In re Peters, B 725-66.
Decision Date | 13 April 1967 |
Docket Number | No. B 725-66.,B 725-66. |
Citation | 266 F. Supp. 742 |
Parties | In the Matter of Erma Cazier PETERS, aka Marie Peters (formerly doing business as Marie Antoinette Professional Cosmetics), Voluntary Bankrupt. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Utah |
Grant Macfarlane, Salt Lake City, Utah, for bankrupt.
Mary C. Lehmer, Salt Lake City, Utah, pro se.
Mary C. Lehmer, one of the creditors of the above-named bankrupt, filed timely objections to the discharge of the bankrupt. The Referee in Bankruptcy disqualified himself from hearing and ruling upon these objections in the first instance and accordingly a hearing on them was had before me. Evidence was taken including testimony from both the bankrupt and the objector. Briefs have been filed by the respective parties and the court considers itself fully advised.
One of the grounds for objection was that the bankrupt allegedly had violated 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (2) in failing to keep or preserve books of account or records from which her financial condition and business transactions might be ascertained. I find that the objector has not sustained her burden of proof as to this ground but that on the contrary while the bankrupt's records were kept informally and imperfectly they were not fatally inappropriate or inadequate under the circumstances and there were no failures relating to their preservation which in and of themselves would justify denial of discharge.
The objector made the further separate claim that the bankrupt has violated 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (7) by failing to give a satisfactory explanation of the $3500 received as consideration for the sale of her business to which more particular reference will be made hereafter. If by this assignment it is meant to claim that the bankrupt has failed to reasonably furnish information concerning the disposition of the proceeds of this sale, I think this ground for a denial of discharge has not been established. The manner and purpose of the dispersal of the funds were reasonably explained although precise records were not kept.
The only substantial ground for objection is denominated ground 1 in the original objections and was amended as such to conform to proof at the trial. This objection as so amended reads:
With the qualifications hereinafter noted I find this assignment substantially borne out by the preponderance of the evidence. Although the general rule is to the contrary, Anno. 84 A.L.R. 1406, I accept the bankrupt's testimony that she understood that the creditors to be listed pursuant to the Sales of Merchandise in Bulk Act of the State of Utah were business creditors. Assuming this, however, it was clear from the bankrupt's testimony that she was advised and clearly understood that all business creditors should be listed in the affidavit filed pursuant to the Act. On the question of whether the objector was in fact a business creditor, the testimony of the objector and the bankrupt is in sharp conflict.
The objector testified to facts which if accepted would not only establish clearly that she was a business creditor, but also that the bankrupt could have been under no possible misunderstanding on the point. The purpose of the request for the loan and the loan itself, together with all of the other circumstances related by the objector, were related to the bankrupt's business, and the evidence rather clearly demonstrated circumstantially that the funds were used primarily in the business.
As opposed to the testimony of the objector, the bankrupt generally asserted that the objector was not a business creditor. Her testimony was far from convincing in this respect however. On the other hand, the circumstances giving rise to the indebtedness to which she testified failed to supply any reasonable explanation for the loan in question except in reference to its business necessity.
I am of the opinion, therefore, and so find, that the...
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In re Weber, Bankruptcy No. 87B-04039
...standard of intent and determined it "was not merely a constructive or general intent on the part of the bankrupt". In re Peters, 266 F.Supp. 742, 745 (D.Utah 1967). Rather, the debtor's intent was said to be a "specifically intended, knowing and considered one". Id. The interplay between s......