In re Morrow, No. 99-0846.
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
| Writing for the Court | TERNUS, Justice. |
| Citation | 616 N.W.2d 544 |
| Parties | In re the Detention of Elroy MORROW, Appellant. |
| Docket Number | No. 99-0846. |
| Decision Date | 07 September 2000 |
616 N.W.2d 544
In re the Detention of Elroy MORROW, AppellantNo. 99-0846.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
September 7, 2000.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Scott D. Brown and Roxann M. Ryan, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State.
Considered en banc.
TERNUS, Justice.
The appellant, Elroy Morrow, appeals an order committing him to the custody of the director of the Iowa Department of Human Services for treatment under Iowa Code chapter 229A, Iowa's Sexually Violent Predator Act. Morrow makes two arguments on appeal: (1) he contends the Act violates his right to equal protection; and (2) he asserts the trial process established by the Act violates his right to due process. We find no merit in these arguments and, therefore, we affirm.
I. Statutory Framework.
Before we discuss Morrow's claims, it is helpful to briefly review the pertinent parts of chapter 229A. Chapter 229A allows the State to seek a court order committing a presently-confined sexually violent predator to the custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS) for control, care, and treatment. See Iowa Code §§ 229A.4, .7. The Act defines a "sexually violent predator" as
a person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility.
Id. § 229A.2(8). "Mental abnormality" is defined in the statute as
a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity of a person and predisposing that person to commit sexually violent offenses to a degree which would constitute a menace to the health and safety of others.
Id. § 229A.2(3).
Upon the filing of a petition, the court must make a preliminary determination that probable cause exists to believe that the respondent named in the petition is a sexually violent predator. See id. § 229A.5(1). If a preliminary determination of probable cause is made, the respondent is notified of the petition and a probable cause hearing is held. See id. § 229A.5(1)-(2). If, after hearing, the court finds probable cause to exist, the court must direct that the respondent be transferred to an appropriate secure facility for evaluation. See id. § 229A.5(5).
A trial to determine whether the respondent is a sexually violent predator is required within sixty days of the probable cause hearing. See id. § 229A.7(2). "The respondent, the attorney general, or the judge shall have the right to demand that the trial be before a jury." Id. At trial, the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent is a sexually violent predator. See id. § 229A.7(3). If such a finding is made, the court must commit the respondent to the custody of DHS "for control, care, and treatment until such time as the person's
II. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Morrow was convicted in 1993 of sexual abuse in the third degree. The victim of the abuse was an unrelated thirteen-year-old boy. Morrow was incarcerated for this offense with a scheduled release date of August 24, 1998.
Prior to his scheduled release, the State filed a petition in the district court alleging Morrow is a sexually violent predator as defined in chapter 229A. The State asked the court to order Morrow committed for control, care, and treatment pursuant to the provisions of chapter 229A until such time as he is safe to be returned to the community at large. After a determination was made that probable cause existed to believe that Morrow was a sexually violent predator, the court ordered that he be detained in the county jail upon his release from prison, pending trial on the State's petition.
Prior to trial, Morrow filed pre-trial motions raising several claims. Two of those claims are asserted on appeal. First, Morrow claimed that his right to equal protection was violated because the Act singled out sexually violent predators on the basis of perceived future dangerousness, whereas a large portion of the prison population were equally prone to violence and recidivism upon release. He also argued that the statute's focus on prior crimes and bad acts, combined with the statutory provision allowing the State to demand a jury trial, was fundamentally unfair, violating his right to due process. The district court found no merit in these claims and the case proceeded to trial.
At the time scheduled for trial, the parties informed the court that they had agreed to submit the case on a stipulated factual record. In view of the stipulated record, the State withdrew its prior request for a jury trial. The State then submitted the following evidence, without objection from the respondent: (1) evidence of Morrow's prior convictions of sexually violent offenses; (2) an expert evaluation of Morrow; (3) affidavits from the victims regarding their sexual contact with Morrow; (4) an affidavit from a correctional counselor that Morrow did not complete the sex offender treatment program while incarcerated; and (5) the transcript from the probable cause hearing, which included the expert's testimony.
Based on this record, the district court held that Morrow was a sexually violent predator. The court ordered that he be committed to the custody of the director of DHS until such time as his mental abnormality had so changed that he was safe to be at large. Morrow filed this appeal.
III. Does Chapter 229A Violate Morrow's Right to Equal Protection?
A. General principles governing our review. This court reviews constitutional claims de novo. See Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 184 (Iowa 1999). Statutes are cloaked with a strong presumption of constitutionality and, thus, a party challenging a statute "carries a heavy burden" of rebutting this presumption. Glowacki v. State Bd. of Medical Exam'rs, 501 N.W.2d 539, 541 (Iowa 1993). "`A person challenging a statute must negate every reasonable basis upon which the statute could be upheld as constitutional.'" Id. (quoting Schroeder Oil Co. v. Iowa State Dep't of Revenue &...
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Arrington ex rel. Arrington v. City of Davenport, No. CIV3.-.301-CV-30058.
...counterpart to the federal Equal Protection Clause are subject to the same analysis as applied to the federal constitution. In re Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 2000). Similarly, the search and seizure clause of the Iowa constitution has been held by the Iowa Supreme Court to be "identic......
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State v. Becker, No. 10–0631.
...or property, without due process of law.” “Due process requires fundamental fairness in a judicial proceeding.” In re Det. of Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544, 549 (Iowa 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In order to satisfy due process, therefore, Becker's trial must not have bee......
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Racing Ass'n of Central Iowa v. Fitzgerald, No. 01-0011.
...These tenets are well established. "Statutes are cloaked with a strong presumption of constitutionality." In re Detention of Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 2000); accord Home Builders Ass'n v. City of West Des Moines, 644 N.W.2d 339, 352 (Iowa 2002) ("Taxing statutes are presumed to be c......
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Channon v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 99-0055.
..."`A person challenging a statute must negate every reasonable basis upon which the statute could be upheld as constitutional.'" 616 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 2000) (citations 2. Seventh Amendment. Channon argues that the damages cap violates her Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial because t......
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Arrington ex rel. Arrington v. City of Davenport, No. CIV3.-.301-CV-30058.
...counterpart to the federal Equal Protection Clause are subject to the same analysis as applied to the federal constitution. In re Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 2000). Similarly, the search and seizure clause of the Iowa constitution has been held by the Iowa Supreme Court to be "identic......
-
State v. Becker, No. 10–0631.
...or property, without due process of law.” “Due process requires fundamental fairness in a judicial proceeding.” In re Det. of Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544, 549 (Iowa 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In order to satisfy due process, therefore, Becker's trial must not have bee......
-
Racing Ass'n of Central Iowa v. Fitzgerald, No. 01-0011.
...These tenets are well established. "Statutes are cloaked with a strong presumption of constitutionality." In re Detention of Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 2000); accord Home Builders Ass'n v. City of West Des Moines, 644 N.W.2d 339, 352 (Iowa 2002) ("Taxing statutes are presumed to be c......
-
Channon v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 99-0055.
..."`A person challenging a statute must negate every reasonable basis upon which the statute could be upheld as constitutional.'" 616 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 2000) (citations 2. Seventh Amendment. Channon argues that the damages cap violates her Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial because t......