In re Northwest Airlines Corp.

• Decision Date: 14 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-17930(ALG).,No. 06-1679(ALG).,05-17930(ALG).,06-1679(ALG).
• Citation: 349 B.R. 338
• Parties: In re NORTHWEST AIRLINES CORPORATION et al., Debtors. NORTHWEST AIRLINES CORPORATION et al., Appellants, v. ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Page 338

349 B.R. 338

In re NORTHWEST AIRLINES CORPORATION et al., Debtors NORTHWEST AIRLINES CORPORATION et al., Appellants, v. ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA et al., Appellees.

No. 05-17930(ALG).

No. 06-1679(ALG).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

September 14, 2006.

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Dan Charles Getman, Law Office of Dan Getman, New Paltz, NY, for plaintiff.

DECISION AND ORDER

MARRERO, District Judge.

                TABLE OF CONTENTS
                PAGE
                I. BACKGROUND ......................................................343
                 II. INTRODUCTION ....................................................344
                III. FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS .....................................347
                     A. FACTS ........................................................347
                     B. THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S DECISION ..............................350
                 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW ..............................................350
                  V. DISCUSSION ......................................................351
                     A. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK ......................................351
                        1. The Railway — Labor Act...................................351
                           a. Section 2 (First) of the RLA ...........................352
                           b. Section 6 of the RLA and the Status Quo ................352
                        2. The Norris-LaGuardia Act ...............................355
                        3. The National Labor Relations Act ..........................355
                        4. Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code .......................356
                     B. LACK OF PRECEDENT HARMONIZING THE STATUTES ...................357
                     C. WHEN THE RIGHT TO SELF — HELP ACCRUES .......................358
                        1. In General ................................................358
                        2. In the Bankruptcy Context .................................362
                           a. Curtailing the Role of the NMB .........................364
                           b. Creation of Conflicts between § 1113 and RLA ......366
                           c. Accounting for Differences Between the NLRA and the RL..370
                     D. HARMONIZING THE STATUTES .....................................373
                        1. Accommodating the NLGA to the RLA .........................373
                        2. Accommodating the NLGA to § 2 (First) of the RLA .....376
                        3. The Section 2 (First) Duty in This Case ...................377
                        4. Harmonizing the RLA and the Bankruptcy Code ...............379
                     E. CONCLUSION ...................................................383
                 VI. ORDER ...........................................................384
                

I. BACKGROUND

Northwest Airlines Corporation ("Northwest") appeals from an order of the Bankruptcy Court rendered on August 17, 2006 denying Northwest's request for a preliminary injunction under Section 2 (First) of the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 152. Northwest had sought to enjoin the Association of Flight Attendants-CWA ("AFA") from carrying out threats to engage in a labor strike or other forms of self-help against Northwest, on the basis that such action would cause irreparable harm to Northwest's estate, unlawful disruption of commerce and of Northwest's operations, and substantial inconvenience to the public. The Bankruptcy Court denied Northwest's motion on the ground that the Norris-LaGuardia Act ("NLGA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., deprived it of jurisdiction to issue an injunction.

On appeal, Northwest argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred in denying Northwest's motion for a preliminary injunction on jurisdictional grounds. The matter came before this Court on August 18, 2006, by way of an emergency motion to expedite the appeal or in the alternative for an injunction pending appeal. The matter was heard by the Court's Part I judge, who granted the motion for the expedited appeal and set a briefing schedule, with a hearing scheduled for August 25, 2006. The Court received briefing from Northwest, AFA, and several amici and intervenors.¹ The Court heard oral argument on August 25, 2006. At the close of the hearing, the Court issued a temporary injunction pending appeal. The injunction barred the AFA from striking pending this Court's decision on the merits of this proceeding.

The central question before this Court is whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to enjoin a strike in the circumstances this case presents, which the Bankruptcy Court characterized as one of first impression. Specifically, the issue presented is whether, following rejection of a collective bargaining agreement in accordance with § 1113(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c) (" § 1113(c)"), by an insolvent carrier engaged in collective bargaining under the process prescribed in RLA Section 6, a court, pursuant to authority drawn from application of Sections 2 (First) and 6 of the RLA, may enjoin a union from striking in response to such rejection, or whether the granting of such injunction is barred by Section 4 of the NLGA, 29 U.S.C. § 104. This Court holds that a court may enjoin a strike under these circumstances, and that the Bankruptcy Court erred in determining otherwise. For the reasons set forth below, the order of the Bankruptcy Court is reversed.

II. INTRODUCTION

This case has drawn extensive public attention. A large number of intervenors, amici curiae and interested third persons, including the United States, have appeared in favor of and against the Bankruptcy Court's ruling here on appeal. The Court has also received in Chambers voluminous correspondence, inquiries and other communications from concerned individuals and members of the press. Mindful of such wide-ranging public interest, the Court here departs somewhat from the traditional model of judicial opinions. To ease understanding of the long and complex analysis that follows, the Court's ruling begins with an overview of the decision. This syllabus states the Court's conclusion, explains the conceptual approach and framework for the decision, and provides advance insight into the considerations the Court found most compelling, in particular the applicable legal principles and Congressional mandates on which the outcome here ultimately rests.

The legal dispute this litigation presents occurs at the junction of four related statute Congress has enacted in the field of labor law: the Railway Labor Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Various terms, legal principles and case law deriving from each of these statutes have been invoked by the parties and their supporters as bearing on the resolution of the dispute at hand. Some of these laws are of general application, while others are more specific. But whether working individually or in tandem they all regulate vital aspects of the relationship between workers and employers so as to promote industrial peace and prevent interruption to the flow of the nation's commerce. In most ways the statutes are complementary and have co-existed in complete harmony. From time to time, however, at the edges where they intersect, as more specifically detailed below, some actual and potential conflicts of legislative policies and goals have arisen from application of two or more of these laws in particular disputes.

The incidence of different Congressional enactments in the same field touching upon the same subject and creating legislative tension and conflicts of public policies is not uncommon. Here, the existence of not two but at least three and possibly four statutes substantially affecting the outcome of the case presents unique challenges. For the Court, as long-standing doctrine has repeatedly affirmed, these circumstances give rise to a threshold duty: to view the terms, policies, purposes and structures of the applicable laws as a whole and to read any clashing provisions in a manner that endeavors to accommodate them as much as possible, to this end giving effect to each statute and allowing them to co-exist insofar as they are not irreparably at odds. See F.C.C. v. NextWave Personal Commc'ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 304, 123 S.Ct. 832, 154 L.Ed.2d 863 (2003).

One essential consideration in this assessment merits considerable weight. Congress, in legislating in the same subject at different times and for different reasons, in permitting the various statutes here at issue to remain in effect despite perceived or apparent conflicts among some of their provisions, and in allowing their application to evolve through judicial interpretation, has thus evinced a considered judgment to design an integrated and well-ordered scheme of labor law. The legislative structure that thus has tacitly emerged may be conceived as having distinct parts, each statute occupying and functioning within its own sphere, yet standing on common ground that equally supports the independent and combined operation of the others, even where their planes and segments conjoin or overlap. Any arrangement of the separate pieces that heavily stresses the role of any one or two parts resting alone, while overlooking or unduly minimizing the central purposes of the others, is bound to be flawed. Almost inevitably such a view would produce results that fail to achieve to the fullest extent possible the most congruous and reasonable accommodation of related Congressional policies and their corresponding public ends.

Regrettably, the difficulty of the Court's task is compounded in this case because to a large measure the arguments that the parties, and to some extent the conclusion of the Bankruptcy Court, have presented to the Court reflect just such a shortcoming. In sum, by focusing disproportionately on one or two of the statutes to an unwarranted exclusion of the application and implications of the others, their analysis suggests a two-dimensional solution to a three-dimensional problem. In this manner, as this Court earlier characterized the flaw, the parties' approach is akin to an...