In re R.C., 19CA20

• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
• Writing for the Court: Hess, J.
• Citation: 153 N.E.3d 538,2020 Ohio 1486
• Parties: In the MATTER OF: R.C. Alleged Delinquent Child
• Docket Number: No. 19CA20,19CA20
• Decision Date: 10 April 2020

153 N.E.3d 538
2020 Ohio 1486

In the MATTER OF: R.C. Alleged Delinquent Child

No. 19CA20

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Highland County.

RELEASED April 10, 2020

153 N.E.3d 542

Sara Barger, Barger Law Office, LLC and Dennis Kirk, Kirk Law Office, LLC, Hillsboro, Ohio, for appellant.

Anneka P. Collins, Highland County Prosecutor, and James Roeder, Highland County Assistant Prosecutor, Ohio, for appellee.

DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Hess, J.

{¶1} R.C. appeals the trial court's decision adjudicating him a delinquent child as a result of committing gross sexual imposition in violation of O.R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). R.C. contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements made to an investigating detective. He argues that he was not properly advised of his Miranda rights and he lacked the capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive those rights. R.C. also contends that his adjudication of delinquency was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the record does not support a finding that the incident occurred or that he acted with the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.

{¶2} We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying R.C.'s motion to suppress because R.C. was not in custody at the time of the interview, thus his Miranda rights were not triggered, and his statements were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Additionally, we find that the trial court's judgment is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We find that the trier of fact did not lose its way and create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed. We overrule R.C.'s assignments of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶3} In February 2019, the state filed a complaint alleging that R.C. was a delinquent child because he had sexual contact with M.G., a child less than thirteen years of age, in violation of O.R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), gross sexual imposition. Prior to the adjudicatory hearing, R.C. filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to an investigating detective on two grounds: (1) he was not properly advised of his Miranda rights and (2) his statements were not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. The trial court denied the motion, finding that R.C. was not in custody when the statements were made and that the circumstances surrounding his statements showed that they were made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the Juvenile Division of the Highland County Court of Common Pleas found R.C. to be a delinquent child. R.C. appealed.

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶4} R.C. assigns the following errors for our review:

1. The trial court erred by overruling appellant's motion to suppress as appellant did not give a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent confession.

2. The trial court erred by finding that appellant was delinquent by reason

153 N.E.3d 543

of gross sexual imposition because such a finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Suppress

1. Standard of Review

{¶5} In general "appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Codeluppi , 139 Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10 N.E.3d 691, ¶ 7. "When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses." State v. Burnside , 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. "Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence." Id. " ‘Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.’ " Codeluppi at ¶ 7, quoting Burnside at ¶ 8.

2. General Principles Concerning Custodial Interrogations

{¶6} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provide that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself in any criminal case. State v. Arnold , 147 Ohio St.3d 138, 2016-Ohio-1595, 62 N.E.3d 153, ¶ 30. "[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). "A suspect in police custody ‘must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.’ " State v. Lather , 110 Ohio St.3d 270, 2006-Ohio-4477, 853 N.E.2d 279, ¶ 6, quoting Miranda at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602.

{¶7} Police are not required to administer Miranda warnings to every person they question, even if the person being questioned is a suspect. State v. Biros , 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 440, 678 N.E.2d 891 (1997), citing Oregon v. Mathiason , 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). Miranda warnings are required only for custodial interrogations. Id. Miranda defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602.

{¶8} "In order to determine whether a person is in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda warnings, courts must first inquire into the circumstances surrounding the questioning and, second, given those circumstances, determine whether a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interview and leave." State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-3430, 811 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 27, citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). After the circumstances surrounding the interrogation are reconstructed, "the court must apply an objective test to resolve ‘the ultimate inquiry’ of whether there was a ‘ " ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of

153 N.E.3d 544

movement’ " ’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Id. , quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983), quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). Whether an individual is in custody is an objective inquiry. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2402, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) ; State v. Hambrick , 4th Dist. Ross No. 15CA3497, 2016-Ohio-3395, 2016 WL 3257782, ¶ 15 ; In re C.M.R. , 2nd Dist., 2018-Ohio-110, 107 N.E.3d 34, ¶15-16.

{¶9} The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, "[i]n some circumstances, a child's age ‘would have affected how a reasonable person’ in the suspect's position ‘would perceive his or her freedom to leave.’ " J.D.B. v. North Carolina , 564 U.S. 261, 270, 271–272, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011), quoting Stansbury v. California , 511 U.S. 318, 325, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994). The Court held that, "so long as the child's age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test." Id. at 277, 131 S.Ct. 2394.

{¶10} In his motion to suppress, R.C. identified few factors to support his contention that the interview was custodial in nature. He stated that it took place in a patrol vehicle parked at R.C.'s residence and started with the investigator, Detective Engle, stating that she "has to give Miranda" even though she told R.C. that "he is not under arrest, which seems to contradict the Miranda she believes she is required to provide." (OR. 20, p. 2) The trial court found that the interview was not custodial in nature and did not trigger Miranda rights.

{¶11} At the suppression hearing Detective Engle testified that she interviewed R.C., a 17-year-old tenth grade student, (Tr. 7) at his home in her vehicle with his mother present. Detective Engle's vehicle was an unmarked police car equipped with a two-way radio, and Engle was wearing a detective uniform. (Tr. 30-31) Detective Engle audio-recorded the interview, which was played for the court. (May 31, 2019 Hearing Tr. p. 6) Detective Engle began the interview by telling R.C. that he was not under arrest and would not be leaving with her. She told R.C., "you can choose to end this interview at any point in time and get out of my car and go back into the house." (Tr. p. 7) After approximately thirty minutes, Detective Engle finished her interview with R.C., turned the recording off, and R.C. exited her vehicle and went back into his house. (Tr. 24) Detective Engle and R.C.'s mother, who was seated in the back seat of the vehicle, continued to talk for approximately twenty more minutes after R.C. left. (T...