In re Prince's Estate
| Decision Date | 01 June 1926 |
| Citation | 246 P. 713,118 Or. 210 |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
| Parties | IN RE PRINCE'S ESTATE. v. IDLEMAN. ONG ET AL. |
Department 1.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County; George Tazwell, Judge.
On final accounting of H. F. Ong, executor of the estate of Thomas Prince, deceased. The claim of C. M. Idleman for attorney fees was allowed, and the executor and others appeal. Decree modified, and, as modified, affirmed.
This appeal was taken from the decree of the circuit court allowing the sum of $40,000 as attorney fees to C. M Idleman, who was attorney for about 15 months for H. F. Ong executor of the last will and testament of Thomas Prince deceased. The controversy in the circuit court arose over the final account of the executor, to whom Gen. Idleman had presented a claim of $50,000 for said services. The executor neither allowed nor rejected the claim, but presented the matter to the judge of the circuit court in probate requesting that a proper allowance be made for the services rendered by Gen. Idleman. The estate consisted of real and personal property in the state of Oregon, which was appraised in the sum of about $315,000, and of personal property consisting principally of stock in corporations in the state of Massachusetts, appraised in the sum of over $800,000, and a small amount of similar property in the state of New York. The testimony consists of the opinion of eight reputable lawyers of unquestionable standing and experience at the bar of Oregon residing in Portland. Their testimony was given in response to a hypothetical question purporting to briefly state the services rendered by Gen. Idleman, and covering twelve pages of typewritten matter. The services were estimated to be worth from $40,000 to $50,000. One attorney stated that a sum of $65,000 and another that $75,000 would not be unreasonable. The executor, trustee for residuary legatees and devisees, produced only one witness, an attorney of equal standing to the attorneys produced by the claimant, who testified that the services rendered, as stated in the hypothetical question propounded to him, were reasonably worth $15,000. The principal difference in the question propounded to the attorneys who were witnesses for Gen. Idleman and the attorney for the other interested parties was that in the former the hypothetical question assumed that Gen. Idleman had the responsibility of advising and directing the executor in the administration in the state of Massachusetts as well as the state of Oregon, while the latter question assumed that the services of Gen. Idleman were limited to the state of Oregon substantially. The evidence and hypothetical questions are too long to be incorporated in this opinion, and would be of no general benefit to the profession. The circuit judge, who was familiar with the work performed and services rendered by Gen. Idleman, fixed the compensation at $40,000.
D. P. Price, of Portland, for appellant Ong.
Rogers MacVeagh, of Portland, for appellants Worcester Bank & Trust Co. and others.
Martin L. Pipes, of Portland (Harrison Allen, G. G. Smith, and C. M. Idleman, all of Portland, on the brief), for respondent.
COSHOW, J. (after stating the facts as above).
The services for which Gen. Idleman is asking and has been allowed compensation were rendered to Dr. Ong as executor. For the services Dr. Ong is personally liable to Gen Idleman. The services are not a direct charge against the estate, but constitute a claim against Dr. Ong personally. The executor is allowed to retain from the money of the estate the expenses incurred by him in the administration of the estate, including reasonable attorney fees. The language of the statute is as follows:
"An executor or administrator shall be allowed, in the settlement of his account, all necessary expenses incurred in the care, management, and settlement of the estate, including reasonable attorney fees in any necessary litigation or matter requiring legal advice or counsel." Or. L. § 1290.
See Waite v. Willis, 42 Or. 288, 290, 70 P. 1034.
What is a reasonable attorney fees depends upon the amount and nature of the services rendered, the amount of the estate and length of time occupied in rendering such services, the ability and skill required, and the experience and training of the attorney rendering this service. The same standard for determining the value of an attorney's service when rendered to an executor should be employed as is used in fixing his compensation when retained by a person in his individual capacity. There is this difference, however, that an executor will not be allowed an amount for attorney fees in excess of the reasonable value of those fees, while one acting for himself alone is at liberty to make any contract with the attorney that he deems advisable. Gen. Idleman and Dr. Ong could have agreed between themselves as to the amount the former should receive for his services, and, assuming that agreement to have been fairly made, both would be bound thereby. But Dr. Ong could not have bound the estate to pay more than a reasonable fee for the services rendered, and, if that fee should be less than the agreed amount, Dr. Ong would have been personally liable for the excess. No agreement was made between them, and the executor was not willing to assume the responsibility of entering into an agreement to pay the amount charged by Gen. Idleman in this litigation.
It was the duty of the executor to account for that part of the estate of his testate situated in Massachusetts and New York so far as it was possible for him to do so. It was his duty to make proper returns to the United States for the purpose of computing the estate tax and to the state of Oregon for the purpose of computing the inheritance tax. This could not be done without a knowledge of the parts of the estate situated in Massachusetts and New York. In fact Dr. Ong, upon the advice of Gen. Idleman, was appointed executor of the will in the state of Massachusetts, and he actually administered that part of the estate situated in Massachusetts.
Gen. Idleman served as attorney for the executor for about 15 months. During that time, in addition to the ordinary work imposed upon an attorney for an executor in the progress of executing the will, he investigated the transactions of one Hammond, who had served as guardian of the decedent for two or three years immediately prior to his death. During the guardianship, the guardian had handled a large amount of property and had not stated any account. The work required the examination of the books of the guardian as well as securing a report of his transactions. When the guardian finally reported, he claimed as compensation for his services the sum of $100,000. That sum seemed exorbitant to the executor, and objections were filed and a contest conducted, resulting in an order of the court fixing the guardian compensation at $25,000. An appeal was taken to this court, where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. In re Guardianship of Thomas Prince, 104 Or. 670, 209 P. 90. An idea of the work involved in the trial of that case in the circuit court may be gained by an examination of the opinion of this court. Gen. Idleman did not appear in this court.
Another additional service rendered by Gen. Idleman was the preparation of a statement of facts in the form of a complaint in a suit instituted in Massachusetts against a trustee of the decedent. A Mr. Ames had served as trustee for a number of years for the decedent and refused to account or make a statement of his transactions, or of the property in his possession or under his control belonging to the estate. Gen. Idleman prepared the necessary statement of facts, and forwarded them to attorneys in Massachusetts for the purpose of instituting a suit there. As a result of this suit, the trustee, who was a nephew of the decedent and one of the residuary legatees, and the other residuary legatees effected an agreement and settlement whereby that suit was dismissed. In this same agreement arrangements were made for the final distribution of the estate and the closing of the administration. This agreement and settlement also resulted in the discharge of Gen. Idleman as attorney for Dr. Ong, executor.
Harold T. Prince, son and only legal heir of the deceased, commenced a contest of the will. Before this contest was brought to a hearing, the agreement referred to above between the other legatees and devisees was entered into, resulting in the contest being dismissed.
The principal contention on the part of appellants is that Gen. Idleman, the claimant and respondent, is not entitled to compensation from the estate administered in Oregon for his services to Dr. Ong, the executor and administrator in Massachusetts. We believe that the appellants are precluded from making this contention, for the reason that Dr. Ong, in his final account, submits to the court this identical question, which is recited in his final account as follows:
"* * * In performing the duties of your executor in the state of Oregon, and as ancillary executor of said estate in the state of Massachusetts, it was necessary that your executor employ attorneys to represent him and to do the legal work necessary in the premises, and to advise your executor as to his duties and procedure in the matter of probating said estate; that your executor employed Mr. C. M. Idleman, attorney in the city of Portland, Or., to represent him in that capacity."
It thus clearly appears that Mr. Idleman was retained, not only to assist Dr. Ong in his duties as executor in Oregon, but in the same capacity also in Massachusetts. Mr. Price, who represents Dr. Ong, as well as the other appellants in this court, received his allowance for similar services from...
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