In re Oreoluwa O.

• Decision Date: 20 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 36845.,36845.
• Citation: 157 Conn.App. 490,116 A.3d 400
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re OREOLUWA O.

157 Conn.App. 490

116 A.3d 400

In re OREOLUWA O.^*

No. 36845.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 20, 2015.

Decided May 20, 2015.^**

James P. Sexton, assigned counsel, with whom was Michael S. Taylor, West Hartford, for the appellant (respondent father).

Michael Besso, assistant attorney general, with whom were Jessica B. Gauvin, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).

GRUENDEL, ALVORD and NORCOTT, Js.

Opinion

ALVORD, J.

The respondent father, Olusegun O., appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating his parental rights with respect to his minor son, Oreoluwa O.¹ On appeal, he argues that it was clear error for the trial court to determine that (1) the Department of Children and Families (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify him with Oreoluwa, (2) the respondent abandoned Oreoluwa, and (3) the respondent had no ongoing parent-child relationship with Oreoluwa. He also claims, on behalf of Oreoluwa, that the guarantee of due process under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution required the trial court to provide the respondent with notice of alternative means of participation in the termination trial and required the court to undertake reasonable efforts to use those alternative means. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history are relevant to the disposition of this appeal. The respondent, together with his wife, Oreoluwa's mother,² live in Nigeria. Oreoluwa's mother traveled to the United States while pregnant for the purpose of birthing Oreoluwa in this country. Prior to his birth, it was determined that he suffered significant congenital heart defects

, and he was diagnosed with several complex heart conditions after he was born. Initially, he was released from the hospital to his mother's care, and the two lived with a family in Milford for a short time after his birth before moving into a hotel. In mid-April, 2013, when he was approximately three months old, Oreoluwa was readmitted to the hospital, where medical personnel observed his mother behaving erratically and having difficulty administering his medications.

On May 3, 2013, the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families (commissioner), sought from the court an order of temporary custody and filed a neglect petition as to Oreoluwa. The commissioner alleged that Oreoluwa was neglected in that he was being denied proper care and was being permitted to live under conditions injurious to his wellbeing, and that he was uncared for in that his home could not provide the specialized care that he required. Oreoluwa was adjudicated neglected and committed to the custody of the commissioner. The court approved specific steps for the respondent to take so he could be reunited with Oreoluwa. On December 23, 2013, the commissioner filed a petition for the termination of the respondent's parental rights regarding Oreoluwa on the grounds that (1) the child had been abandoned by the respondent in the sense that he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child, and (2) there was no ongoing parent-child relationship with the respondent “that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral, and educational needs of the child ... and [that] to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of the parent-child ... relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child....” On February 27, 2014, the court entered a default as to the respondent because of his failure to appear at the plea hearing. The mother had previously been defaulted.³

The hearing on the termination of parental rights petition was held on March 12, 2014. On March 20, 2014, the court rendered an oral decision terminating the parental rights of the respondent. The respondent subsequently filed a motion for reargument and reconsideration, which was denied. On June 14, 2014, the respondent filed this appeal. The respondent also filed a motion for articulation of the decision to terminate parental rights, which was denied. The respondent filed a motion for review with this court, which granted the motion. On October 10, 2014, the trial court issued its articulation.

The court found by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112 (j)(1) that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify Oreoluwa with the respondent given the circumstances. The court noted that “the father's absence from the state, and indeed from this country, has limited the type and number of services that the department has been able to provide to him. When a parent is not available to participate in services, the reasonableness of the department's efforts must be judged in that context.” The court explained that although the department was not able to provide him services, it had provided him with contact information for the Nigerian consulate in New York, maintained communication with him, investigated a possible placement resource for Oreoluwa suggested by the respondent, and attempted, although unsuccessfully, to set up visitation via Skype.

The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent abandoned Oreoluwa pursuant to § 17a–112 (j)(3)(A) and that there was no ongoing parent-child relationship between the respondent and Oreoluwa pursuant to § 17a–112 (j)(3)(D). As to abandonment, the court found that the respondent did make some inquiry as to how he could contribute financially to Oreoluwa's care, but when asked for documentation of his income in order to establish an appropriate child support amount, the respondent did not respond. The court further found that the respondent has not “expressed [his] love and affection to the child on a consistent and continuing basis; [he has] not supplied him with the food, clothing, and medical care that he needs; nor [has he] provided him with an adequate domicile or furnished him with social and religious guidance. [His] absence from this country does not excuse [him] from doing all that [he] could do to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern and responsibility for Oreoluwa, given the circumstances.”

After finding that the allegations of the petition were proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court then determined whether termination was in the best interest of Oreoluwa. The court considered the seven statutory factors and made written findings as to each factor pursuant to § 17a–112 (k). The court ultimately concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that it was in Oreoluwa's best interest to terminate the respondent's parental rights. It is from this decision that the respondent appeals.

“We begin by setting forth the statutory requirements for granting a petition for the termination of parental rights. A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition.... If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists [by clear and convincing evidence], it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child....⁴

“Our standard of review on appeal from a termination of parental rights is limited to whether the challenged findings are clearly erroneous.... A finding is clearly erroneous when either there is no evidence in the record to support it, or the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.... [G]reat weight is given to the judgment of the trial court because of [the trial court's] opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence.... [An appellate court does] not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached.... [Rather] every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the trial court's ruling.” (Citation omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Mindy F., 153 Conn.App. 786, 791–92, 105 A.3d 351 (2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 913, 106 A.3d 306 (2015).

I

The respondent first argues that the court's finding that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify him with Oreoluwa was clearly erroneous. We disagree.

“In order to terminate parental rights under § 17a–112 (j), the department is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it has made reasonable efforts ... to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds ... that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification.... General Statutes § 17a–112 (j)(1).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 144, 962 A.2d 81 (2009), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 746–47, 91 A.3d 862 (2014). “The reasonableness of the department's efforts must be assessed in the context of each case. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn.... [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.... [R]easonableness is an objective standard ... and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 855, 872–73, 83 A.3d 1264, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923, 86 A.3d 468 (2014).

The respondent's argument consists of identifying actions he claims that the department should have taken in order to satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement. Spe...