In re Opinion of the Justices

Decision Date17 April 1925
Citation251 Mass. 569,147 N.E. 681
PartiesIn re OPINION OF THE JUSTICES.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

The following order was passed by the House of Representatives on March 12, 1925, and by the Senate in concurrence on March 16, 1925, and was transmitted to the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court on March 20, 1925:

Whereas, there is pending before the general court a bill designed to secure financial redress in cases of personal injuries or death accidentally sustained and arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use upon the ways of the commonwealth of certain motor vehicles or trailers, such bill being printed in Appendix E in current Senate Document 285, and being entitled ‘An act requiring owners of certain motor vehicles and trailers to furnish security for their civil liability on account of personal injuries sustained by their motor vehicles and trailers,’ a copy of which is herewith submitted; and

Whereas, doubt exists as to the constitutionality of certain provisions of said bill, if enacted into law; therefore be it

Ordered, that the opinions of the honorable the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court be required by the general court on the following important questions of law:

1. May the General Court constitutionally enact legislation requiring as a condition precedent to the right of the owner to register a motor vehicle or trailer for operation on the ways of the commonwealth that the owner of such motor vehicle or trailer shall provide security for——

(a) The discharge of his liability for personal injuries or death at any time resulting from the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle or trailer upon the ways of the commonwealth?

(b) The discharge of the liability of any person responsible for the operation of such motor vehicle or trailer with the express or implied consent of the owner for such personal injuries or death?

2. Would the fact that the said bill does not provide such security for the discharge of such liability of persons other than those mentioned in questions 1(a) and 1(b) render it open to constitutional objection?

3. May the General Court constitutionally enact legislation prescribing that such security shall consist of a policy of liability insurance or a bond with a surety company as surety, as provided in section thirty-four A of chapter ninety of the General Laws, or a deposit of cash or securities as provided in section thirty-four E of said chapter ninety, inserted by section two of said bill?

4. Would the aforesaid bill, if enacted into law, be unconstitutional because——

(a) It does not apply to nonresident operators of motor vehicles or trailers operating in this commonwealth motor vehicles or trailers which have not been registered under said chapter ninety?

(b) It does not apply to certain motor vehicles or trailers set forth in section one A of said chapter ninety, inserted by section one of said bill?

(c) It requires that the operators of certain motor vehicles as common carriers subject to section forth-five of chapter one hundred and fifty-nine of the General Laws shall furnish a liability policy or bond as defined in said section thirty-four A in addition to the bond for property damage required by section forty-six of said chapter one hundred and fifty-nine, as amended by section seven of said bill?

(d) It expressly excludes from its protection employees covered by the Workmen's Compensation Law contained in chapter one hundred and fifty-two of the General Laws?

(e) It provides for security for claims for personal injuries or death resulting from the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles or trailers on the ways of the commonwealth and not upon private property?

(f) It requires that such security shall be provided only in respect to claims for personal injuries or death and not in respect to claims for damage to property?

(g) It provides that the maximum security in the case of a deposit under said section thirty-four E shall be five thousand dollars, while the said security in the case of a policy of insurance or a bond shall be in the sum of $4,000 for death or personal injuries of any one person and $10,000 for personal injuries or death for more than one person in the same accident?

(h) It is made applicable equally, except as provided in section one A of said chapter ninety, to all classes and kinds of motor vehicles and trailers whether operated for pleasure or private business, including the business of operating taxicabs, or by common carriers of passengers?

(i) It does not expressly exclude from its operation motor vehicles or trailers engaged wholly or in part in interstate commerce?

5A. May the general court constitutionally enact legislation regulating the form of motor vehicle liability policies or bonds as defined in said section thirty-four A, and requiring that any such policy or bond shall contain the following provisions:

(a) That the policy or bond shall not be canceled by the insured or principal during its term except upon the transfer, loss, theft or destruction of the motor vehicle or trailer covered thereby or upon the substitution of a deposit of cash or securities for such policy or bond?

(b) That no statement made by the insured or on his behalf and no violation of the terms of the policy shall operate to defeat the claim of any judgment creditor of the insured proceeding under the provisions of section one hundred and thirteen of chapter one hundred and seventy-five of the General Laws and clause ten of section three of chapter two hundred and fourteen of the General Laws, so as to bar a recovery within the limits of indemnity provided in the policy?

(c) That the policy or bond shall cover, subject to the limits of indemnity mentioned in subdivision (g) of the fourth question, all claims, irrespective of number, for such personal injuries or death occurring during its term?

5B. May the General Court constitutionally enact legislation providing that such policies or bonds shall not contain any exclusions or exceptions as to specified accidents or injuries or causes thereof?

6. May the General Court constitutionally enact legislation providing that——

(a) The premiums to be charged by insurance or surety companies issuing policies of liability insurance or bonds as provided in said bill shall be approved in writing by the commissioner of insurance as adequate, just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory for the risks to which they respectively apply and that no insurance or surety company shall issue such policy or bond until such approval is obtained?

(b) The commissioner of insurance in determining the adequacy, justness and reasonableness of the said premiums and whether or not discrimination is being practiced relative thereto shall not allow a loading for commissions to be paid to insurance agents or brokers negotiating or issuing said policies or bonds in excess of fifteen per cent. of such premiums?

(c) The premium rates and classifications of risks approved by the commissioner of insurance shall be used by all the insurance companies issuing such policies or acting as surety on such bonds?

(d) The commission of insurance may from time to time modify, alter or revise any such classification of risks or premiums?

(e) The decision of the commissioner of insurance in approving such premiums or classifications of risks or modifying, altering or revising any such classifications of risks or premiums shall be final?

7. Would the provisions of section one hundred and thirteen B of chapter one hundred and seventy-five of the General Laws, inserted by section four of said bill, if enacted into law, be unconstitutional because no provision is made for a judicial review of the decisions of said commissioner in approving, disapproving, modifying, altering or revising such premium rates or classification of risks?

8. May the General Court constitutionally enact legislation as set forth in section eight A of chapter twenty-six of the General Laws, inserted by section three of said bill, and in section one hundred and thirteen D of chapter one hundred and seventy-five of the General Laws, inserted by section four of said bill, establishing a board of appeal to hear and determine all complaints of any person aggrieved by the cancellation or the refusal of a company to issue a liability policy, or to act as surety on a bond, required by said section thirty-four A of chapter ninety; providing that said board shall determine whether the cancellation or refusal is proper and reasonable and whether the complainant is a proper person to whom to issue a policy or bond; providing that the decision of such board of appeal shall be final and binding upon the parties; providing that if an insurance or surety company fails to comply with the decision of said board in favor of the complainant, the latter may present a certified copy of the decision of the board to the superior court or a justice thereof who shall enter a decree in accordance therewith and notify the parties; providing that such decree of the superior court or justice thereof shall be final; and providing further that if a foreign insurance company fails to abide by such decree of the superior court or a justice thereof, the commissioner of insurance shall suspend its license to transact business in the commonwealth until it complies with such decree, and that if a domestic insurance company fails to abide by such decree, said commissioner shall proceed to have it enjoined from the further transaction of its business until it complies with said decree?

9. Would the provisions of said section one hundred and thirteen D, if enacted into law, be unconstitutional, because said section does not provide for an appeal from a decision of said board of appeal adverse to the insurance or surety company or to the complainant or because it does not provide for an appeal from the decree of the superior court,...

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