In re Petters Co.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | 08–45329(GFK).,08–45331(GFK).,08–45392(GFK).,08–45371(GFK).,08–45258(GFK).,08–45326(GFK).,08–45327(GFK).,08–45330(GFK).,Nos. 08–45257.,08–45328(GFK).,s. 08–45257. |
| Parties | In re PETTERS COMPANY, INC., et al., Debtors. (includes: Petters Group Worldwide, LLC; PC Funding, LLC; Thousand Lakes, LLC; SPF Funding, LLC; PL Ltd., Inc. Edge One LLC; MGC Finance, Inc.; PAC Funding, LLC; Palm Beach Finance Holdings, Inc.). |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Minnesota |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
K. Jon Breyer, Adam C. Ballinger, Terrence J. Fleming, Kirstin D. Kanski, Mark D. Larsen, James A. Lodoen, George H. Singer, Sandra S. Smalley–Fleming, Jeffrey D, Smith, Lindquist & Vennum LLP, Minneapolis, MN, Elisebeth Collins Cook, Joseph L. Fogel, Michael J. Kelly, Neal H. Levin, Patrick J. Woytek, Freeborn & Peters LLP, Chicago, IL, Sarah E. Doerr, Issa K. Moe, Moss & Barnett, Minneapolis, MN, Richard B. Drubel, Ethan Frechette, Matthew J. Henken, Kimberly H. Schultz, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Hanover, NH, Douglas L. Elsass, Adam A. Gillette, Thomas E. Jamison, Lori A. Johnson, Fruth Jamison & Elsass PLLC, Minneapolis, MN, Stacy L. Kabele, Patricia A. Pedersen, Kelley Wolter & Scott PA, Minneapolis, MN, Josiah O. Lamb, Kelley, Wolter & Scott PA, Minneapolis, MN, for Trustee.
Michael R. Fadlovich, Michael E. Ridgway, Robert Raschke, US Trustee Office, Minneapolis, MN, for U.S. Trustee.
Richard B. Drubel, Ethan Frechette, Matthew J. Henken, Kimberly H. Schultz, Ethan Frechette, Matthew J. Henken, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Hanover, NH, James A. Lodoen, Jeffrey D. Smith, James A. Lodoen, Lindquist & Vennum P.L.L.P, Minneapolis, MN, for Debtor.
THIRD MEMORANDUM ON “CONSOLIDATED ISSUES” TREATMENT OF MOTIONS FOR DISMISSAL IN TRUSTEE'S LITIGATION FOR AVOIDANCE AND RECOVERY: AVOIDABILITY AND ACTIONABILITY UNDER LAW AND IN EQUITY; ONE LAST ISSUE OF PLEADING.
This is the third (and last) memorandum of general rulings to be entered, as the basis for the disposition of pending motions for dismissal in a docket of adversary proceedings in these cases. This litigation was commenced to redress the failure of a massive Ponzi scheme conducted by one Thomas J. Petters—the largest case of investor fraud in Minnesota history and one of the largest in United States history.
The Debtors in these cases were all entities in Tom Petters's enterprise structure. The plaintiff is the Trustee for the Debtors' bankruptcy estates. He commenced the litigation to avoid a large number of pre-petition transfers of funds by the Debtors, and to recover money judgments to effectuate the avoidance. His last complaint was filed on October 10, 2010, one day before the second anniversary of the commencement of the lead case in this group, that of Petters Company, Inc. (“PCI”). At that time, the adversary proceedings totaled over 200 in number.
The majority of the defendants elected to file motions for dismissal in lieu of answers, a right they had under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) and Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7012(b). This resulted in a massive number of contests for adjudication. To cope with that, a “consolidated issues” procedure was adopted by order, to coordinate the presentation of issues that were common to the theories for dismissal raised across the range of the motions made by the defense. The plan was to issue general rulings, where such common issues went to the adequacy of the Trustee's pleading or the ascertainment of the substantive law that would be applied when there was no extant governing precedent.
Further detail about the procedure can be found in the first two memoranda entered on the submission of the “consolidated issues.” See Dkt. Nos. 1951 and 2018, reported as In re Petters Co., Inc., 494 B.R. 413, 58 B.C.D. 53 (Bankr.D.Minn.2013) and 495 B.R. 887 (Bankr.D.Minn.2013).1 The earlier memoranda also gave more detail on the origin of these cases and this litigation.
This Third Memorandum sets forth rulings on the balance of the common issues presented via that procedure. Fewer of the issues at bar were formally raised by as many defendants as those in the first two sets. But, all of them are substantial. Two go to the very core of the Trustee's statutory avoidance powers as it is brought to bear toward the greatest potential recovery. A third goes to the sustainability of the Trustee's major alternative theory of recovery, through equitable remedies. All of these rulings will have applicability to defendants who did not formally raise the points treated in their own motions for dismissal.
As before, the issues will be organized by the subject matter of their theory. Formal rulings will be expressly articulated for each issue. The numbering of the discussion and the rulings will be sequential to the first two sets. The same conventions of nomenclature for parties and parts of the record will be used. See Amended Second Memorandum [Dkt. No. 2018], 4 n. 3. These are the four issues presented on the third day of oral argument, as previously directed by the procedures order, plus a fifth raised by the structure of oral argument.
Through three of them, the lender-constituency within the defense challenges square-on the Trustee's right to use fraudulent transfer remedies against the sort of transaction they had with the Debtors. For all of those three, the lender-defendants rely heavily on a 2005 decision by the Second Circuit, In re Sharp Int'l Corp., 403 F.3d 43, and several other decisions by circuits other than the Eighth.
ISSUE # 8:
ACTIONABILITY AS FRAUDULENT TRANSFER, OF TRANSFER AND PAYMENT ON TRANSACTION DOCUMENTED AS A LOAN.2
The lender-defendants argue that fraudulent transfer remedies simply cannot lie against the transfers that the Debtors made to them, in repayment on financing that those defendants furnished for the ostensible “diverting” business of the Petters organization. To support this argument, they cite Sharp Int'l and they characterize it as on-point authority. The gist of their theory lies in the phrase they use throughout, in the fashion of a litany: “A preference is not a fraudulent conveyance.”
Sharp Int'l came out of fraudulent-transfer litigation commenced by the trustee in the bankruptcy case of a business that imported, assembled, and distributed real consumer goods.3 The company had a succession of major operating lenders under lines of credit, plus other debt-investors under subordinated-note arrangements.4
This financing, however, funded not only operations but also a massive looting of corporate assets by the company's individual principals. To obtain the inflated amounts of capital needed, the principals falsified internal company records for customer base, sales, and assets. Then they used these documents to induce the lending. This fraud is described as having taken place over a period of two years or more (from “some point prior to 1997, ... through October 1999”). The creditors thus induced are identified as one major operating lender, State Street Bank and Trust Company—which first lent to the debtor in November, 1996—and a group of subordinated note-lenders—that first loaned in July, 1998 and was then induced by the debtor to advance substantial additional sums in March, 1999 to pay off the majority of the State Street debt.5
The trustee in Sharp Int'l pleaded that the impetus for the takeout of State Street came from that creditor itself, under the following fact averments. One of State Street's officers “began to suspect fraud [on the part of Sharp International] in the summer of 1998,” from several factors: the lack of transparency in the company's accounting procedures; its “fast growth and voracious consumption of cash”; and her own experience as banker with specific cases of borrower fraud that had shown similar characteristics. After several months of investigation and pressing for information from the debtor, the single-transfer takeout of State Street was demanded, arranged, and consummated.
The debtor corporation in Sharp Int'l ended up in bankruptcy. Its trustee challenged the payoff of State Street on several grounds, including the theory that it was a constructively- and actually-fraudulent transfer avoidable under the Bankruptcy Code and New York State fraudulent-transfer law:
The nub of the complaint is that State Street then arranged quietly for the [individual principals] to repay the State Street loan from the proceeds of new loans from unsuspecting lenders, thus avoiding a repeat of the ... losses ... [caused by a similar borrower fraud with which the State Street officer had had direct experience].
On State Street's motion, the bankruptcy court dismissed the trustee's complaint in its entirety. As to the fraudulent-transfer count for actual fraud, the bankruptcy court held that the trustee had not pled sufficient facts to support a finding of actual intent to defraud other creditors, on the inferential process that uses the “badges of fraud” approach. The constructive-fraud count was dismissed for failure to anticipatorily plead that State Street had lacked good faith in receiving the payment. 403 F.3d at 48.
On appeal, the district court affirmed on a slightly-variant theory, but otherwise endorsed the bankruptcy court's analysis. 403 F.3d at 48–49.6
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the actual-fraud count. It held that the trustee had not pled facts on which to characterize as intentionally fraudulent the specific transfer he would have avoided:
... the intentional fraudulent conveyance claims fails [sic] for the independent reason that [the trustee] inadequately alleges fraud with respect to the transaction that [the trustee] seeks to avoid, i.e., Sharp's $12.25 million payment to State Street.
403 F.3d at 56. Laying in the centerpiece characterization that the lender-defendants appropriated here, the Second Circuit observed:
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... ... 543 B.R. 890 INTRODUCTION This adversary proceeding is another outgrowth of the largest bankruptcy cases ever commenced in the District of Minnesotathose of Petters Company, Inc. ("PCI") and certain of its affiliates, BKY 0845257, and the related group of cases in which the Polaroid Corporation was the lead debtor, BKY 0846617. The precipitant of the bankruptcy filings was the failure of massive criminal activity perpetrated by Thomas J. Petters through PCI ... ...
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