In re Porras
Decision Date | 26 May 2004 |
Docket Number | Adversary No. 97-3061.,Bankruptcy No. 95-30583-LK |
Citation | 312 B.R. 81 |
Parties | In re David PORRAS, Debtor. Randolph N. Osherow, Trustee, Plaintiff, v. David Porras and William Edmiston, Trustee of the Lucille Christie Blakley Trust and of the Lucille Christie Blakley Support Trust, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Western District of Texas |
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Bernard R. Given, II, Beck & Given, PC, El Paso, TX, for Debtor.
Michael M. Parker, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., San Antonio, TX, for Debtor, Trustee and Plaintiff.
Jack Minyard Partain, Jr., Fulbright & Jaworski, San Antonio, TX, for Trustee.
Randolph N. Osherow, San Antonio, TX, pro se.
Gregg D. Stevens, Louise P. Hytken, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.
Ben L. Krage, Kasmir & Krage, Michael P. Gibson, Timothy A. Duffy, Burleson, Pate, Gibson, Bobby M. Rubarts, Craig W. Budner, Hughes & Luce, Dallas, TX, for Defendants.
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This matter has a long, long history before this court. For a lengthy period of time, this adversary proceeding was abated while the IRS's claim against the Debtor was being adjudicated in this court (which allowed that claim in an amount in excess of $20 million—see Plaintiffs' Exh. 25), and while the criminal case against the Debtor for bankruptcy fraud and money laundering was adjudicated in the U.S. District Court in this District (which found him guilty—see Plaintiffs' Exh. 27). Now the Chapter 7 Trustee and the IRS request this court to enter partial summary judgment on several of their causes of action in this adversary proceeding.
Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege they are entitled to partial summary judgment avoiding, under one or more of a number of Texas fraudulent transfer statutes, the transfers of three property interests of the Debtor: a condominium located in Midland (the "Oaklawn Property"); the Debtor's remainder interest, after his mother's life estate, in 100 acres of land located in Collin County1 (the "100 Acres Remainder Interest"); and the Debtor's claim to a l/7th residual interest in all property in the Christie Property Trust (the "Christie Property Trust Interest").
In the alternative, the Trustee and the IRS seek a declaration that the latter two interests were contributed to the Lucille Blakley Trust (the "Trust") as a partial self-settlement of that Trust by the Debtor, whom they assert is also a beneficiary of that Trust, so that the 100 Acres and the Christie Property Trust Interest are property of the estate subject to the Debtor's creditors' claims.
It may be helpful at this point to explain that there are several trusts that have been involved in this adversary and this bankruptcy case. The Trust that is a party to the motions for summary judgment addressed in this Opinion is the Lucille Christie Blakley Trust. The Lucille Christie Blakley Support Trust is also a defendant in this suit and was a party to previous motions for summary judgment, already ruled on by this court. Finally, the Christie Property Trust is not a party to this suit, although (as will be discussed below) the Plaintiffs herein do allege that the Debtor transferred certain property interests that the Christie Property Trust ultimately came to hold.
As yet another alternative, the Trustee and the IRS seek a determination that the Debtor's complete dominion and control over the Trust renders it null and void, and/or that the Trust is a sham or an alter ego/nominee of the Debtor so that, in either case, the property in the Trust should be declared property of the Debtor's estate.
Finally, the Trustee and the IRS state in one sentence in the "Background" section of their Amended Complaint that if HWD Corporation is a true corporation, then the Trustee "through this lawsuit seeks to pierce HWD's corporate veil." Amended Complaint, p. 4, para. 5. This "cause of action" (or remedy) is not elaborated on, or even mentioned again, in the Amended Complaint. The Trust and Lucille Christie Blakley ("Blakley"),2 the named beneficiary of the Trust, oppose the Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on a number of grounds.3 In addition, Blakley and the Trust also contend, in their own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law denying relief on the Trustee's and IRS's fraudulent transfer causes of action as to the 100 Acres Remainder Interest and the Christie Property Trust Interest. In particular, they advance four grounds for summary judgment in their favor: the causes of action are time barred by statutes of limitations; the Debtor did not have a property interest under state law that he could have fraudulently transferred; the causes of action are collateral attacks on a September, 1988, agreed judgment entered in state court; and the causes of action are not ripe for adjudication.
In this Memorandum Opinion, the court will address the causes of action that are the subjects of the Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and the matters raised in the Trust's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as they relate to those causes of action. For purposes of this Memorandum Opinion, the following are the "live" pleadings considered by the court:
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Morton v. Kievit ( In re Vallecito Gas, LLC), CASE NO. 07-35674-BJH-11
...until the trustee gained actual knowledge of the transfer. Id. at But, a plaintiff must pursue its rights diligently. In re Porras, 312 B.R. 81 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2004). In this context, "diligence is measured by an objective standard." Juliet Homes, 2010 WL 5256806 at *13; Porras, at 108. I......
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U.S. v. Evans, Civil Action No. SA-05-CV-099-XR.
...988, 991 (N.D.Tex.1995); United States v. Gaona, No. SA-04-CA-00151-RF, 2004 WL 3186398, *3 (W.D.Tex. Dec. 22, 2004); In re Porras, 312 B.R. 81, 97 (Bankr. W.D.Tex.2004). Defendants cite to United States v. McLendon for the argument that TUFTA's four-year claim extinguishment provision is a......
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Ebner v. Kaiser (In re Kaiser)
...; Shearer v. Tepsic (In re Emergency Monitoring Technologies, Inc. ), 347 B.R. 17, 19 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.2006) ; Osherow v. Porras (In re Porras ), 312 B.R. 81, 97 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.2004) ; see also Tronox v. Kerr McGee Corporation (In re Tronox Inc. ), 503 B.R. 239, 274–275 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2013) (p......
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Finkel v. Polichuk (In re Polichuk)
...of the case. E.g., In re Greater Southeast Community Hosp. Corp. I, 365 B.R. 293, 301–02 (Bankr.D.D.C.2006); In re Porras, 312 B.R. 81, 97 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.2004). Here, the Trustee has alleged that the United States, specifically the Internal Revenue Service ... was an actual creditor of the ......