In re Peraltareavis.

• Decision Date: 28 August 1895
• Citation: 41 P. 538,8 N.M. 27
• Parties: In re PERALTAREAVIS.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

8 N.M. 27

41 P. 538

In re PERALTAREAVIS.

Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico.

Aug. 28, 1895.

Application of James Addison Peraltareavis for a writ of habeas corpus. Denied.

By section 14, Act, March 3, 1891, the court of private land claims was created, and given express authority to render judgment against the United States for the value of the lands which the United States may have granted or sold belonging to the claimant, which judgment, it provides, “when found shall be a charge on the treasury of the United States.” By section 5438, Rev.St.U.S., it is made unlawful for any person to present for payment or approval, to any person or officer in the civil * * * service of United States, any claim against the United States, knowing such to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent * * * or who enters into any conspiracy to defraud the United States, by obtaining the payment of any fraudulent claim, etc. On petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the release of the petitioner from commitment, after a preliminary hearing on the charges of presenting to the court of private land claims a fraudulent claim against and conspiring with another to defraud the United States,-Held: The judge of the court of private land claims is an officer in the civil service of the United States, within the meaning of the statute, and the presentation of such claim to that court, of which he is the presiding officer, was a presentation to “an officer in the civil service of the United States.”

Catron & Spiess, for petitioner.

J. B. H. Hemingway, U. S. Atty., and Matt. G. Reynolds, U. S. Atty. for court of private land claims, for the United States.

BANTZ, J.

The prisoner was committed to jail, after a preliminary hearing, on the charge (1) of filing in the court of private land claims a claim against the United States in the sum of $100,000, said claim being false, fictitious, and fraudulent, and known by him to be such at the time; and (2) that he entered into a conspiracy with one Sofia Treadway to defraud the government of the sum of $100,000 in respect to such claim. If the claim had been one for land simply, it is conceded that it would not have been an offense within section 5438, Rev. St. U. S. The material part of that section is as follows: “Every person who makes or causes to be made, or presents or causes to be presented, for payment or approval, to or by any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, any claim upon or against the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, *** or who enters into any agreement, combination, or conspiracy to defraud the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, by obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or allowance of any false or fraudulent claim, *** every person so offending,” etc. Then follows punishment. The information contains two charges: First, presenting a fraudulent claim; and, second, conspiracy to defraud.

By section 14 of the act of March 3, 1891, creating the court of private land claims, express authority was given that court to render judgment against the United States for the value of the lands which the United States may have granted or sold belonging to the claimant, “and such judgment when found shall be a charge on the treasury of the United States.” The information specifically avers that the prisoner made a money claim against the United States. The section under which this prosecution was begun (5438) requires that the fraudulent claim shall have been made to some person or officer in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States. It is, among other things, denied that the court of private land claims comes within this description. In U. S. v. Moore, 3 MacArthur, 227, Judge MacArthur said that a claim presented against the United States in the court of claims was not presented to a person or officer within the meaning of this act; but the other judges did not concur in that opinion, and it was pure obiter dictum. The point arose in U. S. v. Strobach, 48 Fed. 908, in a prosecution against a deputy marshal for presenting an account for approval to the district court, and Justice Woods said: “The contention of counsel for defense is that the law only punishes for presentation to a person or officer in the civil service of the United States of a false claim, and, when a false claim is presented for approval to the district court of the United States in which the district judge is presiding, that is not a presentation thereof to an officer in the civil service of the United States. In other words, that a United States judge in vacation, and when not engaged in the discharge of his usual duties, is an officer in the civil service of the United States, but when engaged in holding the term of court he ceases to be an officer in the service of the United States, and his identity as such is lost, and he is only a court or a member of a court. We think that a United States judge is at all times an officer in the civil service of the United States, within the meaning of the statute, and that, when a claim is presented to a court of which he is the presiding officer, it is presented to an officer in the civil service of the United States.” It may be observed that there is no revising power over the action of the court by the treasury officials in relation to witness and jury fees and mileage.

There is, however, in this case, the charge of conspiracy to defraud the government by means of a false, fraudulent, and fictitious claim. This proceeding by habeas corpus is a collateral attack upon the proceedings upon which the prisoner was committed to jail. In Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking of the limitations of the jurisdiction of the supreme court on habeas corpus which arise from the nature and objects of the writ as defined by the common law, lays down the general rule that the only ground on which that court, or any court, without special statute authority, will give relief on habeas corpus, is where there is want of jurisdiction over the person or the cause, or some other matter rendering the proceedings void, as distinguished from what is merely erroneous and reversible. The writ is not to be employed to take the prisoner away from the court which holds him for fear, if he remains, errors may be committed. Ex parte Crouch, 112 U. S. 178, 5 Sup. Ct. 96. Nor can it be used to subserve the purposes of the writ of error, and it will not be granted to review the whole case, but only to examine the authority of the tribunal by which the prisoner was committed. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339. It has been said that the test of jurisdiction is whether the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, and not whether its conclusions in the course of it were right or wrong (Otis v. Rio Grande, 1 Woods, 279, Fed. Cas. No. 10,613), unless, indeed, some punishment is inflicted which the tribunal had no authority to impose. The prisoner's counsel conceded at the bar that the commissioner who held the preliminary examination of and committed the prisoner to custody had jurisdiction of the person and the subject-matter; but it has been earnestly and ably contended that the information charged no offense against the prisoner on which he could be imprisoned or deprived of his liberty. This point was considered in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, and the language of Chief Baron Gilbert in Bushell's Case, Vaughn, 135, was quoted, that “if the commitment be against law, as being made by one who had no jurisdiction of the cause, or for a matter for which by law no man ought to be punished, the court are to discharge.” Mr. Justice Bradley, commenting, observes: “The latter part of the rule, when applied to conviction and...