In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation

Decision Date06 November 2003
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A.00-11672-JLT. MDL No. 1400.,CIV.A.00-11672-JLT. MDL No. 1400.
Citation292 F.Supp.2d 263
PartiesIn re PHARMATRAK, INC. PRIVACY LITIGATION
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

George E. Barrett, Barret Johnston & Parsley, Nashville, TN, for Noah Blumofe, Plaintiff.

David A.P. Brower, Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, New York City, for Harris Perlman, Plaintiff.

Michael M. Buchman, Milbert, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, LLP, New York City, for Jim A. Darby, Plaintiff.

Bryan L. Clobes, Philadelphia, PA, for Noah Blumofe, Plaintiff.

William J. Doyle, II, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP, San Diego, CA, for Harris Perlman, Plaintiff.

Nancy F. Gans, Moulton & Gans, PC, Boston, MA, for Karen Gassman, Plaintiff.

Louis Gottlieb, Goodkind Labaton Rudoff & Sucharow, New York City, for Noah Blumofe, Plaintiff.

Andrew M. Gschwind, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann, New York City, for Noah Blumofe, Plaintiff.

Shannon Keniry, Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran, Washington, DC, for Noah Blumofe, Plaintiff.

Daniel Krasner, Wolf, Haldenstein, Adler, Freeman & Herz, New York City, for Harris Periman, Plaintiff.

Seth R. Lesser, Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger & Grossman, New York City, for Noah Blumofe, Plaintiff.

Adam J. Levitt, Wolf, Haldenstein, Adler, Freeman & Herz, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Harris Perlman, Plaintiff.

Marvin A. Miller, Miller, Faucher and Cafferty, LLP, Ann Arbor, MI, for Noah Blumofe, Plaintiff.

Stephen Moulton, Moulton & Gans, PC, Boston, MA, for Karen Gassman, Plaintiff.

Brian J. Robbins, Robbins Umeda & Fink LLP, San Diego, CA, for Harris Periman, Plaintiff.

Douglas G. Thompson, Finkelstein, Thompson & Loughran, Washington, DC, for Noah Blumofe, Plaintiff.

Ann D. White, Mager White & Goldstein LLP, Road Jenkintown, PA, for Noah Blumofe, Plaintiff.

Deborah E. Barnard, Holland & Knight, LLP, Boston, MA, for Glaxo Wellcome PLC, Defendant.

James D. Ardin, Sidley & Austin, New York City, for Pharmatrak, Inc., Defendant.

David B. Bassett, Hale & Dorr, LLP, Boston, MA, for American Home Products Corp. Defendant.

Dennis J. Block, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, New York City, for Pfizer, Inc., Defendant.

John J. Curtin, Bingham McCutchen LLP, Boston, MA, for Pfizer, Inc., Defendant.

Donald N. David, Fishbein, Badillo, Wagner & Harding, New York City, for Pharmacia Corporation, Defendant.

Carmela N. Edmunds, Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin, Washington, DC, for Glocal Communications, Ltd., Defendant.

Matthew H. Feinberg, Feinberg & Kamholtz, Boston, MA, for Glocal Communications, Ltd., Defendant.

Seymour Glanzer, Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky, LLP, Washington, DC, for Glocal Communications, Ltd, Defendant.

H. Peter Haveles, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, New York City, for Pfizer, Inc., Defendant.

Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, Sidley & Austin, Washington, DC, for Pharmacia Corporation, Defendant.

Matthew A. Kamholtz, Feinberg & Kamholtz, Boston, MA, for Glocal Communications, Ltd., Defendant.

Marc C. Laredo, Laredo & Smith LLP, Boston, MA, for Pharmatrak, Inc., Defendant.

William F. Lee, Hale & Dorr, LLP, Boston, MA, for American Home Products Corp., Defendant.

Ralph T. Lepore, III, Holland & Knight, LLP, Boston, MA, for Glaxo Wellcome PLC, Defendant.

Paul C. Llewellyn, Kay, Scholer, Fierman, Hayes & Handler, New York City, for Glaxo Wellcome PLC, Defendant.

Elizabeth M. Mitchell, Holland & Knight, LLP, Boston, MA, for Glaxo Wellcome PLC, Defendant.

Douglas J. Nash, Hiscock & Barclay LLP, Syracuse, NY, for American Home Products Corp., Defendant.

Richard F. O'Malley, Sidley & Austin, New York City, for Pharmatrak, Inc., Defendant.

Daniel S. Savrin, Bingham McCutchen LLP, Boston, MA, for Pfizer, Inc., Defendant.

Mark D Smith, Laredo & Smith, LLP, Boston, MA, for Pharmatrak, Inc., Defendant.

David N. Sonnenreich, The Sonnenreich Law Office, P.C., Lake City, UT, for Glocal Communications, Ltd, Defendant.

Daniel J. Tomasch, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, New York City, for American Home Products Corp., Defendant.

Diana Weiss, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, New York City, for American Home Products Corp., Defendant.

Frederic W. Yerman, Kay, Scholer, Fierman, Hayes & Handler, New York City, for Glaxo Wellcome PLC, Smithline Beecham PLC, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

TAURO, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, in a consolidated class action, sued Pharmatrak, Inc. and numerous pharmaceutical companies ("Defendants"), alleging that they secretly intercepted and accessed Plaintiffs' personal information through the use of computer "cookies" and other devices, in violation of state and federal law.1 This court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all counts.2 Plaintiffs' sole claim on appeal was that Pharmatrak, Inc. ("Pharmatrak") violated Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act3 ("EPCA"). The Court of Appeals remanded,4 finding that Pharmatrak "intercepted" personal information within the meaning of the EPCA,5 but that the intent element of the statute had not been adequately addressed by the Parties.6

Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the EPCA claim is now before the court.

DISCUSSION

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."7 Rule 56 mandates summary judgment "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."8

The "party seeking summary judgment [must] make a preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Once the movant has made this showing, the nonmovant must contradict the showing by pointing to specific facts demonstrating that there is, instead, a trialworthy issue."9 The party opposing summary judgment must produce specific evidence of a material factual dispute. The First Circuit has noted that "[a] genuine issue of material fact does not spring into being simply because a litigant claims that one exists. Neither wishful thinking nor `mere promise[s] to produce admissible evidence at trial' ... nor conclusory responses unsupported by evidence ... will serve to defeat a properly focused Rule 56 motion."10

In this action, Defendants must make the initial showing that no genuine dispute of material fact exists and that the material facts demonstrate that they did not have the requisite intent under the EPCA. Once Defendants have met this burden, their motion will succeed unless Plaintiffs can point to specific evidence that indicates that Defendants did have the requisite intent.

To be criminally or civilly liable under the EPCA, the unlawful interception must have been intentional.11 In its remand opinion, the Court of Appeals set out the legal standard to be applied in deciding the intent issue. The court noted that, in the 1986 amendment of the EPCA, Congress changed the state of mind requirement from "willful" to "intentional," defining "intentional" in its legislative history.12

As used in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the term "intentional" is narrower than the dictionary definition of "intentional." "Intentional" means more than that one voluntarily engaged in the conduct or caused the result. Such conduct or the causing of the result must have been the person's conscious objective.13

The court went on to explain that by defining "intentional" in such a narrow manner, "Congress made clear that the purpose of the amendment was to underscore that inadvertent interceptions are not a basis for criminal or civil liability under the EPCA."14

Defendants argue that none of the facts indicates any kind of actionable intent on their part, and set forth three principal arguments in support of their summary judgement motion: (1) there was only a small amount of personal data actually found on Pharmatrak's computer servers; (2) errors from third parties caused the collection of the personal data; and (3) Defendants had no knowledge of the existence of the personal data until after Plaintiffs' filed their lawsuit. Each of these arguments is addressed seriatim below.

A. Only a Small Amount of Personal Data Was Actually Found

After Plaintiffs' computer expert conducted a thorough search of Pharmatrak's computers, as a result of this court's order to do so, he was able to assemble personal profiles on approximately 232 individuals.15 Pharmatrak's former Managing Director of Technology calculated that, between October, 1999 and February, 2001, "roughly 18.7 million unique Web users visited the tracked pharmaceutical company pages."16 Defendants contend that finding only 233 personal profiles from a potential list of 18.7 million (0.0012%) underscores their assertion that any transfer of personal information was inadvertent.

Plaintiffs try to avoid this logical inference by insinuating that Plaintiffs' expert completed only a partial inspection of Pharmatrak's computers.17 They wish to imply that a more thorough search of Pharmatrak's computers might uncover untold numbers of personal profiles. This is mere speculation at best. Pursuant to this court's order, Plaintiffs' expert was given unrestricted access to the hard drives of Pharmatrak's computer servers between December 17, 2001 and January 18, 2002. Plaintiffs now refer to that as "a mere partial inspection"18 without any explanation and without any basis for suggesting that more personal information is contained on the servers. Such unsupported and speculative assertions cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment.

B. Known Errors From Third Parties Caused the Collection of Personal Data

Defendants have provided undisputed descriptions of how pieces of personal information were...

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2 cases
  • Middlebrooks v. United States (In re Hipaa Subpoena (Patient Servs., Inc.), No. 19-1424
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • 5 Junio 2020
    ...nor gross negligence satisfies the intent element required to find a Title III violation. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 292 F. Supp. 2d 263, 267-68 (D. Mass. 2003) (noting that a theory of negligence or gross negligence "is [not] sufficient to satisfy the specific intent requir......
  • Wood v. United States (In re HIPAA Subpoena)
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • 5 Junio 2020
    ...nor gross negligence satisfies the intent element required to find a Title III violation. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 292 F. Supp. 2d 263, 267-68 (D. Mass. 2003) (noting that a theory of negligence or gross negligence "is [not] sufficient to satisfy the specific intent requir......
1 books & journal articles
  • Voice Over Internet Protocol and the Wiretap Act: Is Your Conversation Protected?
    • United States
    • Seattle University School of Law Seattle University Law Review No. 29-01, September 2005
    • Invalid date
    ...(CD. Cal. 2001). 175. See id. at 1278; In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503-04. 176. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 292 F. Supp. 2d 263, 266-68 (D. Mass. 177. See id. at 19-22. 178. See Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1155-57 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re DoubleC......

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