In re Morris, 03-20373.
| Decision Date | 15 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-20373.,03-20373. |
| Citation | 328 F.3d 739 |
| Parties | In re: Kenneth Wayne MORRIS, Applicant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DeMOSS and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
Kenneth Wayne Morris (hereinafter "Applicant") has moved this Court for permission to file a successive petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The authority of this Court to act on such motion is stated in 28 U.S.C § 2244(b)(3)(C) as follows:
The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the applicant satisfies the requirements of this subsection.
In Reyes-Requena v. United States, our Court followed the Seventh Circuit's definition of prima facie showing explained in its opinion in Bennett v. United States as follows:
Our court has adopted the following definition of prima facie showing: We understand [it to] be simply a sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller exploration by the district court.... If in light of the documents submitted with the application it appears reasonably likely that the application satisfies the stringent requirement for the filing of a second or successive petition, we shall grant the application.
Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 468, 469-70 (7th Cir.1997); see Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 898-99 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting Bennett). We have carefully reviewed Applicant's motion and the documents appended as exhibits thereto and the Response filed by the State. We find that Applicant has made a prima facie showing that:
(1) the claims to be presented in the proposed successive habeas corpus application have not previously been presented in any prior application to this Court;
(2) the claim to be presented in the proposed successive habeas corpus application relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable, see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); and (3) applicant should be categorized as "mentally retarded" as defined in these cases.
Accordingly, we authorize Applicant to file a successive habeas corpus petition with the district court. This grant is, however, Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 899 (quoting Bennett, 119 F.3d at 470); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4). The district court "must conduct a `thorough' review to determine if the motion `conclusively' demonstrates that it does not meet AEDPA's second or successive motion requirements." Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 899 (citing United States v. Villa-Gonzalez, 208 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir.2000)).
Applicant has also moved this Court for a stay of his execution now set for after 6:00 p.m. on Tuesday, April 15, 2003. We see nothing upon which we could determine that "the granting of the stay would substantially harm other parties," including the State of Texas. Furthermore, we think Applicant has made a sufficient showing of likelihood of success on the merits that the public interest would be served by...
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