In re Order

Decision Date11 March 2011
Docket NumberMiscellaneous No. 1:11dm00003.
Citation787 F.Supp.2d 430
PartiesIn re: § 2703(d) Order; 10GJ3793.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Tracy Doherty McCormick, U.S. Attorney's Office, Alexandria, VA, for USA.John Kenneth Zwerling, Stuart Alexander Sears, Zwerling, Leibig & Moseley, P.C., Alexandria, VA, for Jacob Appelbaum In re: 2703(D) Order; 10GJ3793.Nina J. Ginsberg, Dimuro Ginsberg & Mook P.C., Alexandria, VA, for Rop Gonggrijp In re: 2703(D) Order; 10GJ3793.Jonathan Shapiro, Greenspun Shapiro Davis & Leary PC, Rebecca Kim Glenberg, ACLU of Virginia, Richmond, VA for Birgitta Jonsdottir In re: 2703(D) Order; 10GJ3793.John Kuropatkin Roche, Perkins COIE LLP, Washington, DC, for Twitter, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THERESA CARROLL BUCHANAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter came before the Court the Motion of Real Parties in Interest Jacob Appelbaum, Birgitta Jonsdottir, and Rop Gonggrijp to Vacate December 14, 2010 Order (Motion to Vacate, Dkt. 1) and Motion of Real Parties in Interest Jacob AppelBaum, Rop Gonggrijp, and Birgitta Jonsdottir for Unsealing of Sealed Court Records. (Motion to Unseal, Dkt. 3). For the following reasons, petitioners' Motion to Vacate is DENIED, and petitioners' Motion to Unseal is DENIED in part, GRANTED in part, and taken under further consideration in part.

BACKGROUND

Petitioners are Twitter users associated with account names of interest to the government. Petitioner Jacob Appelbaum (Twitter name “ioerror”) is a United States citizen and resident, described as a computer security researcher. (Pet. Motion to Unseal at 3). Rop Gonggrijp (Twitter name “rop_g”) is a Dutch citizen and computer security specialist. Id. Birgitta Jonsdottir (Twitter name “birgittaj”) is an Icelandic citizen and resident. She currently serves as a member of the Parliament of Iceland. Id.

On December 14, 2010, upon the government's ex parte motion, the Court entered a sealed Order (“Twitter Order”) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) of the Stored Communications Act, which governs government access to customer records stored by a service provider. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2000 & Supp.2009). The Twitter Order, which was unsealed on January 5, 2010, required Twitter, Inc., a social network service provider, to turn over to the United States subscriber information concerning the following accounts and individuals: Wikileaks, rop_g, ioerror, birgittaj, Julian Assange, Bradely Manning, Rop Gonggrijp, and Birgitta Jonsdottir. In particular, the Twitter Order demands:

A. The following customer or subscriber account information for each account registered to or associated with Wikileaks; rop—g; ioerror; birgittaj; Julian Assange; Bradely Manning; Rop Gongrijp [sic.]; Birgitta Jonsdottir for the time period November 1, 2009 to present:

1. subscriber names, user names, screen names, or other identities;

2. mailing addresses, residential addresses, business addresses, e-mail addresses, and other contact information;

3. connection records, or records of session times and durations;

4. length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized;

5. telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned network address; and

6. means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank account number) and billing records.

B. All records and other information relating to the account(s) and time period in Part A, including:

1. records of user activity for any connections made to or from the Account, including date, time, length, and method of connections, data transfer volume, user name, and source and destination Internet Protocol address(es);

2. non-content information associated with the contents of any communication or file stored by or for the account(s), such as the source and destination email addresses and IP addresses.

3. correspondence and notes of records related to the account(s).

On January 26, 2011, petitioners filed the instant motions asking the Court to vacate the Twitter Order, and to unseal all orders and supporting documents relating to Twitter and any other service provider. Moreover, petitioners request a public docket for each related order. On February 15, 2011, the Court held a public hearing and took petitioners' motions under consideration. For the following reasons, the Court declines to vacate the Twitter Order, and orders that only documents specified below shall be unsealed.

ANALYSIS
I. Motion to Vacate

Petitioners request that the Twitter Order be vacated. The parties have raised the following issues in their briefs: (1) whether petitioners have standing under the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) to bring a motion to vacate, (2) whether the Twitter Order was properly issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, (3) whether the Twitter Order violates petitioners' First Amendment rights, (3) whether the Twitter Order violates petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights, and (4) whether the Twitter Order should be vacated as to Ms. Jonsdottir for reasons of international comity.

(1) Petitioners' Standing Under 18 U.S.C. § 2704(b)

Pursuant to § 2704(b)(1)(A), a customer may challenge a § 2703(d) order only upon an affidavit “stating that the applicant is a customer or subscriber to the service from which the contents of electronic communications maintained for him have been sought.” (emphasis supplied). The Court holds that targets of court orders for non-content or records information may not bring a challenge under 18 U.S.C. § 2704, and therefore, petitioners lack standing to bring a motion to vacate the Twitter Order.

The SCA provides greater protection to the “contents of electronic communications”, sought pursuant to § 2703(a) and § 2703(b), than to their “records” (§ 2703(c)). The statutory definition of “contents” is “any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8)(2002). Targets of content disclosures are authorized to bring a customer challenge under § 2704. Conversely, § 2703(c)(1) describes “records” as “a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not the contents of communication).” According to § 2703(c)(2), records include:

(A) name;

(B) address;

(C) local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session times and durations;

(D) length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized;

(E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned network address; and

(F) means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank account number), of a subscriber to or customer of such service when the governmental entity uses ... any means available under paragraph (1) (emphasis supplied).

The Twitter Order does not demand the contents of any communication, and thus constitutes only a request for records under § 2703(c). Even though the Twitter Order seeks information additional to the specific records listed in § 2703(c)—data transfer volume, source and destination Internet Protocol addresses, and [Twitter's] correspondence and notes of records related to the accounts—these, too, are non-content “records” under § 2703(c)(1). Therefore, as the targets of mere records disclosure, petitioners may not bring a customer challenge under § 2704.

Petitioners, unable to overcome the language of § 2704, assert in reply that they have standing based on general due process, but cite no authority on point. Moreover, § 2704 seems to recognize that only targets of content disclosures would have a viable constitutional challenge to the compelled disclosure of private communications. Customers who voluntarily provide non-content records to an internet service provider would not enjoy the same level of protection.

(2) Proper Issuance of the Twitter Order

Notwithstanding petitioners' lack of standing to bring their motion to vacate, the Court finds that the substance of their motion is equally unavailing.

The Twitter Order came before the Court upon the government's motion and supporting application for an order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). Section 2703(d) provides in pertinent part:

(d) Requirements for court order.—A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” (emphasis supplied).

On December 14, 2010, the Court found that the application satisfied § 2703(d) and entered the Twitter Order. Petitioners now ask the Court to reconsider the sufficiency of the underlying application pursuant to § 2704(b)(1)(B), which authorizes customers to move to vacate an order upon a showing “that there has not been substantial compliance” with § 2703(d). Because the application remains sealed, petitioners face the difficulty of challenging a document they have not seen. Nevertheless, petitioners speculate that regardless of the application's factual support, it could not have justified the scope of the Twitter Order. That is, petitioners contend that because their publically posted “tweets” pertained mostly to non-Wikileaks topics, the Twitter Order necessarily demands data that has no connection to Wikileaks and cannot be “relevant or material” to any ongoing investigation as § 2703(d) requires. Notwithstanding petitioners' questions, the Court remains convinced that the application stated “specific and articulable” facts sufficient to issue the Twitter Order under § 2703(d). The disclosures sought are “relevant and material” to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry. Also, the scope of the...

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