In re Norris' Estate
| Decision Date | 21 March 1938 |
| Docket Number | 59 |
| Citation | 198 A. 142,329 Pa. 483 |
| Parties | Norris's Estate |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued January 18, 1938
Appeal, No. 59, Jan. T., 1938, from decree of O.C. Delaware Co., Sept. T., 1936, No. 21, in Estate of Isaac Norris deceased. Decree affirmed.
Petition and approval of agreement of compromise and settlement.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Decree entered approving settlement, by HANNUM, P.J. Exceptions to decree dismissed, opinion by McDONOUGH, P.J., and final decree entered. Exceptant appealed.
Errors assigned, among others, were overruling of exceptions.
The decree is affirmed at appellant's costs.
B. D Oliensis, with him Howard Lewis Fussell and Milton H. Weissman, for appellant.
Ernest Scott, with him William C. Bodine and Thomas Stokes, of Pepper, Bodine, Stokes & Schoch, and James A. Cochrane, for appellees.
William T. Connor, with him John R. K. Scott, Hardie Scott, H. E. Potter, Frank A. Mooreshead, George T. Butler and R. W. Beatty, for appellee.
Clarence G. Myers, with him Albert C. Weymann, Jr., and Duane, Morris & Heckscher, for appellee.
John Wintersteen, of Wintersteen, McCoy & Wintersteen, and George T. Butler, for appellee.
Before KEPHART, C.J., SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW, LINN and STERN, JJ.
This appeal is from the approval of a compromise agreement pursuant to section 40 of the Fiduciaries Act of 1917, P.L. 447, 508, 20 PS section 787. The section is in these words: "Whenever it shall be proposed to compromise or settle any claim, whether in suit or not, by or against a minor or the estate of a decedent, or to compromise or settle any question or dispute concerning the validity or construction of any last will and testament or the distribution of any decedent's estate, the orphans' court having jurisdiction of the accounts of the fiduciary shall be authorized and empowered, on petition by such fiduciary, setting forth all the facts and circumstances of such claim or question and proposed compromise or settlement, and duly verified by oath or affirmation, and after due notice to all parties interested, and after due consideration, aided, if necessary, by the report of a master, if satisfied that such compromise or settlement will be for the best interests of such minor or of the estate of such decedent, to enter a decree authorizing the same to be made, which decree shall operate to relieve the fiduciary of responsibility in the premises."
The case does not call for definition of what may be included or excluded by the words "parties interested" as there used; the appellant appeared and was heard, as interested, [1] in circumstances in which, on his appeal, we shall review the record as presented: cf. McGinley's Estate, 257 Pa. 478, 101 A. 807.
Isaac Norris, a widower, aged about seventy, died July 6, 1936, survived by a daughter, Mrs. Van Meter, leaving a will and codicil dated August 12, 1931, and July 30, 1934. He gave his property, appraised at $1,333,730.96, to collaterals and charities, leaving nothing to his daughter. She filed a caveat alleging (1) undue influence, (2) lack of testamentary capacity, (3) that her father had agreed to leave all his property to her. The Pennsylvania Company for Insurances, etc., named as executor and trustee, was appointed administrator pendente lite. Hearings were had by the Register of Wills, July 23, 1936 and October 14, 1936. On December 29, 1936, while the proceeding before the Register was pending, this petition [2] was filed, by the administrator pendente lite and others, asking the court to approve a proposed settlement. Notice of hearing on the petition was given to two persons who claimed under assignments made by Mrs. Van Meter, during her father's lifetime, of part of what she hoped to receive from his estate after his death; one of these assignees was Angela B. Klein, the other, Joseph L. Rosenberg, now the appellant. During the proceedings below, the Klein claim was settled for $2,000 and so drops out of the discussion.
In her father's lifetime, Mrs. Van Meter had filed a bill against him for a decree (a) that he had orally agreed to leave to her his entire estate; (b) that any testamentary writing theretofore made by him, leaving his property to others, be declared void; (c) that he be restrained from making a will in violation of the alleged contract; and (d) that a guardian be appointed to prevent dissipation of his property. On preliminary objections the bill was certified to the law side of the court: Van Meter v. Norris, 318 Pa. 137, 177 A. 799. She had also brought another suit against her father by a bill to perpetuate testimony in support of the contract referred to.
The petition contained the agreement dated December 19, 1936, made by the beneficiaries under the will and codicil, together with the Pennsylvania Company, etc., as administrator pendente lite, and as executor and trustee under the will, together with the guardian ad litem, the trustee for unborn children, the University of Pennsylvania, contingent legatee, and Mrs. Van Meter, showing that the parties had agreed, so far as need now be stated, that the will and codicil should be probated; that certain distribution should be made; and, inter alia, that "Mary Van Meter, party of the third part, shall receive in equal quarterly payments during the course of her natural life, 30% of the net income of the said estate as above defined for her sole and separate use and without power of anticipation, and without being subject to assignment, or to attachment, lien, levy or sale by any of her creditors, purported assignees, or other persons whatsoever." She agreed "to mark discontinued, settled, and ended," the two suits referred to above.
At the hearing, December 29, 1936, the appellant, Rosenberg, appeared in person and by counsel and objected to the approval of the settlement unless his claim was allowed. He based his objection on four separate assignments made by Mrs. Van Meter under which he claimed one-tenth of decedent's estate. While the money consideration named in the assignments is one dollar, it is agreed that he paid to her at various times various sums amounting in all to $2,000. Two assignments were dated March 13, 1936, and the other two, June 10, 1936. Their execution was admitted but, when they were offered in evidence, counsel for petitioners objected on the ground that the only matter before the court was whether the proposed settlement should be approved and that the appellant's claims were irrevelant to that inquiry. The court, at that time, sustained the objection and stated, in substance, that the assignments could be presented for consideration at the audit of the fiduciary's account. When that ruling was made, counsel for appellant said: The learned judge replied: The court then made a decree [3] of approval without prejudice to appellant's right to submit his claim "at the proper time for adjudication in due course."
Appellant filed exceptions to that decree, again asserting his interest and claim to be heard, in this proceeding, against the approval of the settlement. Thereafter, on January 26, 1937, the administrator pendente lite filed its first and final account, which was followed by notice that it would come on for audit on March 1, 1937. The next thing shown in the record is that on June 23, 1937, and July 12, 1937, the parties appeared in open court for the consideration of "Exceptions to the Decree of Compromise." Testimony was presented on behalf of appellant's claim on the assignments which, though excluded at the hearing in December, were now received in evidence over petitioners' objection, together with evidence of the transactions culminating in the assignments. The learned court then filed an opinion which shows the scope of the issues presented and adjudicated in the decree appealed from. As showing precisely what appellant then claimed, the learned judge quotes from the brief submitted to him on behalf of appellant, as follows: "Counsel consider it pertinent to state that it is not the purpose of this exceptant to object to or attempt in any manner to upset that provision of the settlement agreement by which Mrs. Van Meter is given a life interest in 30% of the residue of her father's estate, and the whole purpose of counsel for Joseph L. Rosenberg in this present proceeding is to sustain his claim to one-tenth of the 30% of income which will pass to Mrs. Van Meter under the terms of the compromise, and to prevent the operation of the spendthrift trust clause in relation to that particular part of the income."
The court then concluded that Rosenberg should receive from or on Mrs. Van Meter's account the $2,000 which he had paid to her, together with interest and counsel fees; that if he would accept $5,500 in satisfaction of such aggregate, or if he declined to accept it and the amount were paid into court in satisfaction of the claim, the exceptions to the decree theretofore made would be dismissed and the settlement would be approved. Rosenberg declined to accept it; the money was paid into court, whereupon he, and a number of other parties excepted. These exceptions were disposed of on August 13, 1937, in a supplemental decree, the last paragraph of which is in these terms: "If the Exceptant Joseph L. Rosenberg desires to appeal from this decree, and will stipulate that the appeal to be pressed will be limited to that portion of the agreement only which deals...
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