In re R.L., No. 26232.
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
Writing for the Court | FROELICH, P.J. |
Citation | 23 N.E.3d 298 |
Parties | In re R.L. |
Docket Number | No. 26232. |
Decision Date | 14 November 2014 |
23 N.E.3d 298
In re R.L.
No. 26232.
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, Montgomery County.
Nov. 14, 2014.
Tiffany C. Allen, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Dayton, OH, attorney for plaintiff-appellee.
Bradley S. Baldwin, Centerville, OH, attorney for defendant-appellant.
Opinion
FROELICH, P.J.
{¶ 1} R.L. appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which found that he had committed a rape of a person whose ability to resist or consent was substantially impaired, which, if committed as an adult, would have been a felony of the first degree. The court adjudicated R.L. to be a delinquent child and committed him to the Department of Youth Services for a minimum of one year and up to the age of 21; the court suspended the commitment and placed R.L. on probation, on the conditions that R.L. comply with all court orders, laws, and probationary rules. R.L. appeals from the trial court's judgment.
{¶ 2} For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
{¶ 3} On July 30, 2013, R.L., age 9, was accused of raping his mentally and physically disabled cousin, D.G., an adult woman, in the apartment of D.G.'s mother, R.L.'s aunt. On October 7, 2013, a complaint was filed against R.L. He filed a request for a competency evaluation and a motion to suppress statements he had made to the police. A hearing was held on the motion to suppress, at which the competency issue was also addressed. The motion to suppress was overruled.
{¶ 4} With regard to the competency issues, the psychologist stated that she had conducted an extensive evaluation of R.L. She concluded that R.L. had attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and symptoms of “attention and concentration difficulties” for which he “could” benefit from medication, but that he was “capable of focusing and participating in” conversations and legal proceedings. She further stated that R.L. was able to explain his account of “what had happened” with her assistance; he benefits from having information explained slowly and having an opportunity to ask questions. It is unclear from the record whether R.L. was on medication at the time of the alleged offense. The parties stipulated to R.L.'s competence based on the psychologist's conclusions.
{¶ 5} On March 17, 2014, R.L. was tried to the court. On March 24, 2014, the trial court found R.L. responsible for the commission of rape, as alleged in the complaint. On the basis of that disposition, on May 1, 2014, the trial court found R.L. to be a delinquent child. The trial court committed R.L. to the Department of Youth Services, as described above; his commitment was suspended and he was placed on probation.
{¶ 6} R.L. appeals from the trial court's order of disposition, raising four assignments of error.
{¶ 7} R.L.'s first two assignments of error relate to the denial of his motion to suppress.
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS WAS IMPROPERLY OVERRULED BECAUSE HIS INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS WERE OBTAINED DURING A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION WITHOUT BEING AFFORDED MIRANDA WARNINGS.
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS WAS IMPROPERLY OVERRULED BECAUSE HIS STATEMENTS WERE MADE INVOLUNTARILY.
{¶ 8} R.L. contends that his statements to the police were made without the benefit of Miranda warnings, although he was in custody, and that his statements were not voluntarily made. He asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements.
{¶ 9} In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court “assumes the role of the trier of fact, and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.” State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 592, 639 N.E.2d 498 (2d Dist.1994) ; State v. Knisley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22897, 2010-Ohio-116, 2010 WL 169438, ¶ 30. Accordingly, when we review suppression decisions, we must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Retherford at 592, 639 N.E.2d 498. “Accepting those facts as true, we must independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether they meet the applicable legal standard.” Id.
{¶ 10} At the suppression hearing, Police Officer Kim Delong testified about the events of July 30, 2013, when she responded to an apartment complex in her jurisdiction.
She initially responded to the area on a different case but, after she arrived, she became embroiled in a conflict involving the parties to this case. R.L.'s parents were present, claiming that he had been assaulted by his aunt (“Aunt”), and Aunt claimed that R.L. had sexually assaulted her daughter, D.G.
{¶ 11} Because many people were nearby, Police Officer Delong asked R.L. if he would like to speak with her more privately, due to the “sensitive topic.” When R.L. answered affirmatively, Delong made eye contact with R.L.'s mother, who gestured in a manner that indicated to Delong that she consented to the conversation. Delong walked a short distance away with R.L., where they had a conversation that lasted approximately 30 minutes and covered both the alleged assault by Aunt on R.L. and R.L.'s alleged assault on D.G. According to Delong, she and R.L. were standing approximately 15 to 20 feet away from R.L.'s mother during this conversation. They stood in front of Delong's cruiser, but R.L. was never handcuffed or placed inside the cruiser.
{¶ 12} Delong testified that the conversation was not “adversarial,” commenting that “he's nine” and that she brought the conversation “down to [an] age appropriate” level. She did, however, “challenge” R.L. on his version of events when his statements were inconsistent with other facts known to her at that time.
{¶ 13} According to Delong's testimony at the suppression hearing, the incident began when R.L.'s aunt learned from R.L. that police were allegedly looking for people with “weed” in the apartment complex; Aunt, afraid that her 18–year–old son, “Cousin,” might get in trouble, left the apartment to look for him, and R.L. left with her. However, R.L. returned to the apartment, where D.G. had been left alone, before Aunt did. The parties dispute what happened while R.L. was alone in the apartment with D.G.
{¶ 14} Recounting her conversation with R.L., Officer Delong testified that he had provided a very detailed recollection of the events preceding his own return to the apartment and after Aunt returned to the apartment, but he told several different stories about what had happened in the apartment in between, at the time of the alleged assault. In his first account to Delong, R.L. claimed that he went back into the apartment to spend time with Cousin (the victim's brother) and Cousin's friends. Delong expressed doubt about this version of events, because she knew from other witnesses that Cousin and his friends had not been in the apartment at that time. R.L. then claimed that, when he was in the apartment, he had watched television on the couch while D.G. stayed in her room, and he had no contact with her. Next, R.L. stated to Delong that Cousin and his friends had made him (R.L.) take D.G.'s diaper off, and then Cousin had done “nasty things” to D.G. in her bedroom, which R.L. observed from the couch. (Delong noted in her testimony that it was not physically possible to see into D.G.'s bedroom from the couch in the main room of the apartment, as R.L. claimed he had done.) R.L. also stated that Cousin had taken D.G.'s diaper off and had “put his thing * * * in her butt.” Finally, R.L. stated that he could not remember what had happened when he returned to the apartment. Delong testified that R.L. gave a detailed account of the activities “prior to him being in the apartment alone with [D.G.]; he was very detailed after [Aunt] walked in and saw what she saw; but the part in the middle where he was upstairs with [D.G.] by himself, he told me he couldn't remember.”
{¶ 15} After Delong and R.L. had been talking for about 30 minutes, R.L.'s mother
(“Mother”) approached them. When R.L. and Delong told Mother that R.L. did not remember some of the events, Mother “barked” at R.L., told him that he did remember, and encouraged R.L. to be honest with Delong. Delong testified that Mother was not rude or disrespectful to her and did not seem upset that Delong had talked with R.L.
{¶ 16} On cross-examination, Delong stated that she had not inquired of R.L. whether he had previously dealt with police officers, that she had not informed him of his Miranda rights during their conversation, and that he had not been in custody during their conversation. R.L. was released to Mother when the conversation ended. Delong acknowledged that, when she had asked to speak with R.L., she had not specifically stated whether she intended to talk with him about the alleged assault (on him by Aunt), the alleged rape of D.G., or both.
{¶ 17} “It is well-settled that many constitutional protections enjoyed by adults also apply to juveniles. One such constitutional protection is...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
In re R.C., No. 19CA20
..."Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a suspect involuntarily confessed." In re R.L. , 2014-Ohio-5065, 23 N.E.3d 298, ¶ 22 (2nd Dist.), citing Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). Coercive law enforcement tactics in......
-
In re C.M.R., No. 27519
...also apply to juveniles. One such constitutional protection is the privilege against self-incrimination.’ " In re R.L. , 2014-Ohio-5065, 23 N.E.3d 298, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), quoting In re Haubeil , 4th Dist. Ross No. 01CA2631, 2002-Ohio-4095, 2002 WL 1823001, ¶ 9. (Other citation omitted.) The p......
-
State v. Wallace-Lee, Appellate Case No. 2019-CA-19
...the defendant's will was overcome by the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession.' " In re R.L., 2014-Ohio-5065, 23 N.E.3d 298, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.), quoting In re N.J.M., 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2010-03-026, 2010-Ohio-5526, ¶ 18, citing State v. Fille, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2......
-
State v. Nevarez-Reyes, C.A. CASE NO. 27047
...described in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), have been followed. In re R.L., 2014-Ohio-5065, 23 N.E.3d 298, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), citing In re Haubeil, 4th Dist. Ross No. 01CA2631, 2002-Ohio-4095, ¶ 9. Page 13 {¶ 31} Whether a statement was made volun......
-
In re R.C., No. 19CA20
..."Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a suspect involuntarily confessed." In re R.L. , 2014-Ohio-5065, 23 N.E.3d 298, ¶ 22 (2nd Dist.), citing Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). Coercive law enforcement tactics in......
-
In re C.M.R., No. 27519
...also apply to juveniles. One such constitutional protection is the privilege against self-incrimination.’ " In re R.L. , 2014-Ohio-5065, 23 N.E.3d 298, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), quoting In re Haubeil , 4th Dist. Ross No. 01CA2631, 2002-Ohio-4095, 2002 WL 1823001, ¶ 9. (Other citation omitted.) The p......
-
State v. Wallace-Lee, Appellate Case No. 2019-CA-19
...the defendant's will was overcome by the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession.' " In re R.L., 2014-Ohio-5065, 23 N.E.3d 298, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.), quoting In re N.J.M., 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2010-03-026, 2010-Ohio-5526, ¶ 18, citing State v. Fille, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2......
-
State v. Nevarez-Reyes, C.A. CASE NO. 27047
...described in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), have been followed. In re R.L., 2014-Ohio-5065, 23 N.E.3d 298, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), citing In re Haubeil, 4th Dist. Ross No. 01CA2631, 2002-Ohio-4095, ¶ 9. Page 13 {¶ 31} Whether a statement was made volun......