In re PVI Associates
| Decision Date | 28 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 93-15543 SR. Adv. No. 94-0890. |
| Citation | 181 BR 210 |
| Parties | In re PVI ASSOCIATES, a Pennsylvania General Partnership, Debtor. PVI ASSOCIATES, a Pennsylvania General Partnership, Plaintiff, v. The REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, and Borough of Conshohocken, and Montgomery County Commissioners, and Gerald McTamney, and James T. Mullen, III, and Lucius Carter, and Sandra Caterbone, and Vincent Totaro, and Robert Storti, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Frederic J. Baker, Asst. U.S. Trustee, Office of U.S. Trustee, Philadelphia, PA.
Frank J. Perch, Spector Gadon & Rosen, P.C., Philadelphia PA.
Bruce Nicholson, Duffy, North, Wilson, Thomas & Nicholson, Hatboro, PA.
Joseph J. Santarone, Jr., Marshal, Dehenney, Warner, Coleman & Coggin, Norristown, PA.
David MacMain, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, Philadelphia, PA.
Lawrence J. Lichtenstein, Buchanan Ingersoll, a P.C., Philadelphia, PA.
Introduction.
The above debtor, PVI Associates, ("PVI") a Pennsylvania General Partnership, has filed an adversary action against the numerous above named defendants alleging violations of its constitutional and civil rights. PVI seeks injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the alleged violations, together with compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs and attorneys fees. The respective defendants have filed three separate Motions to Dismiss the adversary action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). These Motions have been briefed by all parties and are ripe for adjudication. For the reasons discussed herein, the Motions will be granted in part, and denied in part.
Background.
PVI is the owner of certain improved and unimproved parcels of real property located in the Borough of Conshohocken. The improved properties at issue herein are more specifically known as "One First Avenue," "2 Elm Street," and "10 Oak Street." All of the land owned by PVI lies within an area (the "Redevelopment Area") which has been identified as "blighted" in an Urban Redevelopment Plan (the "Redevelopment Plan") prepared by the Planning Commission of the Borough of Conshohocken (the "Planning Commission"), and subsequently adopted, along with a plan of implementation (the "Redevelopment Proposal") by Defendants, the Borough of Conshohocken (the "Borough")1, the Redevelopment Authority of the County of Montgomery (the "Redevelopment Authority"), and the Commissioners of the County of Montgomery (the "County Commissioners"). The Redevelopment Plan, generally speaking, is a Plan designed to facilitate the reconstruction and rehabilitation of blighted land in the Redevelopment Area.
PVI's grievances relate to both the inclusion of certain of its unimproved property within the Redevelopment Area, as well as the exclusion of certain other improved realty (10 Oak Street) from the Redevelopment Area. PVI complains, moreover, that the Redevelopment Plan, as amended, is discriminatory in that it provides more favorable treatment for a particular land owner (Donald W. Pulver or a Pulver affiliated entity) which is not generally made available under the Redevelopment Plan to PVI or other owners of property within the Redevelopment Area. In particular, PVI maintains that actions and/or omissions of the Borough, the County Commissioners, and the Redevelopment Authority in connection with adoption and subsequent modification of the Redevelopment Plan, have been arbitrary, capricious and malicious. In its complaint, PVI asserts 6 counts arising from its grievances, as follows:
PVI seeks a broad spectrum of affirmative equitable relief ranging from modification of the Redevelopment Plan to an Order declaring the Redevelopment Plan void. As noted, PVI also seeks compensatory and exemplary damage awards.
Certain of the issues raised by the Defendants in their respective dismissal Motions are common to more than one of them and where appropriate these will be considered jointly.
At the outset the Court notes that there is no disagreement between the parties as to the law applicable to the Court's consideration of the instant dismissal motions, as indeed there should not be given the well established body of law on this point. The Court must accept as true all well pleaded allegations contained in the Complaint, and must construe them in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff. The Complaint should be dismissed only where it appears beyond a doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of a claim which would entitle it to relief. Labov v. Lalley, 809 F.2d 220 (3d Cir.1987), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In this respect, too, the Court is to draw all reasonable inferences from the conceded factual allegations, and construe the same in favor of the non-moving party. Greenwood v. Singel, 823 F.Supp. 1207, 1210 (E.D.Pa.1993). Conversely, however, the Court need not accept as true any conclusionary allegations of law, nor make any unwarranted inferences of fact. Flanagan v. Shively, 783 F.Supp. 922, 927 (M.D.Pa.1992).
At the outset, each Defendant group argues that a claim cannot be stated as to it because its role in the adoption of the Plan was tangential compared to the more central roles of others. In this respect, the parties all agree that under the enabling statute (the Pennsylvania Urban Redevelopment Law, 35 P.S. 1701, et seq.) the local municipal planning commission is the entity which is initially empowered to identify blighted or redevelopment areas, and to then create for such areas a redevelopment plan. Thereafter, the local redevelopment authority is charged with preparation of a proposal for redevelopment of all or a portion of the lands within a redevelopment area. The local redevelopment authority submits its proposal back to the local planning commission for a recommendation, and thereafter conveys the proposal to the "governing body," in this case the County Commissioners. The County Commissioners are charged to conduct a public hearing on the Authority's proposal. The County Commissioners may thereafter approve the proposal, but they are prohibited from doing so if the local municipality (here, the Borough) has objected. If approved, the redevelopment proposal is returned to the local redevelopment authority for implementation.
In view of the foregoing, each defendant group maintains that it is the wrong entity to be sued. Specifically, all stress the fact that the Planning Commission is the originator of a Redevelopment Plan. While this is of course true, it is likewise readily apparent, indeed it is conceded by the Defendants, that the entire process is a collaborative one in which each defendant group is expected to and does fully participate. In the cases of the Redevelopment Authority and County Commissioners, this participation takes the form of certain affirmative duties and responsibilities. In the case of the Borough, the participation exists, inter alia, by virtue of the veto power given to the Borough under the enabling legislation.
PVI maintains that at each level of government the foregoing collaborative process has been the product of bad faith and maliciously motivated conduct. In this respect, the division of responsibilities as set forth in the Urban Redevelopment Law does not, and in this Court's view should not, insulate a particular governmental actor from liability if its own conduct at any stage is shown to possess constitutionally proscribed animus. In so concluding the Court does not see itself as "pushing the envelope" of theoretical governmental liability, since, on the one hand, other courts have already held that the constitutionality of a Redevelopment Authority's actions in the redevelopment plan process is subject to judicial review, Crawford v. Redevelopment Authority of Fayette County, 418 Pa. 549, 211 A.2d 866 (1965); In re City of Scranton, 132 Pa.Cmwlth. 175, 572 A.2d 250 (1990), while on the other hand no persuasive argument has been advanced as to why a different standard should exist for other participating governmental actors (such as the Borough and the County Commissioners). The Motions to Dismiss of all Defendants, to the extent predicated on the foregoing argument, shall therefore be denied.
All of the individual defendants, i.e., the County Commissions and the Borough Council Members, as well as the Redevelopment Authority, argue that they are immune from suit based on the doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity. The Court finds these assertions persuasive as to all of the individual defendants and the instant Complaint will therefore be dismissed as to the County Commissioners and the Borough Council Members. The argument of the Redevelopment Authority, on the other hand, fails to persuade, and its dismissal Motion in this context will accordingly be denied.
In Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597 (3d Cir.1994), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued its most recent pronouncement on this subject. In Acierno, the Court held that municipal officials are afforded absolute immunity for civil rights claims arising out of legislative acts. PVI focuses on Acierno's limited restriction to "leg...
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