In re Raynolds' Estate

Decision Date16 July 1942
Citation132 N.J.Eq. 141,27 A.2d 226
PartiesIn re RAYNOLDS' ESTATE.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

[Copyrighted material omitted.]

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The law presumes the validity of a will, and he who contests it must clearly establish facts to overcome that presumption.

2. The burden of proving undue influence is upon him who asserts it, and it must be established clearly.

3. On an issue of undue influence, the burden of proof may shift to the proponent of a will where there is proof that testator's mind was enfeebled and an intimate confidential relationship is established, together with other indicia such as mentioned in In re Barnett's Will, 2 N.J.Misc. 135.

4. Evidence examined, and held that the burden of proof did not shift to the proponents in the instant case.

5. Undue influence exists where free agency is destroyed, and whether this be accomplished by strong or slight exercise of power, or by forceful or peaceful means, is wholly immaterial. Such influence can never be precisely defined. Each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.

6. Undue influence, to vitiate a will, must be operative at the time the will is executed. The time at which such influence is exerted is of no moment so long as its effect remains operative when the will is executed.

7. Every influence is not undue. Suggestions and even persuasion may be safely used with a testator, if they do not destroy free agency and amount to moral or physical coercion.

8. With respect to such persuasion or suggestion, greater latitude is allowed between husband and wife because of the marital relation.

9. Declarations of a testator are admissible in evidence for the purpose of showing his state of mind at the time they are made but not to prove the facts declared.

10. The courts cannot reject a will because it does not comport with their ideas of propriety and justice, or even if it appears to be unreasonable, unjust or cruel. If a testator observes the requirements of the law, and possesses capacity, he may lawfully make an unjust will.

11. A will which is the result of undue influence may, after the removal of such influence, be ratified by the testator and the bane of such influence removed. Such ratification may result from lapse of time after its execution and the removal of the baneful influence which produced it, or from republication thereafter.

Appeal from Orphans' Court, Monmouth County.

Proceeding in the matter of the estate of Edward Hidden Raynolds, deceased. From a decree of the Orphans' Court admitting to probate a will and two codicils of Edward Hidden Raynolds, deceased, Edward F. Raynolds and Harold Raynolds appeal.

Decree affirming order advised.

John E. Toolan, of Perth Amboy, and Meyer E. Ruback, of Newark, for appellants.

Smith & Slingerland, of Newark, for respondents.

BERRY, Vice Ordinary.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Monmouth County Orphans' Court admitting to probate a will and two codicils of Edward Hidden Raynolds, late of Allenhurst, Monmouth County, New Jersey. The will in controversy was executed on June 30, 1936, the first codicil thereto on March 2, 1937, and the second codicil on February 21, 1939. Mr. Raynolds died on March 14, 1940, at the age of eighty-two years. He was a man of exceptional mental and physical vigor, attending daily, until his retirement, to his duties as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of DeVoe & Raynolds Company, one of the largest paint and varnish manufacturers in this country. He was stricken only four days before his death and prior to that time had remained in full possession of his mental and physical powers. He was a leading executive, a man of parts who dealt daily with men, business and the problems of life. Although he retired prior to 1922, he still maintained his prior interests and activities in domestic and worldly affairs. He was described by his attorney as "a high-type chief executive", and at the time of his death, and long prior thereto, he was a man of considerable wealth.

The testator was twice married, his first wife having died about 1897 or 1898, leaving two children: Edward F. Raynolds, born August 6, 1889, and Harold Raynolds, born October 29, 1894, the appellants in this cause. After the death of the first Mrs. Raynolds, the testator remarried, his second wife being Madeleine Taitt Raynolds. Of the second marriage three sons were born: Arthur, now about forty-one years of age; Reginald, now about forty years of age, and Lawrence, about thirty-seven. Upon his remarriage testator, his wife and two sons resided together, and, according to the uncontradicted testimony, both the testator and his wife were very kind and affectionate towards these children, and the testator remained so until his death. However, shortly after the birth of her first child, the attitude of Madeleine Taitt Raynolds changed. With the happening of that event, she apparently lost interest in the welfare and happiness of her two stepchildren, and her affection for them waned. She complained to the testator continuously, according to the proofs, about almost everything his sons by the first wife did. And, also according to the proofs, the father listened to these complaints, and invariably, in response thereto requested the boys to discontinue doing whatever was the subject of his wife's complaint, "to keep peace in the family".

Mr. Raynolds during his school days had been a track star, and was athletically inclined. He was interested in the athletic exploits of his boys, and he frequently told them he would be present at various athletic events important in their school careers, but at the last minute he would cancel the engagement, saying: "I cannot come, your stepmother objects, and I cannot come". Prior to each event in the lives of these boys, such as athletic contests, concerts, military drills, graduations from schools and colleges, the testator would indicate a desire and intention to attend, only to decline at the last minute "because your stepmother objects and I want to keep peace in the family". Both boys served overseas in the First World War. Testator promised to go to the boat to see them leave, but later withdrew his promise, saying that Mrs. Raynolds objected. When these boys returned from the war, although apprised of the date and hour of their return, he was not present at the dock to greet either of them. Only once in this long period did he accede to the wishes of either of his two oldest sons over the objection of their stepmother. That was on the occasion of the marriage of his son Harold in January, 1923, when he attended the wedding in spite of Mrs. Raynolds' objections.

In the matter of education, position and monetary benefits, Madeleine Taitt Raynolds was constantly attempting to improve the status of her own three sons to the discomfort and detriment of her stepchildren. This oppressive conduct included objections to the children's birthday and Christmas parties, objections to assistance by their father in the preparation of school lessons, failure to give them proper care and attention during illness, and refusals to allow them to accompany their father, stepmother and half-brothers for automobile rides. The three younger children were permitted a Christmas tree in their mother's room, but the two stepsons were neither permitted to participate in those festivities nor to have another tree of their own in the house. They were sent to their aunt's for their Christmas celebration. Nor were they ever permitted to have that equally important child's delight, a birthday party. This discrimination between the two sets of children continued throughout her lifetime.

In 1915, Harold inherited $100,000 from his mother and about 1920 he received an additional inheritance of $110,000 from his maternal grandmother, after which his stepmother required him to pay $100 per month for his room and board. Edward, likewise, received $100,000. from the estate of his mother and $110,000 from the estate of his maternal grandmother. After these two inheritances totaling $210,000 to each of the two first born, Mrs. Raynolds made frequent references to the wealth of both Harold and Edward, as contrasted with the position of her three sons. According to one witness, joking remarks would frequently be made by various members of the family concerning the amount of money Harold and Edward had. During the period of financial turbulence after World War I, Harold lost his entire fortune, although he had and still has the position of Manager of the Newark Branch of DeVoe & Raynolds Company, an important and substantial situation. Conditions were so unpleasant, even when Harold was a full grown man, that when he arrived home from South America, where he had been employed, ill with tropical fever, he received such poor treatment at his father's home that he was forced to move to the Cornell Club.

The testimony of Edward F. Raynolds as to the continuous course of prejudicial practices of Mrs. Raynolds is substantially similar to that of Harold. In addition thereto, Edward, more familiarly known as Teddy, states that he was employed in the DeVoe & Raynolds' Newark plant for one and a half years, without salary, because his stepmother objected to his being paid. At the expiration of that time and at his stepmother's suggestion he took a six months' trip to Europe. At the time of his father's death, Edward's fortune had considerably dwindled, nevertheless he still retained of his principal some $70,000.

The foregoing recital of facts is fully supported by appellant's proofs, which are not controverted. The appellees, proponents of the will and codicils, offered no proofs except the documents involved and the testimony of one witness, Richard T. Green, Esq., of the New York Bar, a man of unimpeachable reputation and integrity, with fifty years of experience as a practitioner, who testified concerning the execution of the...

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