In re Phillips

• Decision Date: 13 May 2016
• Docket Number: NO. 14-0797,14-0797
• Citation: In re Phillips, 496 S.W.3d 769 (Tex. 2016)
• Parties: In re Steven C. Phillips, Relator
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

496 S.W.3d 769

In re Steven C. Phillips, Relator

NO. 14-0797

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued November 3, 2015

Opinion delivered: May 13, 2016

Marisa Resendez, Matthew F. Wymer, Renee Fronash McElhaney, Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, L.L.P., San Antonio, TX, for Relator.

Charles Roy, First Assistant Attorney, David C. Mattax, Director of Defense Litigation, Office of the Attorney General, Erika R. Sams, Lesli G. Ginn, Warren Kenneth Paxton Jr., Office of the Attorney, General, Greg W. Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Jennifer Settle Jackson, Financial Litigation Division, Robert B. O'Keefe, General Litigation Division, Austin, TX, for Respondent.

Chief Justice Hechtdelivered the opinion of the Court.

The Tim Cole Act (“the Act”)¹ provides compensation for the time a person is wrongfully imprisoned and for child support owed but not paid by the person, plus interest, while imprisoned.²The Act states that “[t]he comptroller shall determine ... the amount of compensation owed”.³We conclude that the Comptroller's authority to determine the compensation owed is exclusive, and that the Comptroller therefore is not bound by a court's judgment in a child support enforcement proceeding.We also conclude that the Comptroller's statutory duty is ministerial, and that the Comptroller's determinations are in turn subject to review by this Court in this original petition for a writ of mandamus.⁴We grant relief only to direct the Comptroller to correct legal errors in his determination in this case.

I

On the morning of May 15, 1982, a man in a hooded, gray sweatshirt, carrying a handgun, walked into a figure salon in Garland, Texas, and commanded the women present to disrobe while he abused himself, then drove away in a maroon car.This was one in a string of similar, sometimes bizarre sexual assaults in the Dallas area over a two-day period that police believed were committed by a single person.One of the victims initially identified Sidney Goodyear as her assailant but later picked Steven Phillips out of a lineup instead.Phillips was indicted for 11 offenses relating to the May incidents, as well as for an unrelated sexual assault in February.In each case, a victim identified him as the perpetrator.

In one of the May incidents, the assailant had broken into the victim's home and raped her.Phillips was tried first for burglary, then for aggravated sexual abuse.The victims in all the incidents testified as to his bad reputation.He was convicted in both cases and given a 30–year sentence in each, to be served concurrently.Rather than stand trial on the other nine charges, he pled guilty.He was never told that one victim had first identified Goodyear.Nor was he told that Goodyear had later been charged in Kansas City on a string of similar offenses that occurred just two weeks after the Dallas crime spree.And he was not told that police had concluded he was not responsible for the February sexual assault.⁵

In 2001, the Legislature enacted Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, allowing for the first time a convicted person to move for DNA testing of evidence that was unavailable when the person was tried.⁶Phillips immediately moved for testing in his cases, but, despite the availability of biological evidence, prosecutors opposed his motion until 2007, when they finally agreed.⁷The test excluded Phillips as the perpetrator.Goodyear's DNA proved a match to that found at the Dallas crime scene.A further investigation of Goodyear revealed that he had owned a gun and car like those used in the Dallas crimes, had committed a string of almost identical sexual assaults throughout the country for decades, and was wanted by several law enforcement agencies and the FBI.

On Phillips's motion for habeas relief, the trial court concluded that he was actually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted, and that he would not have pled guilty to the other charges but for the prosecutors' Brady violations.⁸The trial court granted relief, and the Court of Criminal Appeals concurred.⁹The District Attorney dismissed all charges.

In October 2009, Phillips applied to the Comptroller for wrongful imprisonment compensation under the Tim Cole Act.He and the Comptroller agreed that he was due a lump sum of approximately $2 million for the time he was incarcerated.¹⁰

Phillips also requested compensation for child support he had failed to pay.A 1978 Arkansas divorce decree ordered him to pay Cheryl Macumber $100 a month in child support beginning in March 1978 but, as confirmed by the Arkansas Child Support Enforcement Office, Phillips had made only two payments of $110 each.Macumber herself wrote to the Comptroller requesting compensation for the unpaid child support.The Comptroller responded that compensation for unpaid child support could be paid only to the state disbursement unit for distribution to the person owed.¹¹Arkansas authorities refused to accept payment because there was no open enforcement proceeding pending in Arkansas.

On May 22, 2013, Macumber sued Phillips in Texas to register and enforce the Arkansas divorce decree under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”).¹²After Phillips did not answer, Macumber sought a default judgment.At a 21–minute hearing on June 28, Macumber testified by telephone, and her counsel in person, that under Arkansas law she was entitled to $304,861.74, which included 10 percent interest compounded monthly, plus 10 percent for attorney's fees.With no other evidence before it, the trial court rendered judgment (“the Enforcement Judgment”) accordingly.The Attorney General filed a post-judgment intervention, but immediately nonsuited.Phillips moved for a new trial but does not appear to have appealed.¹³

Phillips requested that the Comptroller pay child support compensation based on the amount awarded by the Enforcement Judgment.The Comptroller responded that he had the exclusive authority to determine compensation owed under the Act, which, by his calculations was $25,125.69.He explained:

To calculate the amount of child support arrearages and interest that accrued, the Comptroller first determined that: (1) Mr. Phillips's obligation to pay current child support payments terminated by operation of law upon the date [his child] should have graduated from high school, May of 1994; (2) none of Mr. Phillips's child support payments that became due prior to March 7, 1989 accrued interest, and all of Mr. Phillips's child support payments that became due after March 7, 1989 accrued interest at the statutory rate of ten percent (10%) per annum; (3) the ten percent (10%) interest rate in this case should be calculated as simple interest; and (4) interest on child support arrearages stopped accruing when [his child] turned 23 on January 1, 1999.

The Comptroller also explained why Macumber's calculation, on which the Judgment was based, was incorrect:

(1) it compounds the interest when a simple interest rate is required; (2) it begins interest accrual prior to March 7, 1989, the effective date of Act 383 of Arkansas, 1989 Regular Session, which authorized the accrual of interest on child support arrearages; and (3) it continues to calculate interest beyond [his child's] 23rd birthday on January 1, 1999 in contravention of Ark.Code Ann. § 9–14–236.

Phillips petitioned this Court to direct the Comptroller to pay as wrongful imprisonment compensation that portion of the Enforcement Judgment award relating to the period of his incarceration, which he asserts is $246,123.38.We agreed to hear argument.¹⁴

II

We consider first the nature of the Comptroller's authority to determine compensation owed under the Act.We conclude that it is exclusive, ministerial, and subject to review.

A

The Act provides that a person who satisfies prescribed eligibility requirements¹⁵ is entitled to compensation in an amount equal to:

(1) $80,000 multiplied by the number of years served in prison, expressed as a fraction to reflect partial years; and

(2) compensation for child support payments owed by the person on whose imprisonment the claim is based that became due and interest on child support arrearages that accrued during the time served in prison but were not paid.¹⁶

The Act adds:

The comptroller shall determine:

(1) the eligibility of the claimant; and

(2) the amount of compensation owed to an eligible claimant.¹⁷

Phillips acknowledges the Comptroller's authority to determine the amount of compensation owed a claimant, but argues that in making that determination the Comptroller is bound by a judicial determination of the amount of child support the claimant owes.

Phillips's argument misunderstands the Comptroller's statutory authority and renders it meaningless.The Comptroller's authority is to determine, not child support arrearages as between parents, but “compensation for child support ... arrearages”.The arrearage is what one parent owes the other; compensation is what the State(and taxpayers) owe the claimant.Compensation is to be based on arrearages, but the amount is to be determined by the Comptroller, not the court.Were the Comptroller bound in determining compensation owed by a judgment determining child support owed, the court would be determining both.

This case illustrates the importance of the distinction.The enforcement proceeding involved only Macumber's claim against Phillips, not Phillips's claim against the State.When Phillips chose not to answer or appeal, the trial court may have been justified in taking Macumber's factual allegations about Arkansas law as uncontested¹⁸ —by Phillips —and in rendering judgment—against Phillips .The State was not a party, and its interest in the amount of wrongful imprisonment compensation due Phillips was not represented.Phillips argues that the Comptroller's refusal to base the amount of compensation due to him on the amount awarded Macumber by the Enforcement Judgment amounts to a collateral attack.But the Comptroller has no interest...