In re Parenting of DAH

• Decision Date: 22 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-487.,04-487.
• Citation: 109 P.3d 247,326 Mont. 296,2005 MT 68
• Parties: In re the PARENTING OF D.A.H. and G.M.H., Minor Children. F.H. and W.H., Petitioners and Appellants, v. C.P.H., Respondent and Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

109 P.3d 247

2005 MT 68

326 Mont. 296

In re the PARENTING OF D.A.H. and G.M.H., MinorChildren.

F.H. and W.H., Petitioners and Appellants, v.C.P.H., Respondent and Respondent.

No. 04-487.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs February 23, 2005.

Decided March 22, 2005.

For Appellants: Miriam G. Luse, Attorney at Law, Helena, Montana.

For Respondent: Joan Hunter, Attorney at Law, Helena, Montana.

Justice PATRICIA O. COTTERdelivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 F.H. and W.H., the maternal grandparents of D.A.H. (D.H.) and G.M.H. (G.H.), appeal the First Judicial District Court's dismissal of their action for want of jurisdiction.We affirm.

ISSUE

¶ 2 The dispositive issue before this Court is whether the grandparents have standing to bring this action.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 S.H. and C.P.H. (C.H.) are the biological parents of D.H. and G.H.In May 2003, the family moved from Washington to Maine.On August 18, 2003, C.H. assaulted S.H., who required a short hospital stay for her injuries.Upon release from the hospital, S.H. sought a temporary protective order which was issued by a Maine court on August 20, 2003.On the following day, S.H. fled with her children to Oregon where her parents, F.H. and W.H., lived.She and the children have resided with her parents since that time.

¶ 4 On August 29, 2003, C.H. filed for divorce in Maine.S.H. was served with the divorce papers and answered the complaint.On September 9, 2003, S.H. applied to an Oregon court for a protective order.On November 7, 2003, the Maine court assumed jurisdiction and a temporary Order was entered by the court granting custody to C.H.On November 20, 2003, the children, their mother and their grandparents moved from Oregon to Helena, Montana, where the children started intensive therapy for post-traumatic stress disorder.Also, D.H., who was six years old at the time, started public school for the first time.

¶ 5 On January 8, 2004, the Maine court ordered S.H. to return the children to Maine on or before February 15, 2004.On February 6, 2004, the grandparents filed an emergency ex parte motion under § 40-7-204, MCA, in the First Judicial District Court of Montana, requesting that the District Court issue an order blocking the Maine Order to return the children.On March 8, 2004, the Montana District Court entered a jurisdictional order accepting jurisdiction of the children.Subsequently, in accordance with § 40-7-204(4), MCA, of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act(UCCJEA), the Montana District Court communicated with the Maine court.As a result of this communication, the District Court entered an order declining jurisdiction, dismissing the case and remanding the matter to the Maine court.The grandparents filed a timely appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6We review a district court's decision to decline jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion.Riley v. Amundsen(In re Custody of N.G.H.), 2004 MT 162, ¶ 12, 322 Mont. 20, ¶ 12, 92 P.3d 1215, ¶ 12(citingIn re Marriage of Fontenot,2003 MT 242, ¶ 11, 317 Mont. 298, ¶ 11, 77 P.3d 206, ¶ 11).

DISCUSSION

¶ 7 As a general rule, we decline to address on appeal an issue not raised by the parties before the District Court.SeeArmstrong v. State,1999 MT 261, ¶ 4, 296 Mont. 361, ¶ 4, 989 P.2d 364, ¶ 4;Mortgage Source, Inc. v. Strong,2003 MT 205, ¶ 14, 317 Mont. 37, ¶ 14, 75 P.3d 304, ¶ 14.Questions of standing, however, are an exception to that rule.Standing is a threshold requirement of every case and may be raised by this Courtsua sponte or, as in this case, by the parties in their appeal briefs.Armstrong,¶ 4.

¶ 8 Standing is a person's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition.Standing is closely linked to a court's jurisdiction — a court that would otherwise have jurisdiction to hear and decide a matter will not have jurisdiction if a person without standing attempts to bring the action.SeeEdwards v. Burke,2004 MT 350, 324 Mont. 358, 102 P.3d 1271.Moreover, because Montana law recognizes the importance of the rights involved in the natural parent-child relationship, the legislature has enacted a variety of statutory schemes pertaining to custody of children and the manner in which a third party, non-parent, may intercede in the parent-child relationship.Girard v. Williams,1998 MT 231, ¶ 17, 291 Mont. 49, ¶ 17, 966 P.2d 1155, ¶ 17.SeeTitle 41,Chapter 3, MCA(termination of parental rights for abuse and neglect);Title 40,Chapter 6, MCA(the Uniform Parentage Act);andTitle 40,Chapter 4, MCA(the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act)(UMDA).We stated in Girard that when determining whether a non-parent has standing to intervene and petition for custody, we must first determine whether the underlying proceeding is a custody action or some other type of parental rights action.Girard,¶ 27.In the case before us, W.H. and F.H. sought emergency relief under the UCCJEA, claiming that custody of D.H. and G.H. should remain with their family in Montana.Therefore, this is a custody proceeding and, in accordance with Girard, non-parent standing will be determined under the UMDA.Girard,¶ 31.

¶ 9Section 40-4-211, MCA, defines a court's jurisdictional authority for child custody or parenting proceedings under the UMDA.Section 40-4-211(4)(a) and (b), MCA, identify those persons who may commence parenting proceedings.In addition to allowing a parent to do so, § 40-4-211(4)(b), MCA, allows a parenting plan proceeding to be commenced in district court"by a person other than a parent if the person has established a child-parent relationship with the child, by filing a petition for parenting in the county in which the child resides or is found."

¶ 10 F.H. and W.H. argue that they have developed the necessary "child-parent relationship" with D.H. and G.H.They cite the definition for "child-parent relationship" found in § 40-4-211(6), MCA, and provide numerous examples to prove that such a relationship existed.What they have not done, however, is satisfy the statutory predicate which requires the filing of a petition for parenting in the county in which the child is found, followed by the notice to all interested parties, court-ordered investigation, and hearings contemplated by § 40-4-211, et. seq., MCA.It is undisputed that the grandparents have not filed such a petition.

¶ 11 The petition filed before the District Court in this matter sought to keep the children with the grandparents by invoking the District Court's emergency jurisdiction under § 40-7-204(4), MCA.However, the grandparents sought more than temporary emergency jurisdiction; they also sought — and claim on appeal that the court erred in denying — a custody determination.The UCCJEA is not intended to be a vehicle whereby persons with no legal right to custody may sidestep the statutory pre-requisites to obtaining parental rights.Here, no petition for the establishment of parenting rights has been filed, nor has either biological parent voluntarily relinquished custody to the grandparents or had their parental rights terminated.Thus, the grandparents cannot make the predicate showing that they are entitled to custody of these children in the first instance.We therefore conclude that they do not have standing to gain custody of the children under the UCCJEA.

¶ 12 The dissent maintains that we have disregarded the best interests of the children in reaching our decision.We have not.We agree there is evidence to suggest that the father may not be the best of custodians for the children; such factors make decisions like this very difficult to make.However, the fact remains that a party claiming entitlement to custody must comply with the procedural requisites noted above.If, as the Dissent argues, the best interests of the children were the sole factor deserving consideration, then any person asserting the best interests of the children would arguably have standing to gain their custody, notwithstanding the fact that legal custody of such children rested with a stranger to the proceeding.

¶ 13 It is not this Court that placed this case in the posture we now find ourselves facing.While it appears the mother did file a petition to intervene in the proceedings two months after the grandparents commenced these proceedings, she did so in support of their petition, and not as a parent asserting her own custodial rights.Moreover, there is no question that the grandparents are seeking not just emergency protection, but outright legal custody of the children.Under such circumstances, we cannot simply ignore the statutory requirement that the person asserting custodial rights first demonstrate a right to custody under the law.We do not rejoice in the decision we make here; however, it is not our office to render the custody statutes passed by the legislature superfluous.

¶ 14 Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that F.H. and W.H. do not have standing to bring this emergency custody determination.Therefore, although the District Court declined jurisdiction for reasons other than those stated here, we conclude the court reached the correct decision.As we have frequently stated, we will affirm district court decisions which reach the right result, regardless of the court's reasoning.Phillips v. City of Billings(1988), 233 Mont. 249, 252, 758 P.2d 772, 774.

CONCLUSION

¶ 15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court.

We Concur: KARLA M. GRAY, C.J., JIM RICE and JAMES C. NELSON, JJ.

Justice BRIAN MORRISdissents.

¶ 16 In its rush to elevate the form of § 40-4-211(4)(b), MCA, requiring a non-parent to file a petition establishing a "child-parent relationship," over the intent of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, the Court loses sight of the primary purpose of custody determination proceedings under Title 40,Chapter 4, part 2 — to further and protect the best...