In re Q.B.

• Decision Date: 11 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–FS–645.,14–FS–645.
• Citation: 116 A.3d 450
• Parties: In re Q.B.; District of Columbia, Appellant.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

116 A.3d 450

In re Q.B.; District of Columbia, Appellant.

No. 14–FS–645.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued Nov. 18, 2014.

Decided June 11, 2015.

Janice Y. Sheppard, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Attorney General, with whom Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney General for the District of Columbia at the time the briefs were filed, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Rosalyn C. Groce, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellant.

Shilpa S. Satoskar, Public Defender Service, with whom James Klein and Jaclyn S. Frankfurt, Public Defender Service, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before THOMPSON and BECKWITH, Associate Judges, and STEADMAN, Senior Judge.

Opinion

BECKWITH, Associate Judge:

The District of Columbia appeals from the trial court's dismissal of a delinquency petition charging seventeen-year-old Q.B. with contempt under D.C.Code § 11–944 (2012 Repl.) for violating a 7 p.m. curfew that was one of several conditions of his pretrial release. Applying this court's decision in In re (Anthony ) Jones, 51 A.3d 1290 (D.C.2012), the trial court ruled that the pretrial release order contained no “free-standing requirement” to obey the conditions of release and that the petition did not charge an offense under the contempt statute. We agree, and we affirm the court's dismissal of Q.B.'s contempt charge.

I.

On February 10, 2014, the government filed a delinquency petition charging Q.B. with unlawful entry in violation of D.C.Code § 22–3302 (2012 Repl.). The trial court determined that pretrial detention was necessary “to protect the respondent's own person” and “to secure the respondent's presence at the next court hearing.” On defense counsel's motion, Q.B. was released from detention the following week subject to several conditions. These conditions included obeying all D.C. laws, ordinances, and regulations; residing with and remaining in the custody and under the supervision of his mother; observing a 7 p.m. curfew unless with a parent or guardian or engaged “in a structured activity”; attending school regularly and obeying all school rules and carrying his attendance card; refraining from use of illegal drugs, subject to “spot testing” at his probation officer's discretion; staying away from a particular address in Northwest D.C.; complying with “all reasonable referrals from Court Social Services”; not being rearrested; and engaging in mentoring and tutoring services. Q.B. signed the release order beneath a paragraph stating,

The above checked Conditions of Release have been explained to me and I agree to comply with them to the best of my ability. I understand that failure to comply with any of these conditions noted may result in my placement in a secured or unsecured facility until final disposition of my case.

The case was set for trial on April 15, 2014.

At 10 p.m. on April 8, 2014, Metropolitan Police Department Officer Justin Lyons responded to a complaint about “a group of individuals smoking and drinking” and found Q.B. standing in an alley with several other people.¹ The next day Officer Lyons learned that Q.B. had been in apparent violation of a 7 p.m. curfew under the pretrial release order. He applied for a custody order, and Q.B. was arrested on April 10.

The government filed a second petition against Q.B. on April 11 charging him with contempt under D.C.Code § 11–944(a)(2). Four days later, the court dismissed Q.B.'s unlawful entry charge for want of prosecution.

Q.B. then filed three motions: a motion to dismiss the contempt petition for failure to charge an offense, a motion to dismiss the petition for vindictive prosecution in retaliation for asserting his right to trial on the unlawful entry charge, and a motion to compel discovery for a selective prosecution claim. On April 28, 2014, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss for failure to charge an offense and denied the other two motions as moot. The government timely appealed.

II.

The government argues at the outset that the trial court lacked the authority to dismiss the petition for failure to charge an offense before holding a factfinding hearing. In its view, family court judges can dismiss delinquency petitions only pursuant to statutory authority,² and no statute provides authority to dismiss a delinquency petition in this circumstance.³

Q.B. argues that the government waived this claim by failing to press it before the trial court. Even if the government preserved the claim for appeal, however, we disagree that the trial court lacked authority for its action. Juvenile Court Rule 12 provides that “any defense, objection, or request which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion and in accordance with Rule 47–I.” Super. Ct. Juv. R. 12(b). Specifically, this includes “[d]efenses and objections based on defects in the petition,” including a failure to charge an offense.⁴ Super. Ct. Juv. R. 12(b)(2). Rule 41–I further provides that “[a] motion made before the factfinding hearing shall be determined before the factfinding hearing unless the assigned judge ... orders that it shall be deferred for determination at the factfinding hearing.” Super. Ct. Juv. R. 47–I(d) ; see D.C.Code § 16–2317(a) (2012 Repl.) (“Except as otherwise provided by statute or court rule, all motions shall be heard at the time of the factfinding hearing.”). The government did not mention these rules in its opening brief, and in its reply brief and at oral argument appeared no longer to be pressing its broad claim that the trial court's authority to dismiss a juvenile delinquency petition prior to a factfinding hearing was limited to situations in which a statute expressly authorizes dismissal. And with good reason. The trial court undoubtedly has the power to dismiss a delinquency petition pursuant to the Juvenile Court Rules. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. D.E.P., 311 A.2d 831, 832 (D.C.1973) ; Campbell v. United States, 295 A.2d 498, 501 (D.C.1972) (“[T]he Superior Court's rules[,] at least when they are substantially identical to federal rules, have the force and effect of law.”). In this case, these rules authorized the trial court to do just what it did-dismiss a petition for failure to charge an offense before holding a factfinding hearing.

The government also contends that the trial court erred by looking “beyond the face of the petition” when determining that the petition in this case did not charge an offense. In the government's view, the petition adequately charged an offense by alleging that Q.B. “willfully disobeyed” a court order “directing him to comply with a 7 p.m. curfew,” and the trial court should not have considered the language of the release order itself.

We disagree. To evaluate the sufficiency of the petition, as with an indictment, the trial judge had to determine “whether the facts alleged [were] sufficient in law ... to support a conviction.” Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 768 n. 15, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962). To do so here, the court had to ascertain whether the underlying court order contained a curfew requirement that subjected Q.B. to a contempt charge. Cf. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 698, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (“[T]he ‘crime’ of violating a condition of release cannot be abstracted from the ‘element’ of the violated condition.”). This was a purely legal analysis and the question was thus “capable of determination without the trial of the general issue.” Super. Ct. Juv. R. 12(b). We see no procedural impropriety in the trial court's dismissal of the petition prior to a factfinding hearing.

III.

As to the merits of the trial court's ruling, the government argues that, contrary to the trial court's view, the petition in this case validly charged an offense under the general contempt statute, D.C.Code § 11–944, by alleging that Q.B. violated a condition of release in his pretrial release order. Q.B. argues, and the trial court ruled, that this court's holding in In re (Anthony ) Jones, 51 A.3d 1290 (D.C.2012), precludes the government from charging him with contempt.

In (Anthony) Jones, Anthony Jones was subject to a civil protection order (CPO) stating that he “may have unsupervised visitation with the parties' minor children so long as [he] does not use illegal drugs.” 51 A.3d at 1291. After Mr. Jones was accused of using illegal substances and failing to report for a scheduled drug test, he was convicted of contempt under D.C.Code § 16–1005(g), which makes it a misdemeanor to violate a CPO. This court reversed his contempt conviction because the CPO contained “no free-standing requirement that he abstain from drug use under pain of criminal contempt,” but instead “only required appellant to abstain from the use of illegal substances as a condition of his continued right to visit with his child.” 51 A.3d at 1292–93. Had the trial court intended contempt—“rather than or in addition to withdrawal of unsupervised visitation—to be a sanction for drug use, it surely would have known how to draft that order.” Id. at 1293.

Here, Q.B. was subject to an order stating that “the Division finds the Respondent should be RELEASED ON THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: ... Observe the following curfew by being in at: 7:00 PM (S, M, T, W, TH, F) and at 7:00 PM (FRI and SAT.) UNLESS WITH PARENT/GUARDIAN OR IN A STRUCTURED ACTIVITY.” Q.B. signed the order to affirm his understanding “that failure to comply with any of these conditions noted may result in [his] placement in a secured or unsecured facility until final disposition of [his] case.”

The government contends that this order “contained a ‘free-standing requirement’ that Q.B. ‘be in at 7:00 PM’ every day of the week.” But just as the order in (Anthony ) Jones “only required appellant to abstain from the use of illegal substances as a condition of his continued right to visit with his child,” 51 A.3d at 1292, the order here required Q.B. to obey a curfew only “as a condition of his continued...