In re Pan, Civil Action No. 96-11201-PBS.
Decision Date | 05 March 1997 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 96-11201-PBS. |
Citation | 209 BR 152 |
Parties | In re George S. PAN, Debtor. UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Joseph BRAUNSTEIN, Trustee, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Susan M. Poswistillo, U.S. Attorney's Office, Boston, MA, Henry J. Riordan, U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, DC, for appellant.
Alan L. Braunstein, Riemer & Braunstein, Boston, MA, for appellee.
In this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), the United States of America challenges a bankruptcy court's decision to disallow a proof of claim filed by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). During the Chapter 7 proceeding, the bankruptcy court rejected the government's argument that the proof of claim for a federal tax penalty in the amount of $123,371.49 was itself prima facie evidence of the claim's validity. Sustaining the objection raised by Joseph Braunstein, appointed Trustee for the estate of debtor George S. Pan, the bankruptcy court held that the proof of claim did not document adequately the alleged tax obligation and that, as a result, the government failed to meet its burden of establishing the trust fund's liability.
For the following reasons, the bankruptcy court's order denying the proof of claim is VACATED and the case is REMANDED to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings.
On September 8, 1992, the debtor, George S. Pan ("Pan"), filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. On December 16, 1992, the bankruptcy court converted the case to a case under Chapter 7 of the Code, and Joseph Braunstein ("Braunstein") was appointed as trustee for the debtor.
On June 2, 1995, the United States filed a proof of claim, classified as an "unsecured priority claim," for pre-petition federal taxes in the amount of $166,916.43.1 The proof of claim was filed on an official bankruptcy Form 10 and included an attachment entitled "Proof of Claim for Internal Revenue Taxes." The attachment stated that the total claim amount was based upon civil penalties for three separate tax periods — the period ending Dec. 31, 1988; the period ending December 31, 1991; and the period ending June 30, 1992. The attachment also indicated that the tax assessment for the period ending December 31, 1988, which is the sole penalty still at issue in this case,2 amounted to $123,371.49, with interest.
On December 15, 1995, Braunstein filed an objection to the proofs of claim of ten creditors, including the IRS. The gravamen of Braunstein's opposition to the IRS proof of claim was that the claim was "not supported by any documentation establishing the source of such taxes." Objection of Chapter 7 Trustee to Proofs of Claim, at 6 hereinafter Objection. On January 16, 1996, the United States filed an opposition to the Trustee's objection which stated, in relevant part:
United States of America's Response to Objection of Chapter 7 Trustee to Proofs of Claim, at 2 hereinafter Response.3
On January 24, 1996, the bankruptcy court held a hearing on the Trustee's objections. During the hearing, the Trustee requested that the IRS supply documentation to support its claim. The government responded: (Transcript at 11, 11. 24-25, at 12, 11. 1-4.) The bankruptcy court then continued the hearing.4
On April 11, 1996, during the next hearing on this matter, the parties informed the court that a dispute still existed concerning the IRS proof of claim, and the Court inquired as to whether either side desired a continuance. In response, the government stated that it "would not be asking for a continuance per se, but we disagree with Mr. Braunstein's position on disallowing our proof of claim . . . So, I don't know if you maybe want to — maybe put on evidentiary hearing at some later time." The Court responded, "Well, there's no reason we can't do it today."
After a short recess, during which the Court heard other matters, the hearing resumed. The Trustee withdrew his objection as to the tax assessments for the periods ending December 31, 1991 and June 30, 1992 — the two claims for which the IRS had provided documentation. As to the period ending December 31, 1988, the Trustee maintained his objection. The IRS offered Form 4340, entitled "Certificate of Assessments and Payments," which indicates that a "trust fund recovery penalty" was assessed on July 27, 1992. After argument, the Bankruptcy Court made the following ruling:
The Court further stated that:
The problem is, you know, if you were dealing with Chapter 11 debtor\'s counsel objecting that would be one thing. Mr. Braunstein is an independent fiduciary. If he — all he can do is look at the books and records and look at the claims to try to determine whether they\'re valid or not . . . the problem is he can\'t assess the validity of that 12/31/88 claim without assistance, and you haven\'t even provided him that threshold of help. . . . There is no basis on which I could even — there\'s no way I could rule in favor of the IRS on this factual record if I wanted to.
A federal district court must accept a bankruptcy court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous. See Fed R. Bank. P. 8013; In Re DN Associates, 3 F.3d 512, 515 (1st Cir.1993). However, conclusions of law, such as the legal sufficiency of a proof of claim, are reviewed de novo. See In re Circle J Dairy, Inc., 112 B.R. 297, 299 (W.D.Ark.1989) ( ).
The United States Code requires a creditor who is seeking to assert a claim against a bankrupt debtor's estate to file a "proof of claim." 11 U.S.C. § 501(a). Section 502(a) provides that a proof of claim is deemed allowed unless a party in interest objects. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). The statute also sets forth the grounds upon which a bankruptcy court may disallow a proof of claim "after notice and hearing." Id.
At such a hearing, according to the Federal Bankruptcy Rules, "a proof of claim executed and filed in accordance with these rules shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim." Fed. R. Bank. Proc. 3001(f); accord In re Hemingway, 993 F.2d 915, 925 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 914, 114 S.Ct. 303, 126 L.Ed.2d 251 (1993); United States v. Kiester, 182 B.R. 52, 53 (M.D.Fla.1995); cf. United States v. Kontaratos, 36 B.R. 928, 931 (D.Me.1984)( proof of claim filed by IRS not entitled to presumptive validity because no formal assessment had been completed). "To be legally sufficient and, therefore, to be prima facie valid under the Bankruptcy Rules," a proof of claim must: "be in writing"; "make a demand on the debtor's estate"; "express an intent to hold the debtor liable for the debt"; "be properly filed"; and "be based upon facts which would allow, as a matter of equity, the document to be accepted as a proof of claim." Circle J Dairy, 112 B.R. at 299-300 (citing In re Scholz, 57 B.R. 259 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1986)). "A claim that alleges facts sufficient to support a legal liability to the claimant satisfies the claimant's initial obligation to go forward." In re Allegheny Intern., Inc., 954 F.2d 167, 173 (3rd Cir.1992).
Of course, the prima facie validity of a proof of claim can be overcome by an objection that is "supported by substantial evidence." Hemingway, 993 F.2d at 925 (emphasis in original); accord Matter of Placid Oil Co., 988 F.2d 554, 557 (5th Cir.1993), reh'g den., 4 F.3d 992 (5th Cir.1993); Allegheny, 954 F.2d at 173-74 (). In the ordinary Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, "once the Trustee manages the initial burden of producing substantial evidence . . . the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion as to the allowability of the claim resides with the party asserting the claim." Hemingway, 993 F.2d at 925; see also In re Bourque, 153 B.R. 87, 91 (Bankr. D.Mass.1993) (...
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