In re People

• Decision Date: 11 February 2013
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 12SA263
• Parties: In re the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, INthe INTEREST OF W.P., an Adult.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

295 P.3d 514

In re the PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, INthe INTEREST OF W.P., an Adult.

Supreme Court Case No. 12SA263

Supreme Court of Colorado.

February 11, 2013

Supreme Court Case No. 12SA263, Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21, Adams County District Court Case No. 12JD26, Honorable Francis Wasserman, Judge.

Rule Discharged.

Attorneys for Respondent: Don Quick, District Attorney, Seventeenth JudicialDistrict Mariana Vielma, Deputy District Attorney, Brighton, ColoradoAttorneys for Petitioner: Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender Denver, Colorado, Ari Krichiver, Deputy Public Defender Brighton, Colorado

En Banc.

JUSTICE HOBBS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 We accepted jurisdiction over this original proceeding to determine whether an indigent alleged juvenile offender is entitled as of right to a second competency evaluation at state expense. The petition initially framed the issue more broadly as “[w]hether the trial court judge abused his discretion by refusing to order a second competency evaluation at state expense.” However, the public defender had justified—and the juvenile court denied—her request for a second competency evaluation at state expense on the basis that the Colorado Children's Code's silence on the issue meant it referred to sections 16–8.5–106 and 16–8.5–107, C.R.S. (2012), of the Colorado Code of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the petition presents only arguments for the applicability of these adult provisions in juvenile justice proceedings.

¶ 2 Two days after W.P.' s arrest on allegations of sexual assault on a child, and one day after the juvenile division of the Adams County District Court appointed a public defender to represent him, the court ordered W.P. to undergo a competency evaluation at state expense. Upon receiving the evaluation report, the court made a preliminary finding that W.P. was competent to proceed in the case. Citing ongoing concerns about her client's mental health, the public defender objected, requesting a competency hearing pursuant to section 19–2–1302(2), C.R.S. (2012), of the Children's Code and filing a motion for a second competency evaluation at state expense. At the motion hearing, the public defender stated that “[b]ecause the juvenile code is silent, they are referring to the adult code,” which entitles a criminal defendant to a second competency evaluation at state expense. Concluding that the Children's Code was “specifically silent on that issue,” the court determined that the adult competency provisions did not apply to this case.

¶ 3 We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the public defender's request for a second competency evaluation pursuant to sections 16–8.5–106 and 16–8.5–107, because these adult competency provisions do not apply in juvenile justice proceedings either explicitly or by implication. Instead, we conclude the General Assembly created two distinct competency frameworks: one promoting the criminal justice system's goal of just punishment, the other advancing the juvenile justice system's goal of appropriately sanctioning juvenile offenders taking into consideration their own and society's best interests. The juvenile competency provisions require a court to order an evaluation at any stage of the proceedings if it develops doubts about the alleged juvenile offender's competency that are not satisfied by available information.

I.

¶ 4 The Northglenn Police Department arrested W.P. on January 25, 2012. Because the alleged crimes occurred when W.P. was a minor, the court invoked the juvenile justice provisions in article 2 of the Colorado Children's Code (title 19 of the Colorado Revised Statutes).¹ W.P. faced juvenile justice proceedings stemming from allegations of sexual assault on a child, § 18–3–405(1), C.R.S. (2012), a class 4 felony, and sexual assault on a child involving a pattern of sexual abuse, § 18–3–405(1), (2)(d), C.R.S. (2012), a class 3 felony, in the juvenile division of the Adams County District Court. On January 26, the court appointed a public defender to represent W.P. in Case No. 12JD26. At a January 27 hearing, the court ordered a competency evaluation at state expense. Referencing the resulting evaluation report, the court on April 16 preliminarily found W.P. competent to proceed in the case. The public defender objected to the finding and requested a competency hearing, which the court set for June 1.

¶ 5 Citing ongoing concerns about W.P.'s mental health, the public defender on May 2 filed a motion for a second competency evaluation at state expense by an evaluator of W.P.' s choice pursuant to sections 16–8.5–106 and 16–8.5–107 of the adult code. On May 24, the court granted a joint motion to continue the competency hearing, reset for July 10. At the July 10 hearing, the public defender reiterated the request for a second competency evaluation, arguing that 2008 amendments to the adult code–which entitled indigent criminal defendants to a second competency evaluation at state expense–also applied to indigent juveniles (and indigent adults subject to the juvenile court's continuing jurisdiction). Because the Children's Code is silent on the issue of a second competency evaluation, the public defender reasoned it effectively “referr[ed] to the adult code.” However, the juvenile court denied the public defender's motion, concluding that the adult code provisions allowing a second evaluation at state expense do not apply to a proceeding under the Children's Code:

I believe there's case law on this that's already addressed this issue. That being said, the right to a second competency evaluation at State expense is not a constitutional right, it is a statutory right, and the statute is specifically silent on that issue with respect to the juvenile code. Therefore, the Court's interpretation is that the statute allowing for a second evaluation at State expense in the adult code simply does not apply to a juvenile.

¶ 6 The public defender requested “a continuance either to seek appellate relief or to get a second evaluation at Mr. [W.P.'s] expense.” She argued further that, even if the court deemed sections 16–8.5–106 and 16–8.5–107 to be inapplicable, it was still authorized to grant W.P. a continuance for a second evaluation under People v. Palmer, 31 P.3d 863 (Colo.2001), upon “a showing of good cause,” stating:

I do think the good cause additionally is that Dr. Bradley, when he did this competency evaluation, did not have the IEP, the education plans, for Mr. [W.P.], and did not have his history of medical records. I received those after the evaluation was done. There seems to be indications that ... Dr. Bradley was unclear as to whether or not he believed Mr. [W.P.'s] memory issues and such related to competency, however, there's clear documentation dating back years that Mr. [W.P.] had these issues and that it's not simply something he's doing to avoid a prosecution in this case.

So either way, I think that I have to ask for a second—or ask for a continuance to get a second evaluation at our expense if this Court is going to deny a State-expense second evaluation.

The district court did not rule on W.P.'s good cause motion or respond directly to the alternative request for permission for a second evaluation at W.P.'s expense. It granted a thirty-day continuance to allow the public defender to file a C.A.R. 21 petition on W.P.' s behalf on the issue of his statutory right to receive a second competency evaluation at state expense.

¶ 7 We issued our rule to show cause why the district court should not order a second competency evaluation at state expense, as of right.

II.

¶ 8 We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the public defender's request for a second competency evaluation pursuant to sections 16–8.5–106 and 16–8.5–107, because these adult competency provisions do not apply in juvenile justice proceedings either explicitly or by implication. Instead, we conclude the General Assembly created two distinct competency frameworks: one promoting the criminal justice system's goal of just punishment, the other advancing the juvenile justice system's goal of appropriately sanctioning juvenile offenders taking into consideration their own and society's best interests. The juvenile competency provisions require a court to order an evaluation at any stage of the proceedings if it develops doubts about the alleged juvenile offender's competency that are not satisfied by available information.

We begin our analysis by identifying the applicable standard of review. Next we examine the origin and substance of sections 16–8.5–106 and 16–8.5–107, address their scope of applicability in light of the statutes governing competency determinations in the juvenile and criminal justice contexts, and conclude that these sections do not apply in juvenile justice proceedings. Finally, we apply our conclusions of law to the facts of this case.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 10 We review for abuse of discretion a trial court's factual determination of a defendant's competency or incompetency. Bloom v. People, 185 P.3d 797, 808 (Colo.2008). To establish an abuse of discretion, the defendant must show that the trial court's decision was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Id.; People v. Ibarra, 849 P.2d 33, 38 (Colo.1993). Whether an indigent juvenile has a statutory right to receive a second competency evaluation at state expense is a question of law we review de novo. See Bostelman v. People, 162 P.3d 686, 689–90 (Colo.2007) (construing the direct filing statute).

¶ 11 In interpreting a statute, we ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly's intent, reading applicable statutory provisions as a whole in order to accord consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all their parts. Moffett v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 219 P.3d 1068, 1072 (Colo.2009). We begin with the plain language of the statute. Id. If the...