary meanings. "Exceptional" is defined as "[f]orming an exception; not ordinary; uncommon; rare." Webster's New International Dictionary 888 (2d ed. 1959). The added phrase "extremely unusual" plainly indicates circumstances in which the exception to the norm is very uncommon. The "plain meaning" of these terms becomes somewhat less clear, however, when appended to the term hardship, which can have multiple manifestations and inherently introduces an element of subjectivity into this statutory phrase. If the past 50 years have demonstrated nothing else with regard to the phrases "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" and "extreme hardship," they have shown that reasonable people can agree that the meaning of these terms is "clear," but come to quite different conclusions as to their application in various factual situations. These are not terms of "fixed and inflexible content or meaning." Matter of Hwang, 10 I&N Dec. 448, 451 (BIA 1964) (addressing "extreme hardship").
It is obvious, however, under the plain meaning of the words used in the two statutes, that the hardship standard for cancellation of removal is a higher one than that under the suspension of deportation statute. See generally Cortes-Castillo v. INS, 997 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1993) (); Brown v. INS, 775 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same); see also Hernandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 565 (5th Cir. 1987) (Rubin, J., dissenting) () The legislative history also plainly states that Congress intended to tighten the hardship standard, in part as a response...
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