In re Pickus
Decision Date | 20 April 1982 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. H-81-174. |
Citation | 26 BR 171 |
Parties | In re Richard PICKUS and Regina Pickus, Debtors. Richard PICKUS, et ux., Appellants, v. Dominic VITAGLIANO, et ux., Appellees. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Francis X. Dineen, New Haven, Conn., for debtors-appellants.
Stephen Ketaineck, West Haven, Conn., for appellees.
RULING ON APPEAL FROM BANKRUPTCY COURT
This appeal from the Bankruptcy Court comes to the District Court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334. It has been once previously remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for specific findings on certain limited issues. The plaintiffs brought this suit when, one day after they had filed under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act and had received an automatic statutory stay of proceedings under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), they were evicted from their apartment by the defendant landlords. The defendants had previously obtained a summary process judgment against the plaintiffs for nonpayment of rent.
The plaintiffs charged that the defendants' actions had violated not only the automatic stay provisions of the aforesaid statute, but also constituted unlawful collection procedures and the use of unfair trade practices under Connecticut law and had thereby violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs further contended that the defendant landlords had violated Conn.Gen.Stat. § 47a-21(d) by their failure to return the tenants' security deposit at the termination of the lease.
The Bankruptcy Judge found in favor of the plaintiffs solely on the security deposit issue and for the defendants on all remaining issues. 8 B.R. 114. The plaintiffs thereupon appealed to this Court. The case was remanded to the Bankruptcy Judge for a determination of whether or not a letter sent to the plaintiffs by the landlords' authorized real estate renting agent one month prior to the eviction constituted a renewal of the lease. The Bankruptcy Court found that it did not, and the plaintiffs renewed their appeal here. Upon reviewing the record, the Court finds that the agent's letter constituted a renewal of the lease as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court holds that the eviction was unlawful under Connecticut's summary process statute, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 47a-23 et seq., and hereby orders a hearing on the issue of damages.
The factual setting of this case is quite complex and must be set out in some detail. On October 30, 1979, the defendants' counsel served a summary process notice to quit possession upon the plaintiffs for nonpayment of rent. At that time the plaintiffs were in the second month of a one-year lease, which had been extended from the previous rental year. Abode service of the summary process complaint was made on November 21, 1979.
On November 29, 1979, the plaintiffs met with the attorney for the defendants in the latter's office, and they were told that they would not be evicted from the apartment if they made up the arrearages in rent and paid attorney's fees as provided in the lease. The plaintiffs were further orally informed that their rental payments would be for "use and occupancy" only until they became current in their rent, and that the pending eviction in the summary process action would serve as "a sword of Damocles" over their heads to insure the repayment of the rent. In the hearing before the Bankruptcy Judge, the plaintiffs testified that they were unable to remember the exact details of this arrangement, but did recall knowing that the summary process action would not be withdrawn until their rent had been paid in full.
This relationship between the parties persisted until the plaintiffs received a letter in June of 1980 from the renting agent of the defendants offering to extend their lease, effective September 1, 1980, for an additional year. At no time during this period did the plaintiffs become current in their rent. In fact, after not receiving any payments during the months of December and January, the attorney for the defendants on February 5, 1980 filed a motion for default for failure to appear and for judgment of possession in the summary process action. On February 7, 1980, the state court entered the judgment of possession, a copy of which was sent to the plaintiffs. The execution on the judgment was issued on February 14, 1980. The state court issued additional executions on the summary process judgment on May 9, 1980 and July 17, 1980. In June of 1980, however, the plaintiffs received the following letter:
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11.)
Notwithstanding this letter, the defendants sought and obtained the third execution on the summary process judgment and on July 23, 1980 evicted the plaintiffs from their apartment. The parties stipulated that the plaintiffs still owed $450.00 at the time of the eviction. The plaintiffs made their last payment, which they claim was "rent" for June, 1980, on July 3, 1980. It is uncontested that the plaintiffs had filed for bankruptcy on July 22, 1980 under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act and had obtained an automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) one day prior to their eviction.
The statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction to the District Court over decisions of the Bankruptcy Court is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1334. That section provides:
The standard of review of decisions of the Bankruptcy Court is set out in Rule 810 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure which provides:
(Emphasis added).
Rule 810 requires that the same effect be given to the referee's findings of fact as that required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Gross v. Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland, 302 F.2d 338, 339 (8th Cir.1962); Simon v. Agar, 299 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.1962). Rule 810 does not, however, prevent the District Court from reviewing the legal conclusions of the Bankruptcy Court. Thus in Prudential Credit Services v. Hill, 14 B.R. 249 (D.C.S.D.Miss.1981), the court noted that "the district court must independently determine the accuracy of the ultimate legal conclusions adopted by the bankruptcy judge on the basis of the facts shown." Id. at 251. Similarly, in Espiefs v. Settle, 14 B.R. 280 (Bkrtcy.D.N.H.1981), the court observed that Id. at 283. See also In re Wingfield, 15 B.R. 647, 649-50 (D.C.W.D.Okl.1981); Matter of Stanley Hotel, Inc., 15 B.R. 660, 662-63 (D.C.D.Colo.1981).
Turning to the legal consequences of the June, 1980 letter, the Court notes at the outset that summary process may not be instituted unless there has been a termination of a lease. The statute provides in pertinent part:
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