In re Pacific Far East Line, Inc.

Decision Date15 June 1970
Docket NumberNo. 47077.,47077.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California
PartiesIn the Matter of the Complaint of PACIFIC FAR EAST LINE, INC., a corporation, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability as Owner of the American Flag STEAMSHIP GUAM BEAR.

Dorr, Cooper & Hays, John Hays, William K. Mordock, San Francisco, Cal., for Pacific Far East Line, Inc.

Lillick, McHose, Wheat, Adams & Charles, Edward D. Ransom, Willard G. Gilson, San Francisco, Cal., for Humble Oil and Refining Co.

Derby, Cook, Quinby & Tweedt, Stanley J. Cook, Robert H. Thede, San Francisco, Cal., for Air Engineering Co. et al., owners and insurers of commercial cargo aboard the Guam Bear.

U. S. Department of Justice, Admiralty & Shipping Section, John F. Meadows, Gerald A. Falbo, San Francisco, Cal., for the United States.

OPINION

BEEKS, District Judge*:

Shortly prior to 06301, local time, January 14, 1967, the American tanker ESSO SEATTLE, owned and operated by Humble Oil and Refining Co. (hereinafter Humble), and the American freighter GUAM BEAR, owned and operated by Pacific Far East Line, Inc. (hereinafter PFE), were in collision just outside the entrance to Apra Harbor, located on the west side of the Island of Guam. ESSO SEATTLE is a single screw vessel, 634.6 feet in length, 84 foot in breadth, 47 foot in depth, and of 18,600 h.p. GUAM BEAR was also a single screw vessel, 459 feet in length, 63.2 foot in breadth, 37.6 foot in depth, and of 6,000 h.p.

Apra Harbor is a Naval Base under the control and operation of the U. S. Navy. It is over two miles deep, east to west, and is entered from the west. The entrance range through the entrance of the harbor is 084°2 inbound, 264° outbound. The entrance is bounded on the north by the tip of Glass Breakwater and on the south by Orote Island and the tip of Orote Peninsula. There are shallows immediately adjacent to the breakwater and the peninsula, and the deep water entrance to the harbor is marked by two buoys approximately 900 feet apart on a roughly northerly-southerly line. The northerly buoy, off the end of the breakwater, is identified as #1 and the southerly buoy, near Orote Peninsula, as #2.

The collision occurred a short distance outside of a line between the entrance buoys, fairly close to and northwest of buoy #2. The collision occurred before official sunrise, but during the last few minutes prior to the collision sufficient daylight prevailed that each vessel could see the other as well as neighboring landmarks and buoys. Prior to that time the masthead and range lights of each vessel were visible to and observed by the other. At all times material wind and current were negligible.

On the morning of the collision, GUAM BEAR having passed north of Guam Island was inbound to Apra Harbor from Wake Island. Upon leaving Wake, she had radioed her estimated time of arrival at Guam as 0600 on January 14, 1967. At 0530 Orote Point light bore 192° 3.3 miles3 distant. At this time GUAM BEAR slowed her engine and at 0540 stopped it to await the beginning of daylight before proceeding further. During this time GUAM BEAR's radio officer made numerous unsuccessful attempts to contact Navy Radio Center on 2716 kcs.

ESSO SEATTLE had arrived at Apra Harbor with a cargo of jet fuel and was berthed at Pier H. Her departure was originally scheduled at 0600 on January 14, 1967 following discharge of her cargo. Such departure was advanced to 0530. The reason for the advanced departure time was the anticipated arrival of GUAM BEAR at 0600. The pilot, an employee of the U. S. Navy, arrived on board ESSO SEATTLE some time between 0520 and 0538. After undocking and turning ESSO SEATTLE, the pilot, who had the conn, gave a full ahead engine order and such helm orders as were necessary to bring her on or very near to the departure range, heading for the harbor entrance. This full ahead bell was given at 0612½. At the time of departure ESSO SEATTLE had not been "gas-freed."

At a point approximately one half mile short of the entrance, the pilot disembarked onto tug #419 an accompanying Navy harbor tug and ESSO SEATTLE was thereafter navigated by her master, while the tug lay-to inside the entrance, awaiting the entrance of GUAM BEAR so that the pilot could board and pilot her to her berth.

During the time from undocking of ESSO SEATTLE to the time the pilot left the bridge, the pilot, the master and third mate of ESSO SEATTLE, from her bridge, observed the masthead and range lights of GUAM BEAR at sea across the breakwater and the pilot advised the master of ESSO SEATTLE that the lights observed were probably those of GUAM BEAR, which would probably wait outside the entrance until ESSO SEATTLE had exited before herself coming in through the entrance.

At 0606, as day started to break, GUAM BEAR had drifted to a position north of the harbor entrance. Her master then felt there was sufficient visibility to enter the harbor. He could see the masthead and range lights and the green sidelight of ESSO SEATTLE. He ordered full ahead (maneuvering speed) and proceeded on a course of 214°. GUAM BEAR maintained this course and speed until 0617 when her master ordered left rudder to turn toward the harbor entrance. This turn was completed at 0618, at which time GUAM BEAR came to a heading of 125° and directly toward the harbor entrance. At 0618 GUAM BEAR was 2600 yards from #1 buoy on a bearing of 123°.

At 0618 the speed of ESSO SEATTLE was reduced to slow ahead to permit the pilot to disembark. When the pilot left the bridge he was accompanied to the main deck by the third mate and boarded tug 419 at 0623.

Upon observing the departure of the pilot and the maneuvering of tug 419 for such purpose from the port wing of the bridge ESSO SEATTLE's master returned from the port wing of the bridge to the engine room telegraph in the pilot house and rang up full ahead. Very shortly after the pilot left ESSO SEATTLE, her master saw GUAM BEAR clear the end of the breakwater, approximately three points on his starboard bow, and saw that she was then proceeding at a substantial rate of speed on a course toward the harbor entrance which, if projected, would cross ESSO SEATTLE's outbound course. At this time he seemingly realized for the first time that GUAM BEAR was not going to wait outside but was coming on into the harbor, and so remarked to his third mate. At 0623 ESSO SEATTLE was 1000 yards inside the harbor, headed midway between the entrance buoys. ESSO SEATTLE traveled 1700 yards from the time the pilot left the bridge to the time he was off the vessel.

On seeing GUAM BEAR's bow appearing from behind Glass Breakwater, ESSO SEATTLE's master blew two blasts, applied left rudder and told the helmsman to steer close to and just to the north of buoy #2. No response was heard from GUAM BEAR, and after waiting for 20-25 seconds, ESSO SEATTLE repeated the two-blast signal. Her first two-blast signal having gone unanswered ESSO SEATTLE was uncertain as to the intentions of GUAM BEAR, but failed to blow the danger signal, stop her engine, and/or go full astern. Instead, she repeated her two-blast signal.

At the time of the second two-blast signal by ESSO SEATTLE, GUAM BEAR blew a signal and continued on her course. The evidence is in conflict as to the nature of the signal by GUAM BEAR. Humble contended that GUAM BEAR blew a two-blast signal, while PFE contended that GUAM BEAR blew a signal of four short blasts. Upon all the evidence it is more probable and logical that GUAM BEAR blew four blasts, the first two of which harmonized with ESSO SEATTLE's two-blast signal.

For one minute after GUAM BEAR's signal, ESSO SEATTLE continued under a full ahead bell on the last course aforementioned and her master watched GUAM BEAR closely. During this period the relative bearing of GUAM BEAR remained constant and the master of ESSO SEATTLE saw that she was not turning left to meet and pass ESSO SEATTLE starboard to starboard at the entrance. The master of ESSO SEATTLE then put his engine full astern and ordered hard right rudder. At this moment, however, the bow of GUAM BEAR was almost dead ahead and collision was then inevitable. The full astern and hard right rudder were ordered solely in the hope of lessening the angle of impact and the force thereof.

After her one and only signal GUAM BEAR first stopped her engine for a short period, then reversed momentarily, then went full ahead under hard right rudder which was almost immediately changed to hard left in the hope of swinging her stern to the right, away from oncoming ESSO SEATTLE.

At 06264 at a point northwesterly of and fairly close to buoy #2 the stem of ESSO SEATTLE struck the port side of GUAM BEAR between #4 and #5 hatches, well aft of midships at an oblique angle of between 30 and 45 degrees, and the bow of ESSO SEATTLE penetrated GUAM BEAR almost to her midline. At the moment of impact the speed of ESSO SEATTLE was approximately 9 knots and that of GUAM BEAR approximately 10 knots.

Subsequent to the collision GUAM BEAR was aided into Apra Harbor by Navy tugs and was beached, in a navigable channel, at right angles to the shore with her bow on the beach and her stern deeply submerged, thus blocking use of Piers D and H and creating an obstruction to navigation. Some cargo was removed from the forward holds of GUAM BEAR, after which the Navy caused her to be towed to sea and sunk.

As a proximate result of the collision: (1) GUAM BEAR became and was a total loss. (2) A large amount of GUAM BEAR's cargo, some owned by United States and some owned by private parties, was totally lost or damaged. (3) PFE incurred expense to remove salvable cargo from the forward holds of the vessel. (4) Humble sustained loss of use and expense in connection with repair of damage sustained by ESSO SEATTLE in the collision.

At all times relevant herein, and for several years prior to January 14, 1967, Apra Harbor was controlled by U. S. Navy in such matters as...

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